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Calculating Corruption: Political Competition and Bribery under Authoritarianism
Noah Matthew Buckley
Why do some authoritarian regimes exhibit high levels of corruption, while others produce
very little? In this study, I show how corruption is used as a signal of performance and loyalty
in autocratic regimes. I find that elites in non-democratic regimes reduce corruption in the
face of political competitiveness. I test this theory using extensive micro-level data on the
public’s experiences with bribery in contemporary Russia. This data set is comprised of over
180,000 responses to public opinion surveys from 2001-2016 in Russia’s subnational units.
Identification of the causal effect of political competition on corruption is achieved with the
use of an exogenously-determined electoral calendar—I show how the scheduled end of a term
in office is an exogenous positive shock to political competition for authoritarian leaders in
Russian regions, a shock that decreases experienced bribery by over 13% in those years. A
wide array of alternative measures including novel search engine data and crime statistics
support my conclusions. I also show that governors’ tenuous hold on their positions—
all the more tenuous when in their final years of a term in office—can be bolstered by
additional resources that may be at their disposal. By showing how shocks to political
competition drive governors to reduce corruption levels for fear of losing their jobs, but
also that those shocks have varying effects for different governors, I illustrate the power
of a dissatisfied public and authoritarian formal rules to shape behavior in non-democratic
regimes. I also examine the linking assumption between public dissatisfaction and corruption
experiences. These findings have implications for our understanding of autocratic politics,
corruption, and studies of Russia. I show that corruption in authoritarian regimes is not a
byproduct of authoritarianism, nor is it merely a result of low capacity—it is also a means
of rule and control for autocrats. Modern authoritarian rulers are more discriminating in
their application of petty corruption than is commonly understood. Finally, I employ and
extend multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) to generate descriptive estimates
of corruption as experienced by the public with much greater accuracy and precision than
has been possible previously.
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1 | Introduction
The Eskimos have thirty words for
describing different kinds of snow, and
modern Russian has about the same
number of expressions to describe
giving a bribe to a state official.
—Viktor Pelevin
Since the taking of bribes first became illegal in the Russian Empire under Peter the Great
in 1715 to the arrest of Nikita Belykh, governor of Kirov oblast, in Russia in 2016, the fight
against corruption has been a motif in these Eurasian lands. Russia is no outlier, of course—
from Tammany Hall’s “walking around money” to Peruvian President Fujimori’s painstaking
bribery contracts,1 corruption often seems to be a unfortunate constant in modern society.
Officials’ greed for ill-gotten gains may be rather self-explanatory, but the reasons behind
the vast variation in how dominant it is over time and space remain unclear.
In this dissertation, I study authoritarian political competitiveness and how it explains
variation in petty corruption across subnational units of contemporary Russia. I find that
1See McMillan and Zoido 2004 for details on this fascinating look into systematic corruption. Echoes
can be found in documents uncovered in early 2016 regarding Ukrainian President Yanukovych’s
political party dealings.
1
governors reduce corruption in the last year of their scheduled term in office relative to
other years in office. Thus, the political competitiveness that is induced by the end of
a governor’s term in office yields lower levels of petty corruption. My findings show that
petty corruption is affected by authoritarian institutions and the incentives they generate for
regime actors—that corruption has a systematic, political component that has not heretofore
been sufficiently explored.2 Governors, as agents of the central autocrat, react to increased
political competitiveness in the last year of their terms in office by reducing corruption
levels. This helps them maintain the public’s satisfaction and quiescence, thus improving
the probability that the autocrat will choose to reappoint them.
By measuring petty corruption directly and linking levels of petty corruption to the
appointment calendars of Russian governors directly, I help build a more complete picture
of how institutions help keep authoritarian regimes stable. A wide array of accounts in
comparative politics and other fields elucidate the roles of authoritarian legislatures, parties,
welfare states, and coercive apparatuses in ensuring autocratic rule (Reuter and Robertson
2012; Magaloni 2006; Gandhi 2008; Blaydes 2010; Haber 2007). However, their considerable
utility is limited by their static, functionalist nature. In this study, I add to these litera-
tures by showing that formal, dynamic institutions like electoral and appointment calendars
drive changes in political competitiveness in authoritarian regimes. This competitiveness,
in concert with the public ‘bad’ of bribery, alters the calculus of principals and agents in
an authoritarian regime. As a result, I show how competitiveness and corruption link three
important components of the state and its stability.
2As discussed later, Keith Darden describes a compelling way that corruption can be systematic
in countries with low state capacity, but I describe a greater role for intra-regime incentives and
politics than he does (2008).
2
Three assumptions underlie my account of corruption’s role in authoritarian poli-
tics. First, corruption plays an important role in shaping the public’s attitudes towards the
regime. Everyday bribery is an extremely visible and undesirable public ‘good’ that can
easily harm the public’s perceptions of the government. Second, political competitiveness
increases regime agents’ concerns about job security in their tenuous-but-lucrative positions.
Finally, the aforementioned risk of public discontent and agents’ fear of losing their positions
are built into the autocrat’s calculus for staying in power. The autocrat’s ever-present need
to maintain control of sprawling social and political structures means that corruption can
be used as a way of monitoring the performance of his agents.
Why delve into the role of political incentives when explaining corruption variation
in authoritarian regimes? After all, a large body of research in many fields of social science
finds striking differences in corruption between democracies and autocracies (Adsera, Boix,
and Payne 2003; Olken 2005; Montinola and Jackman 2002; Olken and Barron 2007). We
know much less, however, about what is behind the variation in corruption within autocracies
(Dininio and Orttung 2004; Montinola and Jackman 2002; Duvanova 2007; Sharafutdinova
2012; Yadav and Mukherjee 2016). It remains largely unexplained why, in the absence of
democratic institutions, some autocratic states exhibit relatively little graft while others are
replete with it. This omission is all the more troubling since corruption is often so pervasive
in these non-democratic contexts (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).
We are scarcely further in understanding where corruption comes from in autocracies
despite scholars having devoted increasing attention to various types of autocratic rule and
to variation in policy outcomes under autocracy (Magaloni 2006; Gandhi and Przeworski
3
Figure 1.1: Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Corruption















































































Left figure shows cross-national data, with country average (1990-2012) Polity2 score on the x axis and
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index on the y axis. Right figure shows variation across
Russia’s subnational units, with Petrov-Titkov democracy score (for 2006) on the x axis and the region
random effect from a multilevel model on pooled (2001-2016) survey data.
2006; Frye, Reuter, and Szakonyi 2014; Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin 2009). As one can see
in Figure 1.1, there is substantial variation in levels of corruption even within authoritarian
regimes, both across countries and within one electoral authoritarian country, Russia. The
left panel of Figure 1.1 shows that cross-national variation in corruption, measured by the
Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), varies greatly even
between countries in the less-democratic half of the Polity2 scale. We can gain a clearer view
of this variation in the right panel, which shows a gulf in corruption experiences between
subnational units in Russia.
Beyond empirical investigation, there exists little theory for why a phenomenon like
4
petty corruption is found much more often in some authoritarian systems than in others.
In particular, many existing typologies of varieties of corruption (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny
1993; Rose-Ackerman 1999) are silent about the characteristics of the political system that
are driving this observed variation. Corruption is often taken to be a consequence of low
state capacity or lack of control over lower-level agents (Markus 2012). Empirical studies
(e.g. Adsera, Boix, and Payne 2003) generally only distinguish between democracies and
autocracies, or use coarse typologies of regime type (e.g. Chang and Golden 2010). Other
studies focus on specific mechanisms for control of corruption like the free media and politi-
cian accountability, which, while certainly important (and playing a role in my argument as
well), do not satisfactorily explain the wide variation in corruption prevalence that we see in
authoritarian countries.
Still other scholars offer assessments of political competition or selectorate size, tying
these to perceived corruption levels (Montinola and Jackman 2002) or to leaders’ time hori-
zons. In this telling, the shortening of leaders’ time horizons is likely to lead merely to a
‘roving bandit’ situation in which regime insiders simply steal all of the resources they can
before their time in power comes to an end (Olson 1993). The proposed solutions, then, cen-
ter around external constraints on leaders while they are in office rather than (or in addition
to) limiting their time horizons. These constraints may take the form of voter accountability
mechanisms or institutionalization of regime hierarchies. For example, ideologically-based
institutional constraints or dissemination of information about corruption have been shown
to restrain corruption in some forms and in some settings (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Hollyer
and Wantchekon 2012). And yet, these constraints are frequently highly context-dependent
and endogenous to political conditions.
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One notable shortcoming of such explanations is their functionalist nature. This
means that it is assumed that an institution is available and effective if an autocrat should
choose to introduce it. It is worth pointing out, however, that such availability and effec-
tiveness should not be taken for granted. What is more, reliance on the autocrat to desire to
and have the ability to construct a political party, functioning legislature, or anti-corruption
bureau introduces endogeneity to this relationship. This endogeneity is difficult to surmount
and calls into question our ability to assess the exogenous cause of changes to competition,
corruption, selectorate, or longevity in office. The approach employed in the present study
alleviates these concerns by introducing a plausibly-exogenous change in political competi-
tion.
So, while accountability mechanisms within non-democracies operate poorly or are
absent, we see some non-democracies suffering from extreme levels of petty and high-level
corruption alongside non-democracies that have managed to minimize corruption.3 Why is
that the case? In this study, I analyze a range of data from Russia to show that governors
reduce corruption when political competition is high—in the last year of their scheduled
term in office—in the hopes of increasing their chances being reappointed by the autocrat.
In doing so, I show that corruption is controlled by autocrats in a calculated way, since it
provides useful information about the performance of agents of the autocrat. I contribute
3This dissertation focuses on petty corruption. As discussed in Chapter 8, I believe that my theory
applies well to grand corruption in addition to petty corruption. One theoretical consideration and
one empirical consideration drive my focus on street-level corruption. First, petty corruption is
directly related to protest and public discontent—a dominant threat to autocratic regime stability.
Grand corruption is certainly the object of ‘sociotropic’ beliefs about leader quality, as explored
by Tucker and Klasnja (2013), but the path is less direct than with petty corruption. As concerns
empirics, naturally grand corruption is much more difficult to obtain reliable data on. Expert
surveys and public opinion surveys are likely to suffer bias and measurement problems.
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to our understanding of corruption under authoritarianism and to study of the institutions
underlying autocracy by showing how political competition incentivizes governors to reduce
corruption in autocratic regimes at the subnational level. I test my theory with extensive
new micro-level data and an exogenous appointment calendar.4 When political competition
rises, as at the end of governors’ terms in office, agents limit corruption for fear of not being
reappointed by the autocrat. In other years, governors can use petty corruption rents to
provide benefits for their allies within the state.
The research design I employ in this study allows me to exploit variation across the
more than 80 regions of Putin-era Russia from 2001 to 2016 in exploring the determinants
of authoritarian petty corruption.5 Using extensive micro-level data on personal experiences
with bribery, this project focuses on corruption as the public encounters it every day. I ad-
dress concerns of social desirability bias in several ways, including by incorporating evidence
from list experiments. By examining variation in the corruption employed by these ‘petite
autocrats’ across Putin’s Russia, I am also able to hold constant legal system and national
political factors.6 Survey data from 16 surveys over a nearly 15-year period allows me to
build a comprehensive picture of how political competition drives down levels of corruption
4A small portion of this period of study featured direct elections of governors, another portion—
appointment by the president, and yet a third—‘managed’ elections approximating appointments.
The dominant dynamic in my theory and data is on appointment of Russian governors.
5The regions of Russia, also called subnational units or ‘federal subjects,’ gradually decreased in
the 2000s with the merger of several regions. The list of de facto regions expanded in 2014 with
the addition of Crimea and Sevastopol, neither of which are included in any analysis in this study
due to data unavailability.
6I will generally refer to the leaders of regional executives in Russia as governors, though their exact
titles vary. More abstractly, I may refer to them as ‘petite autocrats’ or ‘agents of the autocrat.’
I also generally refer to these individuals using masculine pronouns, since the vast majority of
Russian governors (and, indeed, of authoritarian leaders throughout the world) are male.
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in non-democracies.
The argument outlined in this dissertation breaks with existing accounts that empha-
size types of institutions that decrease corruption. Without a doubt, democratic institutions
that create strong ties of accountability between the prey—the public, business—and poten-
tial predators—officials working in the state—rein in those actors and reduce the venality
they can exhibit (Ferraz and Finan 2011; Montinola and Jackman 2002; see also Frye and
Shleifer 1996 on the grabbing hand of the state). So too will a professional, tightly-controlled
bureaucracy be more effective at eliminating graft than a politicized or low-capacity one
(Rose-Ackerman 1999). I argue, however, that the fact that corruption, working via the
public’s negative reactions, can help describe the job performance of regime actors means
that even when democratic institutions are absent and capacity is held constant, authoritar-
ian regime features will limit corruption in some contexts much more than in others.
A further contribution of this study is the introduction of plausibly-exogenous varia-
tion in the institutions incentivizing officials to engage or abstain from corruption. The plau-
sibly exogenous variation in political competition in this study is generated by the scheduled
ends of terms in office of governors of Russian regions. Since the calendar governing these
terms in office was exogenously determined in the 1990s, there is no concern that corruption
levels may influence political competition as it is defined here. This, along with multilevel
regressions that incorporate a bevy of region-year covariates, allows me to causally identify
the effect of competition on bribery much more confidently than has previously been feasi-
ble. I find that when governors are facing the end of their term, they must mobilize electoral
machines, fend off elite competition, and generally please their principal back in Moscow.
Corruption decreases in these regions as a result—by over 13% in a single year, and even
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more in already uncompetitive regions.
In addition to describing the effects of plausibly-exogenous rules on corruption, I
move beyond descriptions of corruption variation that focus on governance outcomes. I
demonstrate that political competition decreases corruption even in authoritarian contexts
where the traditional drivers of good governance such as accountability and a free press
are absent or weak. Corruption offers authoritarian leaders a convenient way to motivate
and control the state without giving officials a dangerous amount of autonomy and while
keeping them complicit in regime politics. However, petite autocrats (in this case, governors
of Russian regions) constrain their own corruption when their grasp on politics is weak.
Faced with a competitive arena and the attendant possibility of losing his power, a risk-
averse petite autocrat has strong motivations to sacrifice the use of corruption as a political
lever. An important implication of my findings is that corruption and the public’s discontent
over corruption levels are used by the autocrat as information about governor performance.
Authoritarian regimes are generally quite information-poor (Magaloni 2006), but the role
that corruption can play in informing the central autocrat about the performance and loyalty
of his agents has been neglected in previous accounts of authoritarian politics.
In Russia, a competitive authoritarian regime that has been undergoing gradual cen-
tralization of power since Putin took office in 2000, regional governors have had varying
amounts of success at building stable, effective electoral machines (Reuter and Robertson
2012). My theory demonstrates why, when governors act as effective regime agents by keeping
stable control over their regions, Putin has been willing to allow corruption—spoils to keep
those governors happy and co-opted. Governors in autocracies like Russia face a dilemma
with regards to their job security. They are compelled to use petty corruption to reward
9
themselves and their supporters within the regime, but excessively high levels of corruption
may provoke the anger of the president, who will be less likely to reappoint them to office.
So the deleterious effects of corruption on a governor’s popularity or on the restiveness of
the regional public makes it less likely that the governor will be reappointed. Governors are
acutely aware of this dilemma, and so they react to times of high political competitiveness—
times when they are most likely to be removed from office by the autocrat—by reducing
corruption levels. The final year of their scheduled term in office is when scrutiny by the
president is highest. It is in these years that political competition is most worrying to gov-
ernors, so it is then that they are strongly incentivized to reduce corruption in the hopes of
keeping their jobs.
This research contributes to the study of comparative politics more broadly by show-
ing how authoritarian institutions and formal rules affect a prominent ‘public bad’—corruption
(Hollyer and Wantchekon 2012; Polishchuk and Syunyaev 2015; Markus 2012; Yadav and
Mukherjee 2016). I show that corruption is both a highly useful carrot and a stick in many
authoritarian regimes, but that ultimately its use by autocratic actors like Russia’s governors
is constrained by regime exigencies and competitive threats. Such threats notably include
changes to competitiveness driven by an often-overlooked formal institution—the political
calendar. This plausibly-exogenous institution is not determined by the autocrat himself, so
gives a view into how institutions under autocracy affect outcomes. What is more, it does
so while avoiding the functionalist aspect of many arguments about, for example, authori-
tarian legislatures and parties, which are often highly endogenous and make causal inference
difficult.
This study also contributes to literatures on corruption by advancing measurement:
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I present large, over-time survey measures of experienced corruption, as well as list experi-
ments and multilevel regressions (Treisman 2007; Rose and Mishler 2010).7 A survey-based,
micro-level foundation allows me to assess corruption with more precision and more breadth
than what is allowed by subjective or observational measures. The multilevel model re-
search design within one country, combined with a plausibly exogenous measure of political
competition—the shock to the probability of losing office that is associated with the last year
of a governor’s term in office—allows me to hold constant and control for a large number
of possible sources of heterogeneity. In addition to conducting inference, I also contribute
methodologically to the measurement of corruption by introducing a descriptive, predictive
method. Multilevel modeling with poststratification (MRP) allows for more precise estima-
tion of aggregate experienced petty corruption levels, including estimation at subnational and
other group levels not usually feasible, than do traditional survey or perceptions techniques.
Finally, I contribute to studies of modern Russian politics and patterns of corruption
in post-Soviet Russia (Dininio and Orttung 2012; Holmes 2012; Libman and Obydenkova
2015; Reisinger, Zaloznaya, and Claypool n.d.; Sharafutdinova 2010). I show that, even in
the face of the centralized ‘vertical of power’ constructed under President Putin, political
competition and other regional political conditions drive substantial variation in corruption
across Russia. Corruption in Russia is not merely the byproduct of venal, freelancing bu-
reaucrats out for as much as they can steal. Nor is it the result of a uniformly weak state
that may wish to rein in those bureaucrats but is unable to. Rather, political incentives
and regime stability drive the behavior of autocrat and governor alike, who target a level
of corruption that threads the needle of allowing them to enrich themselves and their sup-
7Measurement of corruption using surveys and observational data is fully explored in Chapter 3.
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porters without ‘overgrazing’ a public that is wary of being taken advantage of. This helps
us understand many of the dynamics we observe in Russia today: replacement of governors
and other officials for abuse of office; the roles of performance and loyalty in uncovering how
Putin judges his ‘viziers’; and how the Putin regime has reacted to public discontent such
as was observed nation-wide in the so-called ‘snow revolution’ of 2011 and 2012.
This study joins a number of existing studies that test theories of authoritarian politics
at the subnational level (see, for example, Reuter and Robertson 2012, Sharafutdinova 2010,
and Reuter and Buckley 2015 on Russia, Zhang et al. 2004 on China). By examining
variation across the Russian Federation’s constituent regions, I take advantage of a common
legal-institutional framework, holding constant national-level political and economic trends,
language, culture, and legacies of communism, while making full use of the variation in the
political competition in regional political regimes. I also examine an understudied dimension
of political corruption—petty bribery as experienced by the general public.8 Petty corruption
is no less important than ‘grand’ corruption or corruption among economic actors but receives
relatively little attention. After all, it touches the public directly, a public that is transformed
into a mere source of rent extraction for a venal government apparatus. Petty bribery lends
itself to measurement more readily than grand corruption, which, combined with the fact
that grand and petty corruption are often highly correlated, makes learning about petty
corruption a powerful way to learn about grand corruption as well.
8Relatively little research uses individual-level data on corruption. In a recent working paper,
Reisinger, Zaloznaya, and Claypool (2016) focus on the effects of small-scale corruption on support
for the regime. They find that having experienced petty bribery lowers individuals’ opinion of the
regime’s performance and thereby degrades their support for the regime. Others exploit micro-level
evidence of firms’ experiences with informal payments.
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1.1 Defining Corruption
In this thesis, I generally define corruption quite simply—as small bribes given by citizens
to state officials. This fits with a common definition of corruption, described by Shleifer and
Vishny as “the sale by government officials of government property for personal gain” (1993).
I restrict this study to monetary exchanges between private citizens and officials in order
to focus on the reason that corruption and political competition can pose such a threat to
autocrats: a public that experiences excessive corruption can easily become so unhappy with
the regime that they take to the streets or otherwise abandon the acquiescence required of
them.
I understand corruption differently from many studies focusing on grand corruption,
as the petty corruption in this dissertation can reach down through all levels of the state
from street-level officials up to high-ranking officials who benefit from ‘bundled’ petty bribes.
Certainly this snapshot of one type of corruption somewhat limits the scope of the argument.
It could be that, with another type of corruption such as grand corruption, bribe-givers are
so invested in the regime that they enter into principal-agent relationships directly—no
longer merely victims of extortion, but participants in state capture (Frye and Shleifer 1996;
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2003). This is not the case with petty corruption, where there
is no sense in which bribe-givers receive benefits or a stake in politics. Political competition
could also have different effects on grand corruption than the amelioratory effect on petty
corruption I describe here. For example, political competition might prompt the autocrat
to pursue a few titanic sources of rents in place of street-level bribes, thus increasing grand
corruption while reducing the petty. This too is beyond the scope of this study. I believe the
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theory and argument laid out in the following chapters transfers exceedingly well to other
contexts and, indeed, other types of corruption, but testing of these propositions must await
further research.
1.2 Why Study Petty Corruption?
Why focus on corruption, and why on petty bribery in particular? Petty corruption is both
positively and normatively important. Average citizens have dealings with the state in only a
circumscribed set of ways. The identity, motivations, and behaviors of the state actors they
interact with vary accordingly, as does the distribution of ‘benefits’ from the relationship. For
the most part, these interactions are with low-level bureaucrats.9 Everyday life may bring
citizens in contact with the police, with postal workers, and with the functionaries who issue
the documents that keep modern bureaucratic societies ticking. All of these low-level state
actors are in their own way bureaucrats, working as they are within hierarchical, rationalized
structures of authority and control. I primarily focus here on the stereotypical final variety
of state bureaucrat—the license-issuer, the stamp-wielder, the permission-giver.10
Far from being truly petty, petty corruption is a relatively neglected phenomenon
9In this project, I conceptualize ‘bribery’ as extortive corruption. Here, as opposed to with what
might be termed ‘collusive’ bribery, the official is exerting power over the bribing individual, ex-
tracting private rents under cover of his role as representative of the state. Most petty corruption
in Russia is of this type—a small payment that is effectively required to get mundane tasks done.
Future work will explore this distinction, especially in as far as it is related to larger bribes from
firms or bribes given by very wealthy individuals who may be paying for a service that is only
possible via shady proceedings.
10That this role overlaps substantially with the regulatory barriers faced by economic actors (firms)
is also useful in this project, though I do not engage deeply with firm corruption in the present
form of this study. See Frye 2004 and Frye and Shleifer 1996 for a look at factors that affect the
stability of firms’ property rights vis-a-vis the state.
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that deserves closer scrutiny for several reasons. First and foremost, petty corruption is the
corruption that the public experiences and suffers from every day. Such bribery—unlike
grand corruption—persists in the public consciousness whether or not the press or civil
society organizations are at work bringing cases to light. As such, how (and how much)
the public experiences petty corruption can shape attitudes towards the regime, individual
political actors, or the political system in general (Harmel and Yeh 2011; Klasnja and Tucker
2013; Kostadinova 2009). As a sort of public ‘bad,’ It is an important yardstick by which
citizens can judge the work of the state and their political leaders.
Second, petty corruption is very likely to be highly correlated with grand corruption, a
phenomenon that is much harder to measure and with more diverse theoretical import (Rose-
Ackerman 1999; Jain 2001). So assessing variation in petty corruption across authoritarian
regime types can improve our grasp of the prevalence of corruption as a whole. Third,
petty corruption is intertwined with the broad operation of the state, bureaucracies, and
a where-the-tires-hit-the-road nexus of political regime, the state, and the public. This is
not necessarily the case with grand corruption. Large-scale bribery is largely the product of
shadowy recesses where money and political resources meet, recesses that exist to varying
degrees in any political system and can be taken advantage of by sufficiently unscrupulous
(and powerful) officials given any small opportunity. Petty corruption, in contrast, is derived
from the interactions of political regime type with both state apparatuses and with the mass
public. This is more visible and more pervasive.
It should not be forgotten that low-level bribery is normatively undesirable and of
real impact for the individuals giving and receiving the bribes.11 What is a rough estimate
11Barr Serra (2009) incisively points out that petty corruption is also harmful in that it hurts those
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of the aggregate volumes of corruption rents that are at work?12 Looking at the importance
of regime competitiveness in driving the prevalence of bribery, moving from a minimally
competitive to a maximally competitive regime, ceteris paribus and for a region of median
population (about 1,220,000 in 2010), we arrive at a figure of 88,705 excess bribes. This trans-
lates to—as a very approximate estimate and likely an understatement—an extra $8,631,014
in petty corruption in one region alone. These are large sums of money.
1.3 Why Russia?
While the theory that I develop and test in the following chapters of this study applies
to a wide variety of countries and contexts, Russia is an exceedingly valuable setting in
which to test it. Russia offers an ideal case for studying the effects of political competition
on corruption within authoritarianism for at least three reasons: it features high levels of
corruption with wide variation in its distribution, the subnational units of which the Russian
Federation is composed exhibit markedly different types of regimes and varying levels of
competitiveness, and yet, nevertheless, it is authoritarian through and through.
This project joins a large number of existing studies that test broadly-applicable
theories at the subnational level and at the subnational level in Russia in particular (see, for
example, Reuter and Robertson 2012, Sharafutdinova 2010, Reuter and Buckley 2015). By
who are too poor to pay the bribes that are demanded of them, thus generating a perverse sort
of wealth inequality and pseudo-institutionalized state discrimination.
12Estimating the average monetary value of a bribe is, of course, very difficult. For one first glance, I
use Transparency International/INDEM’s survey-based figure of RUR2780 from 2005, or approx-
imately $100. This is almost surely much lower than corresponding magnitudes in later years,
as the Russian economy grew substantially in this period. I explore this to a greater extent in
Chapter 3.
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examining variation across the Russian Federation’s constituent regions, I take advantage of a
common legal-institutional framework, constant national-level political and economic trends,
and consistency of survey data. I am able to hold all of these factors—language, culture,
formal institutions, legacies of communism—constant to a great extent, while making full
use of stark remaining variation in regional political regimes (see, for example, Figure 4.3
for a glimpse at the extent to which political competitiveness varies from region to region).
This dissertation also joins a bevy of studies addressing corruption in Russia and
the Soviet Union in a wide array of time periods and employing diverse theoretical and
empirical approaches. Valuable contributions include studies by Holmes (2006, 2006), who
provides broad, encompassing discussions of the phenomenon and its dynamics, work by
Libman and coauthors (Libman and Obydenkova 2013, 2015; Libman and Kozlov 2013) and
methodologically-advanced research from Reisinger and coauthors (Reisinger, Zaloznaya,
and Claypool n.d.), and many others. Ledeneva (1998, 2006) describes how corruption
and related phenomena such as ‘blat’ (roughly speaking, connections) are used to build a
coherent, stable system of non-democratic governance.
An empirical focus on one country, as this dissertation focuses on Russia, offers a num-
ber of advantages over cross-national approaches. First, it allows the research to hold broad
historical legacies, political regime and rule, economic development, language and culture,
and many other features constant—features which are doubtless highly endogenous to cor-
ruption and competition. One needs not worry about how to equivalently translate ‘bribe’
into various languages or how a corruption scandal linked to one national leader but not
another may skew survey responses. Second, a subnational focus improves the consistency
and availability of data, most of which can come from a constant source (one polling firm or
17
the national statistics bureau, for example) no matter the region. Finally, careful quantita-
tive data collection can be transparently and robustly tied to deep qualitative knowledge of
politics and society in one country. While there is much to be learned from comparing coun-
tries, a researcher must be certain to apply equivalent contextual cues and case knowledge
between countries that he or she may be more or less familiar with. Examining variation
within one country over time and across subnational units allays these concerns by zeroing
in on a common context.
1.4 Plan of the Dissertation
In the next chapter, I lay out a theory of how political competitiveness drives agents
in authoritarian regimes—in this case governors who are afraid of being punished by a
performance-conscious autocrat—to reduce the volume of bribes they extract from the pop-
ulation. I also describe how my argument contributes to existing theoretical and empirical
perspectives on corruption. In Chapter 3, I dive further into the empirical difficulties in-
herent in studying a topic like corruption while outlining my approach to the problem and
presenting the data sets I employ. My main empirical results are presented in Chapter 4.
I describe my research design and provide the results from regression analyses, including
supplementary tests of the robustness of my results. Chapter 5 builds on these results by
exploring the conditional effects that arise from my theory.
Moving beyond the relationship between political competitiveness and corruption lev-
els, in Chapter 6 I test a fundamental assumption of my theory: I show that the threat of
losing office due to public dissatisfaction is a valid underlying concern for Russian governors.
I do this by showing that even in an authoritarian regime where corruption is common, the
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public’s reactions to corruption experiences are negative and potentially consequential for
stability. A final extension using the corruption experiences data set is found in Chapter 7,
which uses multilevel regression and poststratification to improve measurement of bribery.
Chapter 8 concludes with discussion of theoretical, empirical, and policy-relevant implica-
tions of my findings.
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2 | Theory: Corruption and Autocratic
Stability
Я говорю всем открыто, что беру
взятки, но чем взятки? Борзыми
щенками. Это совсем иное дело.a
-Nikolai Gogol, Dead Souls
aI tell everyone openly, that I take
bribes, but bribes in what? In borzoi
puppies. That is an entirely different
thing.
Staying in office is a prime concern for any political leader—all the more so for leaders
who are not directly beholden to the public for their position. In this chapter, I present a
simple theoretical framework that connects autocrats, governors, and the public using po-
litical competitiveness and job performance. This forms the basis for empirical testing of
the theory—how competitiveness incentivizes leaders to reduce corruption in authoritarian
regimes—in subsequent chapters. My argument is based on the assumption that governors
maximize corruption rents conditional on remaining in power. One important way of staying
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in power is to keep sociopolitical instability low in end of term years when the autocrat as-
sesses their performance and replaces those whose efforts fall short. In other words, governors
seek to maximize the corruption rents they can collect. They are constrained, however, by
their need to maintain stability in their region. This stability is most at risk in end-of-term
years, when the president assesses the performance and effectiveness of his agents, replacing
those who fall short. It is this mechanism whereby governors ‘tailor’ corruption levels to
ensure that the autocrat reappoints them that forms the heart of my theory.
In years when governors’ fates are decided, governors reduce corruption to assuage
public discontent and ensure that positive signals about his popularity and good performance
reach the president. A stationary bandit, even one embedded in a competitive authoritarian
regime, is first and foremost a bandit—a collector of corruption rents. In this context, his
banditry is constrained by his principal. The central autocrat must not become so unhappy
with the amount of corruption that his agent is engaging in so as to replace him. This limits
the amount of corruption that the governor can safely engage in.1
1Similar dynamics should work in autocracies lacking these petite autocrats in the form of governors.
There, public protest or dissatisfaction could weaken the central autocrat in the same way that
it weakens Russian governors, only even more directly. In such cases the central autocrat cannot
pass blame to his agents and so will be held responsible for corruption. Election years will present
a focal point—a period of political competitiveness and contentiousness—for central autocrats just
as it does for Russia’s governors, a theme emphasized in a well-developed line of literature (Ross
2008, 2011; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Teorell and Hadenius 2007) and exemplified in cases such
as Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” in 2003. Where they are able (and it is very reasonable to see
President Shevardnadze in Georgia as lacking any of the capacity necessary), these autocrats will
have the same incentive to rein in corruption in election years.
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2.1 Existing Literature
What do we know from existing research about how corruption and political—especially
authoritarian—institutions are interrelated? Recent scholarship has greatly advanced our
understanding of the determinants of corruption. Perhaps the most prominent line of research
shows how democratic institutions are able to limit corruption (Ferraz and Finan 2008;
Dahlstrom et al. 2011; Dininio and Orttung 2004; Montinola and Jackman 2002; Olken
2005; Olken and Barron 2007; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Indeed, several prominent studies
include competition as an important variable affecting corruption prevalence (Chang and
Golden 2010; Nyblade and Reed 2008). This research often addresses variation in electoral
competition within democracies, or broadly compares how high political competition in
democracies decreases corruption while the low political competition found in autocracies
increases it (Bussell 2012; Dininio and Orttung 2004; Montinola and Jackman 2002; Ferraz
and Finan 2008).
Another long line of research discusses the ways in which electoral institutions and
formal institutions like presidentialism or proportional representation affect corruption (Pers-
son, Tabellini, and Trebbi 2003; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Brown, Touchton, and
Whitford 2011). I contribute to this literature by showing how such institutions can af-
fect corruption even in non-democracies. In doing so, I join a small but important body
of research that shows when and why public goods like low corruption may be provided
by non-democratic leaders (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011). Polishchuk and Syunyaev (2015)
provide a formal model and cross-national statistical evidence that the combination of elite
turnover and elite asset ownership in non-democracies can produce an effect wherein rulers
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work to maintain secure property rights even in the absence of democratic institutions. I
echo their findings using micro-level data within a single non-democratic country. Perhaps
surprisingly, this protection of property rights works not only at large scales of business
investment and other economic outcomes, but is also observed in the experiences of those
being ruled by those elites. This points to implications for how economic features like the
security of property rights have direct connection to political regime characteristics, support
for the regime, and life in the everyday public sphere.
Hollyer and Wantchekon (2012) give one explanation for why autocrats who are by
definition unaccountable to the public would create binding institutions to fight corruption:
anti-corruption institutions commit members of the regime to maintaining ideological in-
tegrity, rather than pursue narrow-minded patronage. This leaves unanswered questions
about regimes that lack strong ideological content or that are underinstitutionalized and
thus unable to enforce such commitments. I contribute to this vein of literature by focusing
on the importance of authoritarian institutions themselves as constraints on the autocrat.
What is more, a theory based on such institutional commitments assumes a greater level
of ideologically-founded public support than is found in many autocratic systems, such as
Russia’s. Hale and others argue against the notion that Putin’s Russia is driven by ideology
in the sense that Hollyer and Wantchekon assume (2015). And, no less significantly, the
theory presented by the authors would predict uniformly high levels of corruption in such
regimes – where ideological support for the regime is very low. But here again, this leaves
unexplained vast variation in observed corruption levels in such non-ideological autocratic
contexts.
An alternative view might be that competition is unimportant in autocracies, that,
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for example, as long as the public is not rising up to overthrow a failed autocrat or that a
coup is staved off through force, authoritarian leaders’ longevity in office is simply a matter
of power or party. Magaloni (2006) describes authoritarian regimes where public support
is purchased and elites are co-opted into stabilizing party institutions. The view I present
here, however, is of competition constraining autocrats. Corruption is not just a way to
build personal wealth or buy off judges, but also as a glue to keep the state politicized and
under control. Elite pluralism or times of uncertainty such as scheduled ends of terms in
office can jolt autocrats out of complaisance and limit how much they can rely on corruption
in their regimes.
The themes I explore here are also engaged with by a variety of existing research.
Gervasoni (2010) explains subnational regime type with fiscal inputs. Here, lack of political
competition in subnational units can be explained by the nature of federal taxation and
redistribution. Regions that exhibit ‘rentierism,’ analogous to the rentierism observed at the
national level when state income comes not from robust taxation but from rent flow, have
carte blanche to exploit their political power and limit dissent. Gervasoni does not directly
discuss corruption, noting only that in rentierist, low-competition regions “if...incumbents
can spend rents discretionally, they might use them to pay high salaries to many civil ser-
vants, award hefty procurement contracts, finance extensive clientelism, and dominate the
media advertising market, all of which decrease the incentive for social actors to oppose the
incumbent” (2010, 307). In this study I go beyond his focus on democracy by showing that
corruption and other features besides rentierism do explain when and how regimes “restrict
political competition and weaken institutional limitations on their power.” (Gervasoni 2010,
303). In this way I contribute to resource- and rent-based macro explanations of regime
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type: while this surely is important, this variation is not all top down but also about how
the state is built and controlled.
McMann (2014) makes a significant contribution to the study of corruption in post-
communist states. She argues, as I do, that accounts tying high levels of corruption to eco-
nomic inefficiency or low state capacity are dangerously incomplete. She offers a compelling
description of how a lack of market reforms in underdeveloped countries pushes the public to
use petty corruption out of desperation and lack of institutional alternatives. This is perhaps
intuitive for the Central Asian nations she considers. However, this cannot account for the
high levels of petty corruption—nor, especially, for the variation in petty corruption—found
in relatively developed Russia of the 2000s. Nor does her account engage deeply with po-
litical regime type or forms of authoritarianism. The framework she employs—supply and
demand for particularistic benefits—is useful in considering individual-level dynamics, but
Russian authoritarianism is in many ways different, more developed, and arguably more
‘generalizable’ than the form of authoritarianism she finds in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
I build a more general argument by capturing political competition as an important regime
characteristic and take advantage of exogenous variation and new measurement strategies.
In another important, recent contribution, Yadav and Mukherjee (2016) argue that
when businesses are able to join forces with oppositional elements within authoritarian insti-
tutions, they are able to lobby for and achieve low levels of corruption. I offer a contrasting
view that focuses on the ways that authoritarian institutions themselves shape corruption.
After all, business interests are only likely to receive traction within government when au-
tocratic leaders are in fact receptive to their input. In addition, low levels of political com-
petition in an authoritarian regime may limit the autonomy and ability to mobilize of small
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and medium-sized enterprises, such that their bargaining capacity is in fact endogenous to
deeper competitiveness. I build on the insight that businesses can take advantage of political
competition to reduce corruption (Yadav and Mukherjee 2016) by showing how members of
the political regime itself may be exogenously driven to limit graft and by bringing elements
of economic-based logic back to the sphere of regime politics and the public.
To be sure, the idea that corruption can be an important means in addition to an
end—indeed, that rents can be used as an incentivizing device for agents—is not new. Dar-
den (2008) stresses that high-level corruption can function as an informal institution that
can strengthen the state. In his account, such elite graft produces a poor foundation for
democracy but can build a reasonably Weberian, well-functioning state. By serving as a
substitute for professionalized state-building, corruption can actually increase overall state
capacity. However, this overlooks how regime politics plays a role in determining corruption
levels, and, at the same time, relies on low levels of state capacity that may be found in
contexts like Ukraine but that do not apply to cases like modern Russia. In competitive
authoritarian regimes, it is not just the broader state of employees and functionaries that
needs to be managed and controlled, but also the ruling elite within the political regime.
I extend the dynamics described by Darden (2008) by incorporating political competition,
explicitly showing how it varies within an authoritarian polity, and what effects it has on
corruption. Darden’s (2008) description of corruption as an institution in many ways echoes
Manion’s (2004) depiction of corruption in China as an informal political system. While
Manion focuses on the shared expectations of elites and masses that can stymie serious anti-
corruption efforts, my contribution shows how autocratic institutions affect the to engage in
anti-corruption fights in the first place.
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A full review of the voluminous literature on corruption in political science, economics,
public administration, and other fields is impossible to include here.2 Several prominent
studies include competition as an important variable affecting corruption prevalence (Chang
and Golden 2010). They often address variation in electoral competition in democracies or
the broad difference in the levels of political competition found in democracies, on the one
hand, and in autocracies, in the other (Bussell 2012; Dininio and Orttung 2004; Montinola
and Jackman 2002; Ferraz and Finan 2008). While this research frequently finds that the
chasm in political competitiveness and accountability mechanisms between democracies and
non-democracies plays a role in the differences in corruption prevalence that we also observe,
these studies also fall prey to issues with measurement and difficulties in adequately managing
cross-national variation of elites and masses.
In an important paper, Montinola and Jackman (2002) find a nonlinear relationship
between political competition (as measured by selectorate size) and perceptions of corruption.
They follow Rose-Ackerman (1978) in hypothesizing that competition between politicians or
between bureaucrats will generally lower state corruption levels. Drugov (2010) expands on
many of the ideas in the seminal paper by Shleifer and Vishny (1993) with a formal model
that compares the ‘monopoly regime’ in India with the ‘competition regime’ in Russia,
focusing on the ways that bureaucrat competition can affect the levels of bribery that firms
face.
In work focusing on autocracies (or comparing autocracies with democracies), various
mechanisms have been proposed to explain variation in perceived corruption levels. Do
2See, for example, reviews by Jain (2001), Lambsdorff (1999), or in Treisman (2000). Holmes (2012)
and Kupatadze (2015) offer some recent overviews of corruption phenomena in post-Soviet Russia.
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and Campante (2008) argue that, in autocracies, where the threat of revolution is real,
greater concentration of the population around the policy making city increases the autocrat’s
incentive to suppress corruption and otherwise improve governance. Duvanova (2007) shows
that—even in non-democracies with poor regulatory frameworks—firms may band together
in business associations in order to shield themselves from capricious and arbitrary state
extortion. A number of studies posit that regime time horizons are negatively associated with
corruption prevalence (Chang and Golden 2010; Campante et al. 2009; Gamboa-Cavazos et
al. 2007; Montinola and Jackman 2002; Sidorkin and Vorobyev 2015; also see Gandhi 2008
and Wright 2008).
Other research attributes corruption to the style of autocratic governance in a polity
(Zaloznaya 2014), organizational hierarchies (Osipian 2010), norms and beliefs “about both
the prevalence of corruption and the reliability of government as an enforcer of rules ostensi-
bly constraining official venality” (Manion 2004), press freedom (e.g. Dahlstrom et al. 2011)
or simply structural and state-based factors (Belousova et al. 2011; Dininio and Orttung
2004; Montinola and Jackman 2002). Finally, two studies find confirmation of the idea that
autocrats seek to adjust corruption levels to fit imminent political realities, generating some-
thing like political business cycles of corruption (Sidorkin and Vorobyev 2015; Mironov and
Zhuravskaya 2014).
2.2 Governors and Autocrats
I argue that governors constrain their own corruption in end-of-term years because they
know that corruption—and the public’s reaction to excessive corruption—is informative for
the central autocrat about how good of a job his agent-governors are doing at keeping their
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polities happy and stable. In addition, while corruption may not be the sole informational
signal3 about job performance, it is an important one for several reasons. It is a feature
that is salient to crucial actors on whose support any regime ultimately depends—firms, the
public, the media, and state agents. Just as importantly, corruption is nearly universally
reviled by each of those actors and is thus much more likely to provoke protest than other
notable ‘public bads’ such as dilapidated infrastructure. Corruption is fundamentally an
active, negative sign of illegal and unscrupulous behavior that cannot be explained away as
lack of effort.
The autocrat monitors the performance of governors, but this task is difficult given the
thousands other appointed officials—envoys, ministers, judges, police chiefs, generals—that
the president must monitor. In addition, the autocrat only views outcomes at the regional
level, not the governor’s effort. However, one way that the autocrat assesses performance is by
keeping tabs on corruption levels in governors’ jurisdictions. The assessments systems used by
the Presidential Administration have been widely reported (see, for example, Polishchuk 2003
in Forbes Russia4). While their exact contents are unverified and change over time, elements
like popularity of the governor, which is closely tracked with large public opinion surveys, and
indicators of social stability such as protest are prominent, ever-present components.Crime
statistics collected by his centralized monitoring apparatuses—the police, procuracy, and
3I use the term ‘signal’ somewhat informally. As discussed in other sections, autocrats can and do
monitor corruption, potentially directly and via public opinion. This, plus the very visible ‘signal’
of street protest, forms the informational content that tells the autocrat how well a governor is




intelligence services5—are available to measure cases of abuse of office, bribe-taking, and
even bribe-giving.6 Corruption also fits closely into the various measures of public opinion
and systems measuring the ‘effectiveness’ of regional governance used by federal officials.
So ‘police patrols’ in the guise of formal monitoring efforts are crucial to assessing the
performance and loyalty of a regime’s agents (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; see also Levi
1988). Bad press and outright public protest (which need not be in large numbers to be
effective) work as a final ‘fire alarm’ that can alert Moscow of egregious violations of agents’
implicit performance contracts.
A fundamental assumption underlying this theory is that, first and foremost, autocrats
are concerned with staying in office, especially ‘petite autocrats’ like Russia’s governors who
are appointed by a central autocrat. In order to remain in the central autocrat’s good favor,
these governors especially must maintain stability and regime coherence in their regions. If
corruption or other failings were to arouse protest or revolt among the public, their jobs could
be at risk. This is especially the case when appointment and election calendars generate
increased political competition and uncertainty. In these times such as ends of terms in
office, governors have incentive to reduce corruption in order to ensure that the public, and
therefore the central autocrat, is sufficiently satisfied with their job performance to leave
them at the helm.
So, as ‘petite autocrats,’ subnational leaders like Russia’s governors wish to remain
5These three structures, along with the military, compose the core of Russia’s ‘force structures.’
They are under central, federal control, such that their operations in Russia’s regions are the work
of appointees and directives from Moscow.
6These crimes are established in Articles 285, 290, and 291, respectively, of the Federal Criminal
Code of the Russian Federation.
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in power above all else—being in office gives them the opportunities they need to extract
wealth by operating as stationary bandits (see Olson 1993, Levi 1988). They function as
stationary bandits while at the same time they are embedded within a set of principal-
agent relationships: as agent of the central autocrat and as principal to their own officials
and bureaucrats. In a competitive authoritarian regime like that of Putin’s Russia, these
principal-agent links are relatively uninstitutionalized by partisan or formal institutional
structures.
While corruption is one of the main benefits that autocrats see from remaining in
office, it also entails risks for autocrats, especially petite autocrats who are held responsible
for local conditions. The foremost cost is the risk of public revolt in the face of overweening
graft. There exist countless examples from all variety of regimes where citizens take to the
streets to protest corruption in the political system, from the crowd that seized a police sta-
tion in Armenia in July 2016 to the reported 10% of the electorate that demanded the prime
minister’s ouster in Iceland in April 2016. For an autocratic leader, this is embarrassing, at
best, and can lead to a full-on uprising, at worst. Economic losses due to corruption are
important as well. For a ruler wishing to extract wealth from an economy, corruption can
be very costly if the inefficiencies it causes shrink the pie so far as to affect the ruler’s own
bottom line (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Olson 1993). At the same time, governors need a
certain amount of corruption rents in order to enrich themselves, and to co-opt their own
agents in the region into remaining loyal. Governing may require the use of corruption to
motivate and maintain the political machine that he needs.
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2.2.1 Unpopularity and Unrest
Governors, like other less-prominent appointed officials, are assessed by the central govern-
ment on their job performance. Among other aspects of their work, maintaining a good
reputation in the eyes of the mass public is of utmost importance—the regime relies on
quiescence and cooperation for stability and legitimacy. Petty corruption may reduce pop-
ularity, trust, and satisfaction with the authorities, as explored more deeply in Chapter 6.
Since the autocrat is more likely in end of term years to pay attention to how well governors
are performing at maintaining these the public mood, governors reduce petty corruption in
those years in order to keep their popularity levels up.
In addition to overall popularity of a governor, the most extreme manifestation of
unpopularity—active unrest—stands out as a ‘fire alarm’ that signals to the autocrat that
corruption has reached impermissible levels.7 The risk of protest and unrest in an authoritar-
ian regime is very real indeed, a theme which I explore empirically in Chapter 6. Established
and growing literatures in social mobilization and authoritarian stability show some of the
techniques that non-democratic regimes use to stave off protest (Lorentzen 2013; Polese and
Beachain 2011; Koesel and Bunce 2013; Reuter and Robertson 2015; Kricheli, Livne, and
Magaloni 2011). In some contexts, even simple dissatisfaction in the public can be enough
to prompt desperate action—anything to prevent revolutionary pressures.
Failures to keep discontent about corruption under control abound. In the so-called
7The concept of passive ‘fire alarms’ that can be used to monitor more cheaply than active ‘police
patrols’ is due to the work of McCubbins and Schwartz (1984). A case of fire alarms failing to serve
their purpose can be observed when public discontent suddenly—and subtly—reaches an unseen
threshold. Kuran describes this situation as one where preference falsification obscures true public
opinion, so discontent bursts onto the streets as protest or revolution (1991, 1997).
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Rose Revolution of 2003 in Russia’s next-door neighbor of Georgia, protest quickly and
unexpectedly brought tensions over an ineffectual regime to a boil (Kukhianidze 2009; Papava
2006). President Shevardnadze was forced to resign and a sort of populist revolution swept
Mikheil Saakashvili into power. In Russia, Robertson describes dynamics in Russia in the
Yeltsin and Putin eras that belie the importance of protest and efforts by the regime to bring
it to heel:
...[U]nder Putin the elite has become dramatically more cohesive, and regional
leaders have had strong incentives to try to prevent protest from taking place.
These incentives come from institutional changes made by the Putin adminis-
tration, from elite perceptions that Putin’s regime will be long-lived and from
changes in the economic environment. The apparent elite unity has meant that,
in the first Putin term in particular, levels of public protest have been very low
compared to the Yeltsin era. (Robertson 2010, p. 8)
Stability is under question in restive regions that—in any year of a governor’s term—
feature contentious or competitive politics. For example, regions with an already-strong civil
society, powerful contenders for power within the ruling party, or a populace particularly
beset by economic difficulties are likely to more quickly boil over. In these situations too, a
governor especially worries that his weak grip will lead to his being punished if the president
observes negative signals from public dissatisfaction or disarray in elite ranks. So while
competitiveness can come from a number of sources, including structural and social sources,
the effect of heightened competitiveness is the same, as it constitutes a threat to the job
security of the governor.
A governor in a high-competition context fears punishment by the central autocrat
very acutely. His response is to be careful, reducing corruption in order to keep the cen-
tral autocrat happy in this uncertain time of potential reckoning. High levels of political
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competition, such as that found at the end of a governor’s term in office, compel him to
fight corruption among his agent-officials. When competition is low, for example in ‘normal’
years when the central autocrat is not paying especial attention as long as corruption is not
glaringly beyond acceptable limits, the governor is relatively free to engage in corruption.
Of course, not all governors will be affected to the same degree by changes to the
competitiveness around them. Governors are less constrained—and thus are less compelled
to reduce corruption at the end of a term—when they have other resources available that can
be used to placate the public and ensure the president is satisfied with their work. Features
that ease the petite autocrat’s task of building and controlling a political machine will reduce
his need to use corruption in that role. So, conditional on the presence of such alternative
resources, an increase in political competition is not so threatening to the autocrat’s survival.
Here, the autocrat-governor is relatively secure in his ability to satisfy the central autocrat
with votes and stability, regardless of corruption.
What will ease the task of building and controlling a political machine? The presence
of natural resources offers a simple source of rents that can substitute for corruption in such
a way. Ethnic division—such as that found in many Russian ‘titular republics’ where the
governor is by law or tradition a representative of the local non-Russian ethnicity—may
also provide identity-based affinities and access to political networks that increase stability.
Other features such as having a larger state, greater state capacity, stability in state cadres
(i.e. low turnover), and simply a longer tenure in office will all similarly serve to improve
stability and lessen the impact of competition on corruption levels. These resources can
serve for governors as a bulwark against instability and insecurity in office. By providing
additional sources of power, wealth, or support bases, they assist the governor in placating
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a restive public and demonstrating competence to the autocrat.
Finally, petite autocrats in regions that have performed poorly in achieving regime
goals like high pro-regime voter turnout in the past will have a particularly difficult task, since
they face an even higher bar in terms of pleasing the president. The risk of ‘overgrazing’
by engaging in too much corruption looms large for these governors, so they tread even
more lightly than those who have performed well in the past. Competition should even
more substantially dampen corruption in these cases, since the risks of the governor being
punished are compounded. In other words, there are features8 of governors’ political contexts
and preexisting relationships with the autocrat and with the public that can mitigate or
exacerbate the harm that end-of-term political competition shocks do to those governors’
sense of how well they are doing at keeping the public happy.
2.3 Governors’ Levers
In order for changes in political competitiveness to affect not only governors’ calculus when
deciding how much corruption to engage in but also the amount of corruption that is actu-
ally generated on the ground, governors must have some ability to change corruption levels.
In other words, there must be the systematic, organized element to corruption that I posit
in this study.9 What levers do governors have to decrease corruption in their purviews
8These features are related to political competitiveness in that they may independently affect the
probability with which a governor is reappointed, but they are not the same as competitiveness.
Their relationship with competitiveness is likely complex and endogenous. Their relationship to
the effects of exogenous shocks to competitiveness, however, is much less so. I am concerned with
the latter, as it is difficult to disentangle the multiple possible causal arrows and overlapping
measurement concerns with regard to the former.
9To be sure, governors are unlikely to have total control over corruption levels—there is a component
of corruption that is random or determined by other, non-political factors. These other factors could
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when political competition spikes? In this dissertation, I assume simply that governors do
have the means to modify the behavior of their agents—the bureaucrats on the street who
are engaging in corruption on a day-to-day basis. In other words, I draw on a theoretical
assumption—supported by substantial qualitative and case evidence along with strong cor-
roborating evidence in Chapter 5—that in authoritarian regimes like modern Russia there
are myriad ways for regime actors to incentivize, disincentivize, and otherwise manage the
corruption that their agents engage in.
First, governors can give powerful signals to bureaucrats that corruption is to be cur-
tailed for a time. These signals could take the form of prominent arrests of a crooked official
or two. As the criminal justice system in authoritarian regimes is often quite politicized, lack-
ing real rule of law, it is quite trivial to find some insignificant low- or mid-level bureaucrats
to make an example of. Alternatively, governors can explicitly signal displeasure with cor-
ruption by beginning loud, public anti-corruption campaigns that promise to enact harsher
legal penalties for graft or employ extra prosecutorial effort. Publicly visible or merely inter-
nal to the bureaucratic apparatus, such signals can reach down through bureaucratic layers
to make the clear point that the brakes should be applied, if only temporarily.
Second, the very hierarchical nature of modern state apparatuses means that often
corruption is highly structured and deliberate. When ‘chains of corruption’ are used to co-
opt regime officials from street-level to the top, such as in scenarios where rents are funneled
upwards yet at every level an official takes a cut, the order to reduce corruption could
essentially be just that—an explicit order. This could be accompanied by assurances that
include things like state capacity or press freedom that have been proposed in previous research.
Nevertheless, the key to my argument is that a non-negligible amount of the petty corruption that
the everyday public can be changed by governors’ actions.
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corruption can increase in compensation after competitive times have ended. It could also
entail a shifting of resources, with the governor’s personal gain deemphasized for a time in
favor of others taking a larger cut of a smaller pie of corruption rents.
Finally, political competition intrinsically aligns the incentives of governors and many
lower-level officials. Bureaucrats too see that a dissatisfied public is likely to prompt punish-
ment of poor performers, so to ensure their own job and the job of the governor who employs
them, cleaning up one’s act is quite natural. Those bureaucrats whose fates are closely tied
to the governor’s fate, such as high-level political appointees who serve at the pleasure of the
governor, will therefore have an incentive to reduce corruption regardless of any actions the
governor may or may not take. Bureaucrats in the civil service, relatively more insulated
from gubernatorial control, may feel pressures from politicized chains of corruption or heed
signals about the need to reduce corruption more acutely than direct fears of losing their
jobs if the governor is replaced.10
2.4 What Is Political Competitiveness?
Political competitiveness for an autocratic leader is the probability (or risk) of being re-
placed.11 In authoritarian regimes without contested elections, appointment mechanisms
10This effect, alongside the others discussed here, will to some extent depend on bureaucrats’ insu-
lation from politics. More professionalized bureaucracies will be better able to buck the demands
of the governor, if in fact their positions depend on the governor’s assent. For the present research
this must remain in the background, assumed to be constant from region to region.
11This means that, in electoral authoritarian regimes, political competitiveness is largely—though
not completely—equivalent to electoral competitiveness, i.e. the risk of losing power to an electoral
challenger. Even in such regimes, though, the lack of true democratic electoral accountability
mechanisms means that there are other means by which a leader’s position can be threatened.
Replacement by coercive means or by a challenger within the dominant party, for example, remain
features of political competitiveness that lie outside of electoral competitiveness.
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dominate, meaning that the probability of being replaced in office is quite directly depen-
dent on the vicissitudes of the autocrat. Actors like governors in modern Russia implicitly
or explicitly assess the features that comprise political competitiveness in their milieu when
attempting to judge the probability that they will be removed from office.
Much of this underlying mechanism of political competitiveness and the risk of losing
office finds echoes in Hale’s descriptions of patronal politics and regime cycles (2015). While
here he discusses elections under hybrid authoritarianism, presidents, and term limits, none
of which are precisely the rules at work in the present dissertation, nevertheless the logic is
worth exploring at length:
Elections, especially when combined with expectations of succession, turn out to
be among the most important sources of regularity. ... [T]erm limits tend to
generate at least some uncertainty as to the president?s staying in office beyond
a certain point. Crucially, the uncertainty generated by term limits is likely to
rise in combination with other reasons people might expect a president to go.
Indeed, term limits facilitate the coordination of any suspicions appearing for
other reasons that the president might depart office but that do not involve a
concrete point in time at which the departure is expected (and expected to be
expected by others). They do this by providing a precise temporal focal point
around which dissatisfied networks can coordinate activity aimed at removing
the leader and by potentially opening up greater possibilities for themselves to
gain the top office one day. (Hale 2015, pp. 69-71)
As he emphasizes, one manifestation of political competitiveness is as important periods of
time which “serve as focal points around which elites coordinate their expectations as to
when precisely an unpopular, ill, aging, weary, or otherwise faltering president is most likely
(a) to leave office voluntarily, (b) to be most vulnerable to ouster by other elites, and/or
(c) to face other elites? attempts to oust him” (pg. 72). Beyond elections and term limits,
Reuter and Robertson note that “appointment events are a natural time for changes to be
made” (2012, p. 1028).
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What are the features of a political arena that contribute to competitiveness? First
is the presence of credible, strong challengers for office. In nearly every autocracy, and
certainly in modern Russia’s unconsolidated authoritarianism, an abundance of eager indi-
viduals seeking the power and wealth of a plum regime position may easily be found. The
greater the political resources of those potential challengers, the more easily political primacy
is contested.12 While, as noted, rarely in short supply, these challengers from either within
ruling party cadres or from opposition forces are often present in various measures due to
historical legacies. One way to either prevent their appearance or to limit the threat they
pose is to build a dominant political machine.
A strong political machine is one of the best tools available to an autocratic leader
for reducing competitiveness. Where a leader lacks such a machine—loyal, capable regime
agents, economic resources that can be used to co-opt, expertise in monitoring and man-
aging insiders—the political arena goes relatively undominated and competitiveness rears
its head.13 Useful in appointment and electoral circumstances, a political machine helps a
leader fight rivals and demonstrate good political performance.
Finally, political competition is shaped by institutions. As noted by numerous scholars
in the last decade or so, the presence and strength of institutions such as political parties,
legislatures, and civil society, as well as formal institutions like presidential or parliamentary
structure, term limits, and the electoral/appointment calendar all affect the probability of
12Potential means of eliminating such challengers include violent, coercive removal and co-optation,
as discussed by Haber (2006).
13A canonical example in modern Russia is the Republic of Tatarstan. First under Mintimer
Shaimiev and then under his protege Rustam Minnikhanov, Tatarstan has for decades been dom-
inated by a political machine both broad and deep.
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being replaced in office (Svolik 2012; Magaloni 2006; Gandhi 2008). Rather than being
mere window-dressing or symbols of legitimization, they contribute to regime durability by
providing mechanisms for the distribution of benefits to supporters and cooptable opposition
They can also serve as useful tools for regime stability by creating credible incentives or
disincentives to move up in regime ranks,14 constraining and channeling individuals’ political
aspirations into hierarchies, and by incentivizing or credibly committing elites to behave in
the regime’s interests (Magaloni 2006; Gehlbach and Keefer 2012). Finally, authoritarian
institutions can also have a perverse effect for regime stability, as when they focus attention
of elites and the public on particular turbulent times or on certain actors. Hale (2011)
and others have shown how elections, for example, can serve as focal points for protest
and even revolution. In this work, I show that neither the elections nor the appearance of
street protest are necessary parts of this equation: political competitiveness, conceived of as
simple scheduled ends of terms in office, can sufficiently impact public dissatisfaction with
the regime to prompt the regime to reduce corruption levels.
2.5 Attention and Monitoring
An important consideration is why actors in an autocracy—autocrat and governors alike—
reduce corruption only in times of high political competition, such as when the risk of losing
office is high. Why can they not foresee changes to competitiveness or decide to ‘play it safe’
all the time? And why would the autocrat not threaten his agents with severe punishment
all the time if he catches them performing poorly? I answer these questions by assuming that
14The modern Chinese system has been widely noted as being successfully structured by institutions
like party hierarchy and age limits (Shih, Adolph, and Liu 2012; Nathan 2003).
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a) corruption is too valuable for the governor and autocrat to limit too much and b) both
the autocrat and the public have limited attention or ability to monitor the performance of
governors.
I assume that corruption is a crucial ‘grease’ that helps authoritarian regimes function
smoothly. It serves as a highly effective motivating tool for regime insiders, and a means
of co-optation, leverage, and blackmail. Governors in particular are exceedingly interested
in private enrichment, especially in a system where political power and economic power are
very concentrated, as in many authoritarian states. They know that eliminating corruption
is neither possible nor desirable, as it would rob them of much of their own power. This
feeds into the dilemma facing governors in corrupt, authoritarian regimes. Going ‘clean’
is manifestly not an option, on the one hand, but nor can they cross the line into full
kleptocracy15 for risk of displeasing the public and autocrat.
Attention and monitoring capability are also in short supply, all the more so the
larger the country ruled by the autocrat is. I assume that autocrat and public alike must
ration their attention to indicators of performance that are visible and salient, that times
of high political competitiveness also serve as focal points for attention, and that autocrats
are indeed able to monitor public satisfaction and thus the performance of their agents. The
president of any modern country of reasonable size, especially one with a relatively plural,
complex federal-authoritarian regime like Russia’s, has myriad issues constantly competing
15At least, they cannot cross the line into full kleptocracy when it comes to petty corruption that
directly affects the public. That can only be done with the support of a very strong repressive
apparatus that can ensure that the populace is sufficiently cowed. Such strong, coercive regimes
are beyond the scope of this study, which is concerned with hybrid, competitive, unconsolidated,
and non-totalitarian autocracies. See also Levi 1988.
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for his attention.16 The president maintains what often amounts to direct control over
appointments of regional governors, super-regional presidential envoys, prosecutor generals,
judicial positions, heads of police, military and security service posts, federal ministries, party
leaders, and the over 1,500 employees of the presidential administration’s 18 departments.
This is in addition to state-run media, foreign affairs, defense, budgetary difficulties and all
other day-to-day decision making that weighs heavily on the leader of a quite personalized
regime. Governors are simply one set of cogs in regime machinery, cogs which cannot occupy
the autocrat’s constant attention. Thus, governors are particularly aware that an overworked
autocrat, likely pushed towards micro-managing affairs as Putin increasingly appears to be
and many insecure autocrats are, turns his judging gaze towards them only when important
decisions are to be made.17 Final years of governors’ terms in office are prominent among
those times.
16Note that delegation of this attention and authority to ‘viziers’ may temporarily alleviate the
problem, but is no solution. As witnessed by President Putin’s efforts since 2000—seemingly
accelerating after 2011 with appointment of personal bodyguards to political positions, creation
of a ‘praetorian guard’ in the National Guard in 2016, and frequent reports of isolation bordering
on paranoia—the loyalty of such viziers is always under question. See Egorov and Sonin (2011)
for insightful elucidation of such dynamics.
17A recent journalistic account by well-regarded news outlet RBK describes in general terms Putin’s
presidential administration has a staff hierarchy of officials working on ‘the regions’ and domes-
tic politics. These officials are tasked with collecting and distilling information for delivery to
the Kremlin. In fact, until recent changes under new First Vice-Head of the Presidential Ad-
ministration Kirienko (a post that oversees domestic politics within the administration), there
was a specific administration official in charge of managing regional elections and bringing im-
portant governorships to the president’s attention. http://www.rbc.ru/politics/02/12/2016/
58413ca89a79478f86bc097a?from=main (in Russian)
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2.6 Selection Mechanisms in Russia
As the data in this study covers the years 2001 through 2016, it encompasses three periods
of gubernatorial selection in Russia. In the first period, through 2004, governors were elected
by the public. Beginning in 2005, the electoral system was replaced with an appointment
scheme, wherein President Putin (and later President Medvedev) selected and appointed
regional governors by hand. President Medvedev returned direct election of governors in
2012, albeit with very close control over candidacies by central authorities. In my theory,
the mechanism by which political competition depresses corruption is through the central
autocrat—his decisions about who to appoint and re-appoint. As such, I predict a strong
effect in the second and third periods.18
While my theory does not explicitly predict how political competition will affect cor-
ruption when governors are elected (i.e., in the first period), I expect a similar effect for
two reasons. First, to the extent that these elections are free and fair, the accountabil-
ity mechanisms driving lower levels of corruption in democracies than in non-democracies
cross-nationally should produce the same effects here (Dahlstrom et al. 2011; Montinola and
Jackman 2002; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Chang and Golden 2010). In such cases, political
competition may work much as it does in democracies, perhaps with significant manipulation
of election outcomes (and thus dampening of accountability’s effect) in the regime’s favor.
Second, to the extent that these elections are not free and fair, conducted as they are in a
regime that is rapidly advancing its control over politics using a dominant party and other
18In the third, pseudo-electoral, period the selection of candidates is so highly controlled that, along
with the dominance of the United Russia party, the effect is more one of appointment than true
election.
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methods (Reddaway and Orttung 2005), the regime’s support for regional candidates for
governor could give the president an element of control analogous to that of direct appoint-
ment. Here, then, authoritarian elections may produce dynamics broadly similar to those
under authoritarian appointment schemes.
I further assume that the central autocrat is concerned with the stability of the
regime that he heads. To maintain stability (and thus maintain power) he must evaluate
the performance of his agents—in this case, the governors who have substantial power over
Russia’s far-flung federalized government. He always has the de facto ability to replace
underperforming governors who, for example, are so dirty that they present a risk of social
protest. But in as complex a system as Russia’s, and as the personalization of decision making
has been seen to grow of late, end of term years are critical focal points. Formal institutions
like the electoral calendars establishing petite autocrats’ terms in office exogenously introduce
an element of competitiveness—a friction that heightens the importance of seeking out and,
if necessary, punishing poor performance.
The central autocrat (in the case of Russia, the president) is most likely to punish
underperforming governors at the end of their terms in office, so it is these years when
governors feel the most pressure to reduce corruption. This focus on end-of-term years arises
from two self-reinforcing assumptions. First, the task of monitoring all of Russia’s more
than 80 regions, each comprising its own complex political arena, is onerous. Monitoring
may proceed apace at all times, but the autocrat’s limited attention is drawn to critical
moments like the scheduled end of a term in office. What is more, actively reappointing an
extremely corrupt governor may dangerously redound on the autocrat—an unhappy public
could blame the autocrat himself for supporting a governor they know to be poor-performing.
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No such active role needs to be taken in non-end-of-term years, so the autocrat may pay
less mind in these times and, in turn, governors feel relatively unconstrained to engage
in corruption. This points to the second reason for a strong focus on end-of-term years.
Replacing a governor outside of the established electoral/appointment calendar is a drastic
move. While Russian presidents do this from time to time,19 it may seem desperate or not
in-control. Rather than provoke the very instability that the autocrat seeks to avoid, in all
but the most egregious cases, prudence should dictate patience until normal ‘cadre rotation’
can be invoked at the end of a term in office.
2.7 Empirical Implications and Scope Conditions
In sum, if political competition rises, such as when a petite autocrat enters the last year of his
scheduled term in office, then he will have incentive to reduce corruption. Knowing that his
performance—in particular, his ability to keep the public in his purview sufficiently satisfied
with his and the regime’s rule—is monitored closely by the autocrat in these competitive
times, he is incentivized to reduce petty corruption levels. While petty corruption rents
are important for co-opting his supporters, the risk of angering the public and thereby
the autocrat is too great in these times when attention is turned to his office-holding. If
the governor has additional resources available, for example alternative sources of rents or a
well-established political machine, then political competition will have a smaller incentivizing
effect on him to reduce corruption than it would in the absence of those resources. Petite
autocrats in precarious political positions will be strongly concerned about staying in office
19Most recently, President Putin abruptly replaced several governors in the summer of 2016, in what
was widely seen as a rather shocking ‘shake-up.’
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and so will have incentive to reduce corruption even more than those in strong positions.
The theory of competition and corruption developed in this dissertation intends to
encompass a wide variety of authoritarian regimes and varieties of corruption. In the fol-
lowing chapters, I test the theory on the Russian case over a period of time and spectrum
of subnational regimes that captures much of this variation. Nevertheless, it is important
to explicate scope conditions of the theory as it may apply to other countries and contexts.
Three dimensions of autocracies are of particular note: institutionalization, the formal insti-
tutions governing regime structure and agent selection, and state capacity. I consider each
in turn.
One important possible limitation of this theory is in that authoritarian regimes where
autocratic control is very heavily consolidated—institutionalized through single-party rule,
for example—corruption may fall far to the wayside in the set of signals a regime can use to
judge performance and loyalty. The more institutionalized or cowed are agents in a regime,
the greater the variety (or veracity) of signals may be available. What is more, engaging in
petty, street-level corruption may become so costly to any actor that it is foregone altogether.
In such institutionalized regimes, it may be that important offices in the regime hierarchy are
governed more systematically than in countries like Russia. Similarly, petty corruption may
be supplanted by grand corruption—lucrative deals made between high-powered political
and economic actors.
Two additional sets of formal institutions may join the appointment calendar (which I
conceive of in this dissertation as a prime manifestation of political competitiveness) to shape
incentives for engaging in corruption. First, the presence or absence of political federalism
(and possibly fiscal federalism, see Gervasoni 2009) can bring mid-level regime agents akin to
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Russia’s governors under greater or lesser control by the central autocrat. If agents have little
power to engage in corruption in the first place or have few levers of control over bureaucrats
in their realm, then political competition is unlikely to affect their behavior in the way that
I argue that it does in this dissertation. Second, at the more ‘democratic’ end of the hybrid
authoritarian regime spectrum, if these regime agents are selected through elections that
are reasonably contested, then the role of petty corruption becomes more complex. Here,
competing incentives such as a stronger need for resources to defeat electoral challengers
and the availability of information inputs into voter accountability mechanisms (Ferraz and
Finan 2008) make the links between the public, the autocrat, and governors—provided by
petty corruption in my theory—much more difficult to assess.
Finally, while I argue in this study that corruption in authoritarian regimes depends
on political conditions in addition to resulting from lack of robust state capacity, there is no
doubt that state capacity can play an important role in determining corruption levels. In
regimes where capacity is very low, the ways that political competitiveness shapes regime
actors’ incentives for engaging in corruption are likely to become irrelevant. If there is no state
bureaucracy that can be governed by a governor, or if institutions are entirely unresponsive
to his efforts to reduce corruption, then the risk of losing office due to excessive corruption
levels becomes an unavoidable constant.
At another extreme of a spectrum explored empirically in Chapter 5, a regime with
readily available rents such as those coming from natural resources has another tool available
to co-opt actors into the regime. Here too, corruption, petty corruption especially, may
become simply unnecessary or the regime may be able to pay the costs associated with
overwhelming monitoring to suppress corruption across the board.
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3 | Measuring Corruption:
Experiences and Surveys
А няхай ты правалiся! —
Вось парадкi завялiся:
Дзе нi сунься, так i знай —
Ўсюды ў лапу дай ды дай...
-Belorussian folk song, 1922
A central challenge to studying corruption—in any form and in any time or place—is
measurement. By its very nature, corruption is illicit and shrouded in secrecy. It stands
quite singularly as a physical, two-party economic transaction—and, as I argue in this dis-
sertation, a politically-charged behavior—that is not measurable by typical means. One of
the contributions of the present research is to measure petty corruption both directly and
precisely by using individual-level survey experiences with corruption and advanced statisti-
cal techniques. In this chapter I describe the difficult task that has pervaded literatures on
corruption and also the data and approach I take to addressing these challenges.
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3.1 Existing Approaches
Some of the most prominent challenges in identifying the determinants of corruption are
empirical. Causal inference, measurement, data validity, and operationalization of the central
concept remain obstacles even as research on corruption has steadily advanced (Treisman
2000, 2007; Sharafutdinova 2012). For example, while some studies have pointed to political
competition, the presence of liberal democratic institutions, or more broadly regime type
as determinants of corruption, it is difficult to find exogenous sources of variation in these
features (Beazer 2015). Much existing literature on corruption also struggles with the validity
and operationalization of measures of corruption itself—too often corruption perceptions or
other crude proxies must carry a heavy empirical burden, while observational research is
severely hampered by data availability and weak validity (Treisman 2007; Olken 2009; Ferraz
and Finan 2007; Gehlbach 2009). In addition, what limited survey data on corruption we
have may be tainted by social desirability bias and vague conceptualizations of corruption
perceptions (Rose and Mishler 2010; Treisman 2007; Sharafutdinova 2012; Olken 2009).
Finally, the picture of corruption prevalence that we have is often a mere snapshot that fails
to capture the phenomenon’s evolution over time.
In recent years, scholars have increasingly begun to employ individual-level data about
corruption. Tucker and Klasnja (2013, 2016) present empirical and theoretical analyses of
pocketbook and sociotropic voting in reaction to corruption. Recent research by Sidorkin
and Vorobyov (2015) use micro-level data on firms’ experiences with corruption to show that
trends akin to business cycles can be found in the economic sphere. These works generally
address attitudes towards corruption as a phenomenon or other ‘types’ of corruption such
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as economic corruption. What they handsomely contribute in theoretical importance and
empirical rigor, they miss in capturing the realities of corruption exchanges and the roles
that these exchanges play in political dynamics involving regimes and the mass public.
In this study, I move beyond these limitations in some ways. By contributing new
measures of corruption and competition, I test the theory of authoritarian regime compet-
itiveness, organization, and petty corruption explored above using data on contemporary
sub-national Russia. I employ a large new dataset to show how authoritarian regime types
and low-level bribery are related in the real world. The quantity and quality of data I em-
ploy here represent a substantial advance in our ability to effectively identify the correlates
of petty corruption.
Existing efforts to measure corruption can generally be grouped into perceptions-
based, experience-based, and observational measures. Perceptions measures such as Trans-
parency International’s ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’ (CPI) are perhaps easiest to collect,
since they largely require polling experts and analysts about how corrupt they think a coun-
try or region is. The extent to which they are subject to various forms of measurement
error, endogeneity to assessments of other country characteristics, or bias in capturing dif-
ferent types of corruption is difficult to conclusively state, but remains a weakness of these
measures.
Observational measures, wherein researchers directly quantify the frequency or mag-
nitude of corruption, improve on perceptions in many ways. They are generally less subject
to bias and endogeneity. However, observational corruption measures suffer from at least two
prominent drawbacks: they are difficult to collect and are usually more limited in external
validity. This is because they require direct evidence of the occurrence of a phenomenon
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which is almost always illegal for all parties and which is engaged in behind closed doors.1
And when clever, powerful ways of solving this problem are produced by researchers, the
methodology often only applies to a specific context that may not generalize to other types
of corruption, other countries, or other sets of actors.
In this dissertation, I primarily take a direct, experiential, survey-based approach
to measuring corruption.2 This chapter describes the approach, the data, and how the
advantages and disadvantages of each fit my research into existing literatures that quantify
corruption.
3.2 My Data
Given the many difficulties with measuring and assessing corruption as it actually occurs,
taking the simplest approach—asking people about it—offers many advantages.3 Experts’
views of corruption may be colored or prejudiced in many ways. Going directly to the victims
of corruption can present a clearer picture than that provided by a small group of selected
1Two interesting examples underline the difficulty in obtaining peeks behind these closed doors
and also the value in doing so. Most prominently, Peruvian President Fujimori and his security
chief Montesinos give us a rare look at the explicit contracting often involved in grand corruption.
McMillan and Zoido (2004) give a fascinating look at the written contracts used by this regime,
showing also the importance of controlling the media with bribery if they cannot be brought to
heel in other ways. The recent discovery of a book detailing payments, some of them apparently
bribes, made by the Party of Regions of the former Ukrainian President Yanukovych to various
groups during his tenure promises to elucidate many details of corruption as it is used in that
post-Soviety state.
2Some novel, widely-applicable observational alternative measurement schemes are introduced and
incorporated in Section 4.4.
3These distinctions between perceived and experienced corruption, or between subjective mea-
sures and population survey-based measures of corruption are discussed by Treisman (2000, 2007),
Gehlbach (2009), Lee and Guven (2013), and Sharafutdinova (2010), among others.
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outsiders offering subjective opinions.4 Furthermore, as discussed later, corruption is likely
to encompass a greater variety of malfeasant behaviors when presented in a subjective way
to experts than it is in a carefully and concretely worded survey question.
To examine the determinants of low-level corruption as actually experienced by the
public, I employ a newly assembled dataset from thirteen large, representative public opinion
surveys. These surveys, outlined in Table 3.1 and described in detail in the appendix, all offer
data on respondents’ recent experiences with corruption from a public official.5 The FOM
GeoRating surveys in particular offer very large sample sizes and attempt to be representative
of each region’s population, giving great analytical purchase into the individual- and regional-
level factors affecting corruption experiences.
This data offers several notable advantages over existing measures of corruption. First
and foremost, these surveys offer a direct, survey-based measure of experienced corruption.
The dependent variable in all models in this study, unless otherwise noted, is a dichotomous
response to having experienced corruption (a request for a bribe) from a government official
in the last 1-2 years. A 1 indicates that the respondent did experience a request or demand
for a bribe, while a 0 indicates that he or she did not.
4One of the main potential drawbacks to this approach is that it relies on self-reporting of cor-
ruption experiences. The implications of this for sensitive question (social desirability) bias are
discussed at length in a later section. Measurement error due to poor recall, misunderstanding,
or survey firm error are constants in any research that employs survey data. Without minimizing
the potential harm from these concerns, I note that the direction and magnitude of bias is a priori
difficult to discern, that results appear very consistent across the many surveys in my data set, and
that measurement error should at least be no greater of a worry for survey data than for typical
perceptions-based or observational data.
5While the question wording does vary slightly from survey to survey, I do not expect any particular
bias to arise from this fact. I include survey fixed effects in all using these surveys and see only
cosmetic changes if they are excluded. Full details about the surveys and questions used are offered
in Appendix 10.1.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Survey Data
Year Survey Num Obs Num Regions
2001 INDEM 2,017 15
2002 FOM Penta 1,933 46
2002 INDEM 5,666 40
2003 FOM GeoRating 31,325 63
2005 Levada Courier 1,651 45
2005 INDEM 3,100 29
2006 Levada Courier 1,570 46
2006 Life in Transition 1,000 32
2007 Levada Courier 1,601 46
2008 FOM GeoRating 32,289 65
2010 FOM GeoRating 32,870 68
2010 Life in Transition 1,391 37
2011 FOM GeoRating 52,670 74
2012 Levada Courier 1,601 45
2013 Levada Courier 1,601 45
2016 Levada Courier 1,484 47
181,659
Note: FOM stands for Fond Obshchestvennogo Mnenia. Life in Transition Survey (LiTS)
conducted under the auspices of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment.
While none of the surveys included covers all of Russia’s regions, a core of approxi-
mately 20-40 of the most populous regions of Russia are very frequently included in this set
of surveys. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show the number of non-missing responses to the dependent-
variable survey question, tabulated by region and year while pooling across surveys.
Out of the 16 surveys in my data set, 11 were conducted by one of what might be
termed the ‘big three’ Russian public opinion polling firms: the Public Opinion Fund (FOM,
in Russian abbreviation), the Levada Center, and the Russian Public Opinion Research
Center (VTsIOM). The remaining 5 surveys were conducted on the behalf of NGO ‘INDEM’
or were part of the international ‘Life in Transition Survey’ (LiTS) project. The final survey,
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Table 3.2: Region-Year Sample Size (part 1 of 2)
Region 2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2016
Adygeja R 0 0 0 23 23 23 0 14 487 25 25 19
Aginskij-Burjatskij AO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Altaj R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Altajskij K 0 170 495 72 77 40 465 567 782 42 42 38
Amurskaja 0 141 0 40 0 0 481 493 788 0 0 0
Arhangel’skaja 0 141 477 79 43 23 480 508 772 21 21 11
Astrahanskaja 0 27 482 0 0 0 458 463 776 0 0 0
Bashkortostan R 0 171 464 111 31 35 480 523 794 34 34 31
Belgorodskaja 0 140 352 0 20 0 461 460 775 0 0 0
Brjanskaja 0 27 495 0 20 0 478 490 783 0 0 0
Burjatija R 0 0 472 99 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chechenskaja R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cheljabinskaja 0 169 485 110 35 35 450 522 771 35 35 34
Chukotskij AO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chuvashskaja R 40 0 496 24 22 22 492 522 796 20 20 20
Dagestan R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 492 30 30 22
Evenki 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Evrejskaja AO 0 0 498 0 0 0 488 497 494 0 0 0
Habarovskij K 20 139 460 82 31 32 478 506 756 34 34 34
Hakassija R 0 29 0 12 8 11 462 499 497 10 10 10
Hanty-Mansijskij AO 0 26 0 0 40 0 472 490 788 10 10 10
Ingushetija R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Irkutskaja 220 25 473 21 0 0 479 507 781 0 0 20
Ivanovskaja 0 0 493 65 0 0 493 522 793 0 0 0
Jamalo-Neneckij AO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 0 0 0
Jaroslavskaja 0 158 489 23 21 21 485 531 773 22 22 20
Kabardino-Balkarskaja R 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 469 0 0 9
Kaliningradskaja 0 0 489 25 46 26 448 500 745 24 24 34
Kalmykija R 0 0 489 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kaluzhskaja 139 0 488 153 52 37 497 514 773 0 33 0
Kamchatskij K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 446 463 0 0 0
Karachaevo-Cherkesskaja R 0 0 0 24 22 22 0 0 479 0 0 20
Karelija R 0 170 486 37 28 32 463 493 492 0 0 0
Kemerovskaja 0 162 498 53 52 53 482 540 790 51 51 29
Kirovskaja 0 24 491 0 0 0 488 492 785 0 0 0
Komi R 0 0 482 0 20 0 476 481 782 0 0 0
Komi-Permjackij AO 0 0 0 12 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0
Korjakskij AO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kostromskaja 21 0 495 74 44 24 463 490 494 23 23 22
Krasnodarskij K 0 191 493 105 94 36 443 523 764 37 37 33
Krasnojarskij K 0 175 494 41 41 41 480 559 776 30 30 32
Kurganskaja 0 140 504 33 29 35 482 499 771 35 35 32
Kurskaja 0 24 493 35 35 35 484 520 787 32 32 29
Leningradskaja 320 140 481 25 25 25 479 507 781 23 23 20
Lipeckaja 0 21 437 34 74 34 488 511 793 23 23 28
Magadanskaja 0 28 0 11 10 10 472 483 475 11 11 0
Marij Jel R 0 0 485 0 20 0 498 520 497 0 0 0
Mordovija R 0 29 470 0 0 0 470 464 694 0 0 0
Moskovskaja 0 201 488 35 74 34 487 512 774 33 33 78
The ‘legal status’ of each region is abbreviated in this table. No marker indicates that the region is an oblast’, an ‘R’ indicates
a republic, a ‘K’ indicates a krai, and the designation ‘AO’ indicates a avtonomny okrug (autonomous region). For present
purposes, these designations are largely historical relics with no de jure effect on competition or corruption. In many of the
following analyses I control for republic status and other statuses.
conducted in April 2016 by the Levada Center, was commissioned specifically by the author
and colleagues, and so includes additional questions about corruption experiences.
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Table 3.3: Region-Year Sample Size (part 2 of 2)
2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2016
Moskva 150 737 481 283 200 120 491 721 784 135 135 125
Murmanskaja 0 0 478 0 0 0 483 507 753 0 0 0
Neneckij AO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Nizhegorodskaja 0 169 486 126 51 39 487 518 779 38 38 44
Novgorodskaja 20 170 492 0 0 0 497 499 493 0 0 0
Novosibirskaja 0 170 477 146 104 46 476 540 756 46 46 44
Omskaja 256 165 477 121 53 33 470 521 783 35 35 33
Orenburgskaja 0 29 481 48 68 48 503 532 783 46 46 35
Orlovskaja 0 0 496 0 0 0 445 496 793 0 0 0
Penzenskaja 0 29 493 49 0 0 472 507 777 0 0 0
Permskaja 81 171 0 72 67 27 0 524 791 34 34 30
Primorskij K 80 163 450 30 44 25 383 430 661 24 24 23
Pskovskaja 0 135 483 55 20 0 468 493 483 30 30 24
Rjazanskaja 0 145 484 0 0 0 491 485 789 0 0 0
Rostovskaja 0 166 458 113 84 45 481 559 769 49 49 41
S-Peterburg 0 188 473 176 91 52 478 621 793 54 54 57
Saha (Jakutija) R 0 24 0 9 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sahalinskaja 0 0 0 0 0 0 471 468 450 0 0 0
Samarskaja 0 170 489 83 34 35 465 527 763 35 35 31
Saratovskaja 0 170 467 106 78 38 479 545 775 36 36 31
Severnaja Osetija R 0 0 494 0 0 0 0 9 481 0 0 0
Smolenskaja 0 25 463 36 32 36 459 513 783 42 42 30
Stavropol’skij K 130 175 495 69 32 33 466 529 776 67 67 34
Sverdlovskaja 210 193 486 168 69 49 481 565 794 35 35 35
Tajmyrskij AO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tambovskaja 0 140 474 0 0 0 477 487 761 33 0 0
Tatarstan R 0 164 473 86 111 51 482 553 795 48 48 42
Tjumenskaja 0 163 498 22 43 21 488 524 795 19 19 15
Tomskaja 0 139 491 0 20 0 476 475 745 0 0 0
Tul’skaja 0 163 492 35 33 35 493 507 783 35 35 22
Tverskaja 0 171 492 0 0 0 487 497 753 0 0 0
Tyva R 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Udmurtskaja R 220 174 492 0 0 0 488 563 791 0 0 8
Ul’janovskaja 0 158 494 48 47 48 497 524 794 44 44 39
Ust’-Ordynskij Burjatskij AO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vladimirskaja 0 29 483 36 74 34 486 499 771 31 31 29
Volgogradskaja 110 166 482 132 86 46 457 575 787 46 46 53
Vologodskaja 0 30 499 0 20 0 488 493 784 0 0 0
Voronezhskaja 0 167 477 160 33 35 473 548 791 34 34 24
Zabajkal’skij kraj 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 418 729 0 0 0
As noted by Daniel Treisman (2000, 2007), there is a distinct and troubling lack of
research exploiting experienced corruption. With few exceptions, subjective expert assess-
ments take the place of reports of corruption as it is experienced by citizens and business-
people. Measures based on observation and direct measurement of corruption offer many
advantages over subjective measures, but they capture something rather different: secret
flows of rents and bribes between economic and state actors. The empirical focus here is on
the interface between low-level representatives of the state – bureaucrats – and the citizenry
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they are tasked with regulating. This measure is much more reproducible and representa-
tive than are subjective expert ratings and observational measures, relying as it does on a
nationally-representative survey conducted recently and in a large subset of regions in Rus-
sia. It assesses corruption directly rather than incorporating broader concepts of governance
or government performance, as subjective ratings are likely to do.
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics: Individual-Level Variables
Variable N Min. Max. Mean Median #NA
Bribery Experience 173422 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.00 8237
Male 181593 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.00 66
Education 181422 1.00 4.00 2.57 3.00 237
Age 170811 2.00 99.00 44.87 44.00 10848
Income 151277 -1.72 30.44 0.00 -0.13 30382
Urban 181594 0.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 65
Internet User 127682 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.00 53977
Gov’r Approval 133553 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.00 48106
Putin Approval 73913 0.00 1.00 0.69 1.00 107746
UR Supporter 134914 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.00 46745
Judges Bribe-Givers 78970 0.00 6.00 0.51 1.00 102689
Despite a voluminous literature on corruption, we know relatively little about how
everyday experienced corruption is related to the spectrum of authoritarian regimes types we
observe in modern authoritarian states. Russia provides a valuable view into this relation-
ship. By examining variation in corruption across the many regions of Russia, which have
exhibited starkly differing ‘types’ and ‘degrees’ of authoritarianism over space and time, we
can better grasp the dynamics connecting corruption and authoritarian regimes. We can
take advantage of a unitary legal system and single national government while exploiting
variation in regional political systems.
Who pays bribes in modern authoritarian Russia? Figure 3.1 shows the relationships
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between a variety of individual characteristics and the probability of having experienced
bribery. These findings accord well with what we know about the prevalence of bribery in
other contexts. Men are more likely to experience bribery, as are the well educated, the
young, urban residents, and those with higher incomes. Most notably, three characteris-
tics that I will later use to measure the closeness of individuals to the regime are strongly
negatively correlated with bribery experiences: being a government employee, voting for
or supporting the dominant party, United Russia (UR), and having an approving attitude
towards the governor of one’s region.6
3.3 Missing Data and Non-Response
Given the empirical design of the analyses I use, missingness can arise as a problem in any of
three places: the dependent variable, individual-level covariates, and region-year covariates.
Despite its marked disadvantages, I rely on simple listwise deletion of incomplete cases
throughout this dissertation. This is for two reasons: the abundance of survey data available
to me mitigates the dangers resulting from loss of sample size; and multilevel modeling of
large-N, time series cross-sectional data such as this data set is quite effective at smoothing
out inadvertent missingness in particular regions or years (Shor, Bafumi, Keele, and Park
2007; Fairbrother 2014; Bell and Jones 2015).
The first ‘type’ of missingness, missingness in the dichotomous survey question asking
respondents about their experience with bribery, I discuss in the subsection below on item
6To be sure, such correlations leave open concerns of endogeneity. I cannot exclude the possibility
that being a regime supporter or employee may affect the likelihood of experiencing corruption. I
take these findings as suggestive and largely descriptive.
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Note: coefficient plot showing two linear multilevel regressions. Points represent estimated coefficients; lines
represent 95% confidence intervals. Data: FOM GeoRating and Life in Transition Survey representative
surveys, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2011.
non-response. As to the second, of the 5 primary individual-level covariates I include in my
models (age, gender, education, urban/rural, and income), only income shows substantial
levels of missingness. My results are robust to exclusion of this variable, which, as with all
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individual-level predictors used here, does not appear to substantially affect my results.
With regard to region-year variables, no missingness is found in the key predictor,
scheduled end of term. As inference is based solely on the plausible exogeneity of this variable,
occasional missingness in the additional region-year controls I introduce in some models is of
minimal concern. The regions with the least reliable and most missing region-year statistical
data are often those least likely to be included in the surveys I employ. Results are robust
to inclusion or exclusion of a large array of these region-year predictors.
3.3.1 Item Non-Response
A larger potential concern, discussed more broadly in the context of sensitive question bias
in Section 3.4, is that of non-random item non-response in the dependent variable I use,
experienced corruption.7 I generally find very low rates of item non-response. Below I
show average statistics for item non-response across surveys, regions, and years, along with
regressions placing dichotomous non-response on the left hand side and individual- and
region-year-level predictors on the right hand side.
3.4 Sensitive Question Bias
One possible concern is the validity of the outcome measure, individuals’ responses to a
survey question about having been asked to give a bribe. If respondents are unwilling to
7Unfortunately, information on overall survey response rates is generally unavailable for the surveys
I employ. I have no reason to believe that this could be a source of bias or invalidity for my
inferences. The surveys were conducted by highly respected professional Russian public opinion
polling firms.
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Table 3.5: Predictors of Item Non-Response
DV: Dichotomous Non-Response to Bribe Request
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.001)
Income 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban Rural −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Levada Dummy 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Scheduled End of Term 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Log GRP −0.020∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
Pct Russian −0.001 −0.001
(0.027) (0.028)




Pct Urban Population 0.069∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031)
Petrov Competitiveness −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.039∗∗∗ 0.010 0.042∗∗∗ −0.055
(0.006) (0.063) (0.006) (0.065)
Number of regions 78 77 78 77
Number of years 6 6 6 6
N 130,669 129,977 130,669 129,977
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
tell the truth because they worry about the survey interviewer judging them for engaging
in this behavior, then this social desirability bias will produce an overall underreporting of
experienced petty corruption. It is also possible that bias could arise not from concern about
the social desirability of their response but from concern about implicating themselves in
a crime. After all, giving a bribe is illegal in Russia just as accepting one is. Finally,
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respondents may worry that a vengeful regime could find out about their having divulged this
sensitive information to a third-party, resulting in possible politically-motivated punishment.
There are several reasons why these concerns are very unlikely to threaten the data
I employ in this study’s analyses with bias. First, it is notable that the question wording in
the surveys I use is about a request for a bribe, not about whether or not the respondent
actually paid a bribe. It is not illegal or particularly risky to truthfully report that someone
merely asked you for a bribe, so the fact that this question is quite oblique should drastically
reduce any risk of bias. In the few surveys in my data that do ask about the outcome
of the bribe request, this question invariably follows the question about the request. This
feature does not eliminate the possibility that the regime could be unhappy that a respondent
even discussed the fact of a bribe request having occurred. However, there is no reason to
think that respondents expect their survey responses to be tied back to them personally
by a regime apparently obsessed with punishing such a minor (and common) statement.
The surveys in question were all conducted by private, well-established, respected polling
agencies. Interview preambles included a notice of confidentiality.8
Second, Russians are on the whole not shy about discussing corruption, which is
generally regarded as being a fact of life in Russia for centuries. Reports of bribery, grand
and petty, is common in the media. Once again, their is no a priori expectation that
individuals’ survey responses would be tied back to them or that the government is involved
in the surveys at all. Third, the direct questions I use exhibit very low rates of item non-
8In the case of the surveys conducted by FOM, the survey preamble was the following: “Allow me
to introduce myself. I am an interviewer from the Fund for Public Opinion. We are requesting
your participation in our survey. This will not take much time. We guarantee the confidentiality
of the information we receive from you. Thank you in advance for your cooperation!”
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response.9 If respondents were concerned about the sensitive nature of the question, one
would assume that many respondents, in addition to those who would untruthfully report
‘no,’ would refuse to answer and thus avoid confirming or lying. Furthermore, non-response
would only be a threat to the identification strategy employed in this study if it were strongly
correlated with political competitiveness. Regressing an indicator for item non-response on
individual-level characteristics and region and year random effects in a multilevel model,
I find very little variation between regions in the amount of non-response to this question.
While Scheduled End of Term is positively and statistically significantly associated with non-
response, the effect is miniscule—on the order of a 0.1 percentage point change. The Petrov
competitiveness measure is negatively associated with non-response, though also with a very
small effect size. These facts, together with consistently low levels of non-response across
regions, provide strong evidence that non-response is not generating concerning amounts of
bias in my results.
Finally, I present the results from an original list experiment included on a nationally-
representative Levada Center survey of 1600 Russians in April 2016. List experiments,
also known as the item-count technique, are a way of asking sensitive questions in surveys
while guaranteeing that no one—not even the interviewer or researcher—will know any one
individual’s response (Corstange 2009; Blair and Imai 2012; Glynn 2013). To do this, it only
allows for an aggregate measure of how frequently respondents said ‘yes’ to the sensitive
question. Respondents are given a list of possible responses and are told to say only how
many of the items they respond positively to. By randomly giving some respondents (those
9A number of the surveys included in this dataset did not allow for a response of ‘don’t know’ or
‘refuse to answer,’ so their non-response rates are zero.
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in the ‘control’ group) a list of innocuous responses and other respondents (the ‘treatment’
group) that list with the addition of the sensitive response, the researcher is able to determine
what proportion of the sample responded affirmatively to the sensitive response.
The question that was included in this survey was worded as follows, with the ran-
domly provided sensitive response in bold:
List Experiment 1: Look at this card and try to remember which of the following
actions you have taken at least once in the last 12 months. Don’t say which actions,
just say how many of the actions listed on this card you have taken at least once
in the last 12 months.
1. Gone to local authorities to get some documents in order
2. Seen the head of your local administration on television
3. Called local authorities to get information about the services they offer
4. Complained to a friend about the work of your local administration
5. Given a bribe to an official of your local administration in order to
solve an everyday problem
Respondents in the treatment group were given the sensitive item in addition to the
four control items that were presented to all respondents. Figure 7.5 shows histograms of the
number of items respondents replied affirmatively to in the control and treatment groups.
63
Figure 3.2: Histograms of List Experiment Responses
Control List







































In both this list experiment and a similar one conducted in 2012 (detailed in Chapter
7), the proportion of responses indicating an experience with bribery accords very well with
the ‘traditional’ direct question asked in the same survey, as described below, with the direct
question responses in my survey data on the whole, and with existing research that indicates
that approximately 15-20% Russians report bribery experiences. This suggests that there is
little difference between direct questioning about corruption from an array of surveys and
the list experiment method. Russians do not appear to be concerned with admitting directly
to survey interviewers that they have had a bribery experience.
Additional evidence that the sensitivity of this question is of minimal concern is
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provided by examining data from the list experiment and using statistical tests to examine
any differences with the direct question. Aronow, Coppock, Crawford, and Green (2015)
show how the inclusion of both a direct question and list experiment question on a survey
can mitigate many of the limitations of each approach. I use this framework and associated
tests implemented in the ‘list’ package in R, to analyze an original survey that I conducted
with colleagues in March 2016, which was implemented by the Levada Center, a leading
Russian survey firm.10 Aronow et al. (2015) provide a simple and useful test, which they call
Placebo Test I, for whether the assumptions underlying the list experiment hold. “If these
assumptions hold, the standard list experiment difference-in-means estimator will recover
estimates that are in expectation equal to one among the subsample that answers ‘Yes’ to
the direct question” and the test will fail to reject the null hypothesis (Aronow et al. 2015, pg.
54). The p-value when conducting this test on my list experiment data is 0.088, providing
suggestive evidence that the rather stringent assumptions underlying this list experiment
do indeed hold. Most importantly, the non-parametric estimator derived by Aronow et
al. (2015) that combines information from the direct question and list experiment shows
an effect of 0.134 (SE=0.066), which is extremely close to the value of 0.146 produced by
the direct question alone. On this basis, there is little reason to fear that respondents are
overly hesitant to provide truthful responses to this direct question about having experienced
corruption.
10Information on this data and the list experiment conducted are available in the appendix.
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3.5 Corruption: Perceived, Experienced, High-Level, Low-Level
The only existing measure of corruption in Russia at the sub-national level that encompasses
all of Russia’s regions is the corrup subcomponent of the Petrov-Titkov regional democracy
scores (Petrov and Titkov 2013). This measure ranges from 1 to 5, with a 5 indicating
minimal or absent corruption in that region. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show how these measures
assess corruption levels in Russia’s regions.








Another prominent assessment of corruption in Russia comes from a Transparency
International survey and study conducted in the early 2000s in 20 regions. Figure 3.4 shows
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how the regions included in this survey report corruption experiences on average.








3.6 Describing Petty Corruption in Russia
Who gives bribes in Russia and to whom? What demographic and other individual char-
acteristics are associated with having to give bribes to public officials? What are Russians’
overall attitudes and opinions about corruption, bribe-givers, bribe-takers, and how are these
views connected with other political attitudes and behaviors? In this section I provide the
first comprehensive and reliable answers to these questions.
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3.6.1 Who Gives Bribes?
Who is more likely to have had personal experience with corruption in Russia? Do trends
seen in previous sections regarding the public’s experiences with corruption in other countries
around the world carry over to Russia? Tables 3.6-3.7 show a number of linear multilevel
models with the dichotomous corruption experience measure as the dependent variable and
a variety of demographic and other individual-level predictors.
As expected, and in accordance with other research on corruption, men are more likely
to experience corruption than are women. The regressions in Table 3.6 show that this effect
is consistently about 3-4 percentage points. More educated Russians are also more likely
to encounter bribery, controlling for other factors. Each one-unit increase in the four-point
education level scale is associated with a 2-3 percentage point increase in the probability of
having experienced bribery. A similar effect is found for living in an urban area as opposed
to a rural area. Younger respondents are more likely to have experienced corruption than
are the old, as are wealthier Russians.
Very interestingly, though not surprisingly perhaps, respondents who indicated that
they voted for or would vote for United Russia experience substantially less corruption than
others. It is not clear without further investigation whether this is because the regime targets
non-supporters as a source of bribes or whether other unobserved factors are in effect. The
fact that this association persists even when controlling for other individual characteristics
likely to confound the relationship lends some credence to a meaningful interpretation of this
coefficient.
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Table 3.6: Additional Individual-Level Correlates of Bribery Experiences
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male 0.033∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Education 0.026∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Age −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Income 0.021∗∗∗ −0.001 0.017∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Urban 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Employed 0.017∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.003







Voted in Duma Elect −0.029∗∗∗
(0.004)
Approval of Governor −0.030∗∗∗
(0.002)
Region Run Well −0.052∗∗∗
(0.003)
Could See Self Protesting 0.096∗∗∗
(0.003)
Constant 0.161∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.010) (0.025) (0.026) (0.037)
Number of regions 76 68 76 74 74
Number of years 4 1 4 3 2
N 107,901 52,409 106,259 86,567 60,664
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income, employed not shown.
As shown in Table 3.7. Russians who work in government or in government ‘force
structures’ (i.e. the military or police) are substantially less likely to have experienced
corruption. This is not at all surprising, but offers the first clear evidence that a certain ‘class’
of privileged individuals are somewhat exempt from the bribe-hungry world of everyday
Russians.
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Table 3.7: Work Experience and Bribery Experiences
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.038∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Education 0.026∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Age −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Income 0.014∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Urban 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Employed 0.022∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗









Works in Unskilled Labor 0.002
(0.009)
Works in Services etc. 0.023∗∗∗
(0.009)
Constant 0.157∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.015) (0.038)
Number of regions 76 76 65 71
Number of years 5 4 3
N 124,570 108,671 24,939 55,072
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income, employed not shown.
3.6.2 What are Bribes Like?
What do we know about the bribes that Russians are describing in their responses to these
surveys? Unfortunately rather little, as only one of the survey waves, the FOM GeoRating
survey in 2003, asks about the bribes themselves. The only information available here is
on the size of the bribes that respondents recall giving. Each individual was given the
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opportunity to report a figure in rubles. These results lend additional credibility to the data
I employ in my main empirical analyses; they generally conform well with expectations.
Only 139 respondents, about 4% of those who reported the size of the bribe they
gave, indicated that they gave over 10000 rubles (about $165 at the time of the survey in
2003). Figure 3.5 shows frequency distributions for these bribes; the left panel shows all
bribes under 10000 rubles, the right shows more detail for bribes under 1000 rubles.
Figure 3.5: Bribe Size


































Note: Left panel shows a histogram of bribe sizes indicated in the full sample, in 2003
Russian rubles (RUR). Right panel shows the subset of bribe sizes under 1000 rubles.
These data come from the 2003 FOM GeoRating survey.
A comparison can be made with data on bribes as reported by Transparency Inter-
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national in their 2002 survey. An important difference is that this survey asked about all
bribes, not just bribes to government officials. As such, this measure is likely capturing
some other large bribes to healthcare workers or those in education, who, while technically
government employees, may not be considered ‘officials’ in a survey response. In any case,
the TI data shown in Figure 3.6 confirms that most bribes are at or around 1000 rubles.
Figure 3.6: Bribe Size (TI 2002)













We can see that in most cases the bribes that Russians report are quite small. The
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median bribe (among bribes under 10000 rubles) was 500 rubles, or about $8 in 2003. The
mean bribe under 10000 rubles was 1101 rubles, with a standard deviation of 1617 rubles.
Men give much larger bribes than do women; greater personal income is, unsurpris-
ingly, strongly positively correlated with bribe size, as is being employed. Another interesting
finding is that bribes are substantially and statistically significantly larger in regions with
greater GDP per capita. This suggests that the size of a bribe is ‘adjusted’ to some extent
to fit the wealth of the individuals it is being extracted from.
3.6.3 To Whom are Bribes Given?
The measure of bribe experience I employ captures all corruption to government officials.
Who exactly are these government officials? While the data here unfortunately does not ever
ask about who exactly is receiving the bribes in question, it does ask about respondents’
perceptions of which areas of government are most engaged in corruption. By taking the
responses to this question only for those respondents who indicated having given a bribe, a
reasonable proxy measure can be constructed. In this section I explore, using this proxy, the
characteristics of the bribe takers in this data.
Fitting expectations and previous research (Gerber and Mendelson 2008; Holmes
2012), by far the most frequent takers of bribes in Russia are the police – both regular police
and traffic police. These results are presented in Table 3.6.3.
There is substantial variation between regions in the prevalence of corruption in these
various government structures. This is explored briefly in Figure 3.7. The left plot shows
the average in each of 65 regions of the extent to which respondents reported the police to
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Housing and Communal 0.106
be corrupt (on the x axis) and the extent to which regional and local authorities are corrupt
(on the y axis). While no clear positive or negative correlation is present, the extent of
regional variation in both measures is striking. In some regions, less than 20% of the public
views regional and local authorities to be quite corrupt. In other regions, nearly 50% of the
public sees these authorities to be corrupt. Similarly with the police, though the police are
consistently viewed as more corrupt than are political authorities. The lack of correlation
between these measures points to the relative independence of the police in Russia from
regional politics – while certainly some control is exerted at the regional level, all regional
police forces in Russia are under the jurisdiction of federal authorities in the Ministry of
Internal Affairs.
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In the right plot, we further can see the substantial variation in political and police
corruption on the one hand and ‘life’ corruption (like in healthcare and education) on the
other.
3.6.4 How do Russians Feel about Bribery, Bribe-Givers, and Bribe-
Takers?
Are individuals’ attitudes towards corruption – such as moral judgment of those who give
bribes or those who take them – reflected in their actual corruption behavior? Table 3.8
suggests that indeed yes, those who claim to more harshly judge bribery in normative terms
are less likely to participate in corruption. This association is appropriately much stronger
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for those who say they negatively judge people who give bribes than for those who say they
negatively judge bribe-takers.
Table 3.8: Judgment of Corruption
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3)
Male 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Income 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Urban 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Employed 0.029∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Judge Bribetakers −0.007∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Judge Bribegivers −0.046∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Constant 0.147∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Number of regions 74 74 74
Number of years 2 2 2
N 63,314 61,897 60,156
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income, employed not shown.
Who views corruption – in general – as a very important phenomenon to fight among
the many possible ills befalling modern Russia? In Tables 3.9 I examine the individual-level
determinants of viewing corruption as important. In each model, the dependent variable is
a dichotomous variable capturing whether or not the respondent chose corruption as one of
the three responses from a list of possible factors that could be important.
As one would expect, having personally experienced bribery makes one much more
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Table 3.9: Importance of Corruption
Corruption as Important
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male 0.070∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education 0.032∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Income 0.019∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Urban 0.033∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Employed 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Bribe Experience 0.079∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)










Constant 0.040∗∗ 0.028 0.042∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Number of regions 74 74 74 74 74
Number of years 2 2 2 2 2
N 69,799 67,943 57,526 61,399 67,943
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income, employed not shown.
likely to view corruption as important. Holding pro-regime views, conversely, is associated
with being less likely to see corruption as a problem. Frequent use of the internet has a
positive and statistically significant, if small, effect.
While the level of regional democracy is substantially related to viewing corruption
as important (this variable is standardized, so the coefficient represents the change in the
dependent variable as a result of a 1 standard deviation change in regional democracy),
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the interaction of regional democracy and personal bribery experience is not statistically
significant.
3.6.5 Comparing Russian Bribery to Post-Communist Bribery
How does the corruption experienced by the Russian public compare to that experienced by
publics in other post-communist countries? This can inform our understanding of the varia-
tion within Russia while also providing context for the individual- and demographic-related
results presented earlier. If Russians’ bribery experiences are abnormal, for example, by
carefully comparing and contrasting these countries we can better comprehend the variation
we see between Russian regions and also between Russian individuals. In this section I show
data on bribery experiences using the cross-national Life in Transition Survey (LiTS). This
survey was conducted in 27 post-communist countries in 2006 and 2010. I pool these survey
waves.
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Note: Data come from the Life in Transition Surveys (LiTS) by the EBRD. Shown are the
mean proportion of respondents in each country reporting having given a bribe.
In Figure 3.8, we can see that Russians’ experiences with corruption are in fact quite
average among post-communist countries in this time period.
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Table 3.10 shows the results from two multilevel regressions. These regressions are
identical in the predictors they include. The first model is on Russian survey responses
alone. It shows results within Russia, taking the second level of the multilevel model as the
Russian regions included in the LiTS survey. The second model shows a full cross-national
regression, ignoring variation within Russia.















Number of units 51 37
N 2,277 64,419
+p < .1; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
We can see that the demographic results are very similar, with notable exceptions.
Income, age, and education are found to have similar (positive, negative, and positive, re-
spectively) associations within Russia and across countries. However, the effect of gender
and urban residency are starkly different. Figure 3.9 explores these findings by showing the
random coefficients for each country; Russia is highlighted in each plot as a red diamond.
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Figure 3.9: Russian Corruption in Relation to other Post-Communist Corruption, LiTS










































It is clear from the left plot that Russia is a rather extreme outlier in the extent to
which being a man is associated with much greater experiences with corruption. On the
other hand, the right plot shows that Russia is in the middle of the pack in terms of the
effect of urban residency. In Russia on average, the effect of being an urban resident on
experiencing corruption is slightly negative. But, as we saw in Table 3.10, looking at Russia
alone, urban residents very weakly experience more corruption than do rural residents.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have introduced the core individual-level data set that I will use in subse-
quent empirical chapters to test my theory of how political competition, measured primarily
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as scheduled ends of terms in office of Russian governors, affects the amount of corruption
that the public experiences in their day-to-day lives. The use of this data set, more exten-
sive and detailed than is generally available for studying corruption, allows me to confidently
examine subnational variation in petty bribery in Russia over a substantial time span. In
Chapter 4, I use multilevel models to show that political competition sharply reduces the
amount of corruption that Russians experience. I also employ this data set, in combination
with publicly available Russian census data to generate high-quality descriptive estimates of
regional experienced corruption levels using a developing technique called multilevel regres-
sion and poststratification (MRP).
I have also endeavored in this chapter to show descriptive details and empirical trends
in petty corruption as it is experienced by Russians today. This provides useful context for
understanding what exactly is happening when graft seeps in to relations between citizens
and the state. Chapter 6 further explores the consequences of these interactions. There, I
exploit another advantage of this individual-level data set on bribery by showing that Rus-
sians overwhelmingly react negatively to experiences with corruption. This has potentially
dire consequences for governors if they do not curtail corruption when they risk losing their
jobs.
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4 | Political Competition
and Corruption:
Empirical Evidence
In Chapter 2, I presented my theory of how political competitiveness decreases corruption
in authoritarian regimes and the data available to test this theory. In this chapter I conduct
a number of statistical tests on propositions that flow from this theory. I first introduce
my measurement strategy for exogenously assessing political competition shocks in Russian
regions. From this I build and describe my research design, which combines this measure of
political competition, the extensive survey data set introduced in Chapter 3, and multilevel
regression. I provide regression results that test my theory. I also lay out a series of robustness
tests, alternative measures, and discuss some implications of my findings.
Where previous research has generally relied on perceptions data about corruption,
cross-national assessments that gloss over much underlying variation, and potentially en-
dogenous measures of competition. I look within Russia from 2001 to 2016, comparing the
varied levels of competition and corruption that are found in what may be thought of as
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‘miniature’ authoritarian regimes under the thumb of the central Moscow regime. While
this empirical strategy, as any does, comes with limitations, such as limitations to external
validity, it allows me to gain a new and powerful view into the workings of corruption in
authoritarianism.
4.1 Research Design
The research design I employ in this chapter is built around three advancements to much
of the existing research on corruption or political competition: an exogenous measure of
competitiveness, individual-level data nested within regions and years, and the capability of
multilevel modeling to include time-varying and time-invariant covariates at individual and
aggregate levels to increase variance explained and automatically ‘pool’ information as the
data demands. In the first case, the availability of plausibly exogenous shocks to political
competitiveness (scheduled ends of terms in office) allows me to avoid concerns of reverse
causation and confounding that are often encountered when explaining political variation
using competitiveness as a predictor. In the second, the use of micro-level survey data
increases confidence in the validity of the dependent variable while allowing for flexible data
exploration and modeling. Finally, while remaining robust to alternative approaches such as
fixed effects modeling, the use of multilevel (random effects) models allows these datasets to
‘speak for themselves’ as to the amount of pooling of information over time and space that
is required, while allowing for covariates of interest to be included without concerns of time
invariance.
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4.1.1 Measuring Competition: Scheduled End of Term
As the end of an authoritarian leader’s term approaches, rising political competition can
have two effects on petty corruption. First, as political exigencies rise to the fore, machines
previously focused on collecting and distributing corruption rents find their attention turned
to these time-sensitive matters: driving the vote for the incumbent and keeping the public
happy. Second, the bureaucrats themselves—the cogs in the machine—keep their head down
until calmer waters return and the winner of the political contest becomes clear.
An important challenge for empirical tests of political features like competitiveness is
measurement. Measurement of competitiveness should be maximally exogenous, in order to
properly identify the effect of competitiveness on the outcome of interest and to not become
entangled in reverse causation. It also must be valid—homing in on competitiveness itself
rather than other related factors. In the present study I employ a measure, scheduled end
of term in office, which meets both of these criteria.
The exogeneity of Scheduled End of Term is derived from the nature in which the
electoral calendar in Russia’s regions was determined. In the early post-Soviet period, from
1991 to 1996, heads of Russian regions were elected sporadically and with little consistency
either within or across regions, with most governors being appointed ad hoc by the Russian
president. A large number of regions then held elections in 1996, after a Constitutional Court
decision and passage of a law required heads of regions to be popularly elected. Regions
were allowed to set lengths of term in office of 4 or 5 years and to hold their elections on
any date. This marks the beginning of a messy electoral calendar across Russia’s many
regions. A significant change came in 2004, when President Putin signed a law abolishing
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elections for these governors. Coming into force in 2005, this law solidified and codified
the ‘electoral’ calendar into a set of predetermined appointment terms.1 A further law
signed by President Medvedev in 2012 returned the practice of electing governors, though
with substantial presidential control over the nominating process.2 To a great extent, the
governors in this data set are still appointed rather than elected.
In both the electoral periods (1996-2004, 2012-2016) and the appointment period
(2005-2011), the approaching end of a governor’s term in office is occasion for sharply in-
creased political competitiveness and uncertainty. In electoral periods, pretenders to the
office frequently arise from both within the governor’s party and from without. Powerful
business groups, once-loyal lieutenants, and popular mayors of large cities in the region all
vie to win what is a prominent and lucrative position. The sitting governor must fend off
challengers using his political machine and administrative resources. In the appointment
period, this competitiveness and uncertainty did not diminish. The president often used
the end of term period as a time to maneuver, create intrigue about favored choices, and
collect information about who within the region’s elite (or, if intra-region elites are found
to be severely lacking, outside elites) will best serve his goals. This is in some ways exem-
plified by the much-discussed complex system of ratings of the ‘effectiveness’ of governors,
1Note that neither of these modifications to governors’ selection mechanisms—the switch to gu-
bernatorial appointments and the return to “managed” elections—entailed any changes to each
region’s original calendar. Terms in office continued unaltered.
2Under this rather complex scheme, still in place in 2016, candidates for the post of governor must
first be nominated by political parties, regional legislatures, or, occasionally, by self-nomination.
This amounts to what is called the ‘municipal filter’ alongside an informal ‘presidential filter’
whereby the President meets with nominating groups and can exercise a sort of veto (Goode 2013).
The effect is tight political control by Putin, United Russia, and other elements of the regime over
who participates in gubernatorial elections. The end result is very close to appointment, given
Russia’s political system.
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used by the Presidential Administration in selecting appointees. Furthermore, the intra-elite
jostling for power seen in electoral periods often continued unabated though less visible. One
example among many is the rivalry between longtime governor of the Omsk region, Leonid
Polezhaev, and upstart mayor of Omsk Viktor Shreider, which erupted into a full intra-party
and intra-elite tussle in 2011.3
Figure 4.1 shows the results of balance tests—the statistical significance of tests with
a set of 20 regional covariates. If region-years with a scheduled end of term differed strongly
from those without a scheduled end of term, one might be concerned about the true exogene-
ity of this measure. The finding that none of the 20 covariates have statistically significant
differences at the 5% level and only 1 does at the 10% level provides suggestive evidence
that Scheduled End of Term is not associated with other region-year characteristics that
might bias this study’s results. Of course, such balance tests in principle cannot capture
unobserved or unobservable differences between these region-years, but nonetheless they can
be helpful for locating egregious violations of the identification strategy.
3http://www.rospres.com/government/9164/
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Figure 4.1: Balance of Region-Years With and Without a Scheduled End of Term
p-value
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Points represent the p-value from a t test of each covariate listed on the left with the scheduled end of term
indicator dividing region-years in to treatment and control groups.
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Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for the region-year variables, including Sched-
uled End of Term, that I employ in subsequent analyses.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics: Region-Year Variables
Variable N Min. Max. Mean Median #NA
Sched End of Term 1424 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.00 92
Petrov Competitiveness 1417 -2.39 3.11 0.00 -0.03 99
Log GRP 1479 6.38 16.27 11.88 11.96 37
Pct Russian 1516 0.01 0.97 0.74 0.85 0
Log Population 1516 9.70 16.30 13.78 13.97 0
Republic/City/AO 1504 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.00 12
Press Freedom 1417 1.00 5.00 2.76 3.00 99
UR Vote in National Elects 1239 -1.86 2.97 -0.01 -0.30 277
Gov’r Margin Victory 1222 0.20 4804.50 79.50 38.00 294
Gov’r Yrs Tenure 1034 0.00 20.00 6.83 6.00 482
UR Vote in Regional Legis 830 17.66 90.40 49.59 50.01 686
Nat Resources 1504 0.00 78.60 9.63 1.70 12
Gov’t Size 928 1.00 101.00 33.56 33.00 588
Official Turnover 839 0.00 18.00 0.42 0.28 677
Machine Organization 1441 -1.89 3.58 0.02 -0.34 75
4.1.2 Statistical Modeling
In the Results section below, I present the analysis of this data using a series of linear
multilevel models.4 Multilevel modeling is perfectly suited to this unbalanced regional panel
consisting of a large number of individual-level responses that can be grouped by region
and year into second-level units (Shor, Bafumi, Keele, and Park 2007; Fairbrother 2014;
Bell and Jones 2015). These units can then be modeled with region-year covariates, with
4For ease of interpretation I employ linear models in all analyses presented here, despite the di-
chotomous dependent variable. Out-of-bounds predictions and individual-level heteroskedasticity
are not of great concern in the multilevel inference framework I employ. The results of running
these analyses using logistic regression are available in the Robustness section. They show nearly
identical findings.
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inference made possible by examining the coefficients and standard errors of these region-year
predictors.
In each model below I run a multilevel regression of my dichotomous dependent
variable—corruption experience—on a set of individual-level demographic predictors and
a number of region-year regressors.5 The model I estimate is presented below as Equation
4.1. As this is a multilevel model, I allow the intercept of each model to vary (non-nested) by
year and region. The dependent variable in all models is Bribery Experience, a dichotomous
yes-no response to the question “Have you in the last year or two personally encountered
a situation where any government official requested or expected an unofficial payment or
service from you for his or her work?”
Pr(yi = 1) = α0 + βEndofTermy,r + γXy,r + αregionr[i] + α
year
y[i] + εi (4.1)
αyeary ∼ N(η, σ2year), for y = 1, ...,Y (4.2)
αregionr ∼ N(η, σ2region), for r = 1, ...,R (4.3)
Where my main variable of interest, EndofTermy,r, is an indicator variable with coefficient
β, Xi is the set of individual-level demographic variables with coefficient vector γ , η is a
vector of region-year predictors, and α0 is the grand mean. Each model is linear OLS—i.e.,
a linear probability model—for ease of interpretation.
The results are also robust to linear fixed effects (no pooling) modeling of region and
year instead of multilevel modeling, as shown in Table 4.6. The multilevel (also referred to
5Estimations conducted using lmer() in R. I have implemented the logit analyses shown in Table 4.6
using both bglmer() and Stan (via rstanarm) but the large data set makes this very time consuming
and appears to offer no practical benefit.
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as random effects or partial pooling) solution that I employ in this thesis offers a number of
advantages over fixed effects (Bell and Jones 2015). In particular, it allows for the inclusion
of region-level variables that change over time and those than do not. Multilevel modeling is
a more flexible, data-centered modeling approach than fixed-effects modeling, which, when
estimating parameter αi, does not allow for information about other units or the grand mean
to be incorporated.
Multilevel modeling relies, as all statistical procedures do, on untestable assumptions.
The most crucial for multilevel modeling is the assumption that there is no correlation be-
tween randomly varying parameters and the explanatory variables. However, it is important
to note that corrections, due originally to Mundlak (1978), are available. I present results
that apply these corrections in Appendix Table 10.3.
4.2 Results: Effect of Political Competition on Corruption
As discussed in previous chapters, in modern, competitive-authoritarian Russia, the end
of a governor’s term in office is a time that is weighted with risk and uncertainty. As
a prominent political leader of his own authoritarian political machine, a governor must
ensure that neither the public nor the ‘appointer-in-chief’ is dissatisfied with his tenure. If
he has not provided the level of public goods that constituents expect, if seen as overly dirty
or compromised, or if his machine has not been able to rally the support demanded by the
regime, he may be removed. Whether replaced by the voting public in elections, however
managed and sanctioned, or passed over for reappointment to his post, nerves run high. As
the last months of a governor’s term approach, he faces an increasingly competitive political
arena. Rivals emerge, allegiances are tested, and machines of support are revved up.
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I first show how political competition, measured using an indicator for a governor’s
term scheduled to end in a given year and region, Scheduled End of Term, affects average
levels of corruption that the public experiences. In Table 4.2, I show the results from mul-
tilevel linear regressions.6 The first six covariates, not shown in this table but presented in
the appendix, capture individual-level characteristics of the respondents: gender, education
level, age, income, urban or rural location, and employment status.7 All variables other than
these six are region-year variables, such as scheduled end of temr, entered in the second-level
of the multilevel model. All models allow the intercept to vary by region and year, also
referred to as region and year random effects.
Column 1 shows the raw effect of being in a year with a scheduled end of term in
office on regional experienced bribery levels.8 In these years, average corruption levels drop
by about a half of a percentage point. Column 2 includes a variety of region-year covariates,
with the effect of Scheduled End of Term unchanged. Since, as discussed earlier, my theory
is assumed to work most cleanly in appointment periods (rather than the gubernatorial
election period through 2004), Columns 3 and 4 reproduce columns 1 and 2, excluding the
6Multilevel logistic regressions are shown in the appendix. These show nearly identical results to
the linear regressions I present in this thesis. I show linear results for ease of interpretation.
7These individual-level variables are also omitted from presentation in subsequent tables, though
they are present in the analyses. Their values and statistical significance are highly stable, regard-
less of what other variables are included.
8As discussed elsewhere, as the scheduled end of a governor’s term in office is set far in advance
by legislation or chance timing, it is exogenous to both other regional characteristics (including
political features of the region) and to individual-level factors. This exogeneity ensures that it is
not corruption experiences that are driving political competition, nor is there other confounding
occurring at the region level. While the nature of Scheduled End of Term satisfies the ignorability
assumption required for causal inference in this case, nevertheless Column 2 includes additional
region-year covariates.
92
Figure 4.2: Determinants of Corruption Experiences: Scheduled End of Term and Demo-
graphics
Marginal Probability of Experiencing Bribery








years 2001-2004. The results are stronger, with larger effect sizes that are more precisely
estimated.
In all models, Scheduled End of Term shows a negative and statistically significant
effect, indicating that in times of heightened political competition for Russia’s regional auto-
crats, petty bribery is lowered substantially.9 I provide additional evidence below that this
9Chapter 5 explores this finding more deeply by examining the conditional (heterogeneous treat-
ment) effects of scheduled end of term on corruption levels. The results shown there also provide
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Table 4.2: Political Competition and Experienced Corruption: Main Results
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sched End of Term −0.005∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log GRP −0.017∗∗
(0.008) (0.010)
Pct Russian −0.081∗ −0.100∗∗
(0.046) (0.050)




Constant 0.116∗∗∗ 0.015 0.091∗∗ −0.042
(0.036) (0.122) (0.037) (0.133)
Number of regions 78 77 77 76
Number of years 12 12 9 9
N 143,264 142,558 106,816 106,110
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income not shown.
effect is tied to deliberate control over corruption. The linear coefficient on Scheduled End
of Term is -0.005, showing that in a region with a governor’s term scheduled to end in that
year, the probability of any given member of the public experiencing bribery is reduced by
half of 1 percentage point. This effect is equivalent to approximately a 5% decrease in the
overall level of bribery experienced in that region. This results in many thousands fewer
corruption events per year. Columns 3 and 4 show the models from Columns 1 and 2, but
limited to a subset of the data: those region-years where the governor was appointed by the
a conceptual check that strongly supports my interpretation of the findings in the present chapter
as confirmation of the theoretical mechanisms described in Chapter 2. If governor characteristics,
for example, had no effect on the competition-corruption relationship or an effect other than what
is predicted, that would indicate that an alternative explanation for my main results is at work. I
do not find this to be the case.
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president rather than elected. In these years where governors are appointed by the autocrat
rather than elected, we see a yearly decrease in corruption of over 13% when the governor’s
term is ending.




Sched End of Term 0.003
(0.003)
Petrov Competitiveness −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)










Constant 0.119∗∗∗ −0.051 0.118∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.122) (0.036)
Number of regions 78 77 78
Number of years 12 12 12
N 143,254 142,558 143,254
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income not shown.
In Table 4.3, I show that political competitiveness as measured by the Petrov score—
an alternative, expert assessment-based measure of competitiveness levels rather than dy-
namics, discussed at length in the next section—is strongly associated with lower corruption
levels. In fact, a region two standard deviations above average on the Petrov competitive-
ness scale is estimated to display more than three percentage points less corruption per year,
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an approximately 20% change in corruption levels. What is more, as shown in Column 6,
competitive regions (on the Petrov scale) show even greater effects of Scheduled End of Term
– a very competitive region two standard deviations above the mean will see an additional
four percentage point drop in corruption levels in years with a scheduled end of term. This
suggests that already competitive regions—where governors are ill-at-ease—are particularly
susceptible to further shocks to their competitiveness.
Employing both a plausibly exogenous measure of a positive shock to political competitiveness—
the final year of a term in office for a Russian governor, a time when he is assessed by
the autocrat and most easily fired for excessively high levels of corruption—and a widely-
used assessment of relative levels of regional political competitiveness—the Petrov-Titkov
‘democracy’ score—I have found that governors are responsive to competition. When po-
litical competition is high, they reduce corruption in order to keep the public sufficiently
happy (explored further in Chapter 6). This, in turn, helps keep the autocrat, who is mon-
itoring governors’ performance especially in these years, satisfied with the governor’s work
and thus more likely to reappoint him. I find effects of political competition of substantial
magnitude—over 10% decreases in petty corruption per year—and consistent statistical sig-
nificance. I address potential concerns that unrelated region-level factors may be at play or
that individuals’ demographics are behind my findings by including a large array of addi-
tional covariates. Further examination of the robustness of my findings follows in Section
4.3.
One potential empirical implication of this finding (and the theory it provides confir-
matory evidence for) is that, ceteris paribus, governors who do not lower corruption levels
in the final years of their terms in office should be reappointed much less frequently than
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those who successfully reduce graft. I do not test this proposition in this dissertation. Such
an event can be thought of as occurring ‘off the equilibrium path’ in the sense that those
governors who are being replaced failed to follow what they were incentivized to do. This
means that it would be difficult to interpret any result from such a test: a null result may
strongly confirm that governors stay on this equilibrium path or it may indicate a simple
statistical failure to reject a null hypothesis, while a result that governors are being replaced
either more or less frequently than expected also does little to confirm or disconfirm the
theory. Furthermore, these difficulties are made worse by severe limitations of the available
data. Few governors in Russia are replaced, but the reasons they can be replaced are legion.
Such replacements are often overdetermined, so a full investigation would require strong
assumptions about how numerous other factors are playing into both replacement and the
corruption-replacement relationship.
4.2.1 Interpretation
I interpret the findings in this chapter as showing an active link from governors’ incentives
to governors’ behavior to corruption levels as experienced by the public. At least three
pieces of evidence support this interpretation over other possible alternatives.10 First, the
following chapter, Chapter 5, uses exploration of conditional (heterogeneous) effects to show
that this interpretation better fits the data at hand than do other interpretations that would
need to explain those findings as well. Second, the following section, Section 4.3, tests the
10Such alternatives include interpretations involving other, more complex causal pathways whereby
governors change some other behavior in end-of-term years and that behavior has an unintended
side effect of reducing corruption. Another possibility would be that the survey-taking public in
these years reacts to political or social changes and responds to surveys differently.
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robustness of these conclusions to a wide array of alternative specifications. That the central
findings hold is supportive of the mechanisms I propose over the alternatives these covariates
and modeling strategies would entail. Finally, additional support for the interpretation
If, as proposed in Chapter 2, Russian governors use various levers under their control to
decrease corruption in end-of-term years, then a lesser effect should be observed for bribery
in areas that the governor has limited control over bureaucracies than those where he has
greater, more direct control. We find such a situation for the police when compared to
provision of government social services, respectively. Police and law enforcement structures
in modern Russia are nominally federal agencies, with governors having little leverage over
their work.11 On the other hand, the documents and permits that constitute another large
portion of corruption situations in Russia are generally parts of the regional administrative
bureaucracy, where the governor has clear hierarchical leverage.
11In practice, of course, governors can have substantial influence on police activity. This influence
may vary from place to place. The key is that their influence is dramatically weaker and less
direct than on state organs that fall under their regional administration. I propose that this is
indeed the case.
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Table 4.4: Effects of Competition on Structures under Governors’ Control (2016 data)
Bribery Experiences with...
All Bribery Experiences ...Police ...Government Services
(1) (2) (3)
Sched End of Term −0.066 −0.054 −0.118∗
(0.056) (0.045) (0.068)
Constant
Number of regions 47 47 47
Number of years
N 1,199 1,256 1,256
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income not shown.
Only one of the surveys comprising my main data set includes evidence about to whom
bribes were given, the final survey conducted in early 2016 in 47 regions by the Levada Center
at the behest of the present author and colleagues. In Table 4.4 I show that end of term does
have a much larger effect on regional administrative corruption than on police corruption,
thus lending additional credence to the assumptions underlying my overall findings.
4.3 Robustness
Familiar difficulties with measuring corruption underline the importance of testing the ro-
bustness of the findings presented above. In this section, I discuss potential sources of bias in
survey measures of corruption, show analyses using alternative measures of political compe-
tition in Russia, and also provide additional measures of corruption, including observational
and novel search engine-based measures.
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4.3.1 Controlling for Attitudes
The findings presented in this study are built on multilevel regressions where the funda-
mental unit of observation is the individual. As such, it is worthwhile to ensure that stark
differences between respondents are not driving the effect of political competitiveness de-
pressing reported corruption. While the exogeneity of the Scheduled End of Term variable
ensures that the results would remain valid if this were the case, nevertheless it is useful to
show that survey responses indicating having had an experience with corruption are clear
and valid measures of having actually experienced that corruption, rather than unrelated
factors like attitudinal willingness to report.
One particularly salient concern is that survey respondents who are opponents of the
regime may be less willing to report corruption experiences. If this were the case, potential
bias emerges if this willingness to report is differential across competitive and non-competitive
regions. As discussed in the previous chapter, there is no reason to believe that this is the
case, as Russians are quite willing to discuss this topic, especially when the question wording
allows for substantial plausible deniability. Furthermore, this objection fully fails to explain
why respondents in regions that happen to be in the final year of their governors’ terms in
office would exhibit differential response. Nevertheless, with some data limitations in mind,
in Table 4.5 I control for some individual attitudes and characteristics that address this
possibility and others.
Table 4.5 shows Column 1 of Table 4.2 with a series of additional individual-level
covariates added. This task of controlling for additional factors is difficult, since many of
the relevant questions are asked only in a few survey waves, creating problems with missing
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Table 4.5: Additional Individual Covariates
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sched End of Term −0.015∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗ −0.007 −0.006∗ −0.023∗∗∗











Constant 0.104∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.025) (0.072) (0.023) (0.017)
Number of regions 75 76 75 76 74
Number of years 6 4 3 4 2
N 99,209 106,572 57,997 108,153 62,212
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income not shown.
data. For this reason, Table 4.5 shows the addition of each covariate one at a time. The
problem of missing data in some cases drastically decreases the sample size. That fact, taken
with the post-treatment nature of these survey questions, make these findings suggestive.
Nevertheless, Scheduled End of Term shows a negative and, in all but one regression, statis-
tically significant effect on corruption levels. This provides substantial additional evidence
that political competition, such as that found at the end of electoral terms in office, does
indeed diminish petty corruption.
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4.3.2 Modeling
I have chosen to use linear multilevel regression, implementing the linear probability model,
in analyses throughout this dissertation. Aside from drastically eased interpretability of the
results, the linear probability model avoids a distributional assumption about the shape of
the distribution of the outcome variable and is much more computationally stable (a partic-
ular concern with the large data sets and complex multilevel models used here). Moreover,
the typical objections to the use of the linear probability model when the outcome variable
is dichotomous are of very minimal concern in this case. As I am not engaged in a pre-
diction exercise, out-of-bounds predictions are not a worry. Heteroskedasticity is similarly
not a significant problem when the error structure is as highly modeled as it is when using
multilevel models. Nevertheless, in this section I demonstrate the robustness of my find-
ings to alternative modeling approaches: logistic multilevel regression and linear fixed effects
modeling.
In Table 4.6 I reproduce selected regressions from Table 4.2, employing logistic re-
gression in place of linear regression. Columns 1 and 2 show that the scheduled end of
term variable maintains its negative and statistically significant coefficient when the depen-
dent variable is modeled using a logistic distribution. This is the case for a wide variety of
specifications, including robustness to additional controls (not shown).
In Column 3, I conduct a linear fixed effects (within) regression in place of multilevel
modeling. In this no-pooling case, I am not able to include other region-year controls without
introducing potential multicollinearity. The coefficient on the scheduled end of term variable
is of smaller magnitude and loses some statistical significance, but the findings do not argue
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Table 4.6: Political Competition and Experienced Corruption, Alternative Modeling
DV: Bribery Experience
Logistic Multilevel Linear Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Scheduled End of Term −0.053∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.005∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.003)
Male 0.318∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.002)
Education 0.249∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.001)
Age −0.356∗∗∗ −0.356∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.001)
Income 0.148∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.002)










Constant −2.316∗∗∗ −3.109∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
(0.266) (0.933) (0.029)
Number of regions 78 77
Number of years 12 12
N 143,264 142,558 143,264
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income not shown.




In this section I provide the results of analyses that employ alternative measures of both my
dependent variable, having experienced bribery, and political competition, my key indepen-
dent variable. While, for reasons explained earlier, neither the reliability nor the validity of
the dichotomous self-reported measure of corruption experience that I use is under substan-
tial question, the use of survey-based evidence in general may come with some challenges.
In particular, these results are to some extent beholden to a fixed, specific question wording,
as well as to decisions about sampling and interviewing that are beyond my control as a
researcher. Regarding the measure of political competitiveness I have used, scheduled end of
term, there may be concerns that the exogeneity that it brings is bought with a substantial
amount of conceptual narrowing and limited external validity. In this section I loosen all of
these restrictions by introducing alternative measures for these variables.
4.4.1 Alternative Measures of Competition
By its nature, Scheduled End of Term is a highly dynamic, quickly-varying measure of
competitiveness (see Beazer 2015). This has advantages, such as the ease of locating the
effects of such fast-changing variables, but also disadvantages, since it does not pick up the
background differences in competitiveness that are present across regions. For this reason
I also employ an alternative variable, Petrov Competitiveness, an extensively-used measure
of regional political competitiveness in Russia (Petrov and Titkov 2013). This measure is
frequently used to proxy for the degree to which Russia’s regional political regimes are,
at one end of the scale, uncompetitive and strongly autocratic, versus, at the other end,
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‘hybrid,’ competitive, and relatively more democratic (Sharafutdinova 2012; Buckley, Reuter,
Shubenkova, and Garifullina 2015; Reuter and Buckley 2016).12 I employ a centered and
standardized form of this variable in regressions in order to improve the computational
stability of complex multilevel models. In order to get a sense of the variation between
regions within this measure, Figure 4.3 shows a map of this variable in 2010 for each region,
along with a histogram of these values.
12The Petrov-Titkov variable is composed of a number of subcomponents, each ranging from 1 to
5, with higher values indicating more liberal, democratic, competitive regime along that dimen-
sion. In this thesis, I choose the subcomponents that most closely fit the regime characteristic
I am interested in, namely, the extent to which regional politics are uncompetitive and strongly
centered around a consolidated political machine. To this end I build an additive index from
the following subcomponents: pluralism, liberalization, political structure, elite competitive, lo-
cal self-governance, and openness (Petrov and Titkov 2013; Reuter et al. 2015). The resulting
variable, Petrov Competitiveness, ranges from 9 (least competitive) to 28 (most competitive).
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Note: This chloropleth shows the 2010 values of the Petrov-Titkov ‘democracy’ score for
each region.
Several additional commonly-employed measures of political competitiveness within
an authoritarian regime present themselves.13 First is a measure of the share of the vote
won by United Russia in the most recent elections for the regional legislature.This measure
has been employed by numerous researchers and is an intuitive way of assessing how dom-
inant United Russia is in regional politics (Sharafutdinova 2006; Buckley and Reuter 2016;
13See Chapter 5 for further exploration of some of these variables, including effects conditional on
high and low levels of these variables.
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Lankina and Getachew 2006; Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004) . Where UR dominates the
legislature, the political sphere is less contested and so the threat of political competition
recedes into the background. Where UR is weak, politics is uncertain and the autocrat is
likely to be wary of allowing excessive corruption or discontent in such a contested context.
4.4.2 Results with Alternative Measures of Political Competition
First, in Table 4.7, I show that measuring political competition using several alternative
conceptions bears out the findings presented in earlier sections. First, in Column 1, greater
press freedom is actually associated with higher levels of corruption. This rather surprising
result may indicate that, in regions with more press freedom, the media more frequently
reports on bribery, thus increasing its salience in the minds of survey respondents. This
finding is entirely opposite from that which would be expected if press freedom were a proxy
measure for greater political competitiveness. In Column 2, the null hypothesis that regions
that produce a greater share of the vote for the dominant party, United Russia (UR), in
national elections (and so are less competitive) feature greater corruption is not rejected.
In Columns 3-5 we see that three commonly-used alternative measures of competitiveness—
the margin of victory of the governor of the region (if he is elected and not appointed), the
years of tenure in office for the governor, and the proportion of the vote received by UR
in elections to the regional legislature—all show expected positive and statistically signifi-
cant coefficients. All three variables are measures of lack of competitiveness, since greater
values indicate regions governors are stronger or where UR is particularly dominant. Thus
these regions are less politically competitive and exhibit greater corruption than competitive
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Table 4.7: Alternative Measures of Competition
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Press Freedom 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004)
UR Vote in National Elects −0.004
(0.003)
Gov Margin Victory 0.0003∗
(0.0002)
Gov’r Yrs Tenure 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002)
UR Vote in Regional Legis 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002)
Constant 0.068∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗
(0.039) (0.037) (0.062) (0.040) (0.033)
Number of regions 78 75 70 77 75
Number of years 12 11 9 9 9
N 143,254 135,703 45,440 139,354 105,654
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income not shown.
regions.
4.4.3 Measuring Corruption Using Web Search Data
Next, I replicate my main findings using an alternative dependent variable which is obser-
vational rather than survey-based. This is an original variable that measures the frequency
with which Russian internet users in each region search for relevant terms, in this case
‘bribe,’ using the popular Yandex search engine. Yandex, a homegrown search engine of
roughly equal popularity with Google in Russia, offers a tool called Wordstat that functions
nearly identically to Google Trends. Wordstat allows the user to view trends in search term
popularity over time for particular regions of Russia and the world. Figure 4.4 shows the
interface of this service.
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Figure 4.4: Yandex Wordstat Interface
Note: Shown is a portion of an example page from the Yandex Wordstat interface, with
search term ‘bribe’ entered for all of Russia. This interface can be accessed at word-
stat.yandex.ru
To collect this data, I chose a set of appropriate search terms, such as “corruption,”
“bribe,” and “how to report bribery.” I then used a web-scraping tool to download the over-
time content of the page for each region of Russia. Wordstat only shows the data for the last
two years (if monthly averages are displayed) or one year (if weekly averages are displayed),
so my ability to look back in time is quite limited. The tool shows both a total number
of searches performed for each term in a region in a period of time as well as a measure of
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the share of searches in that time period that the search term represents. The use of either
measure produces little difference in the results. In all cases I transform the measures by
relating them to Russia-wide trends—this gives a picture of comparatively how prevalent
searches for that term are relative to other regions.
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The dependent variable here is the relative frequency (i.e. relative to overall regional
search volumes) of searches for the term ‘bribe’ in each region, averaged over November
2014 to March 2016. The result is a region-level dataset. I then introduce my indicator for
scheduled end of term and Petrov competitiveness as predictors in a linear regression. This
variable shows regional-level search volumes on a week-by-week basis from approximately
November 2014 to the present day. Since no earlier data is available, I am limited to testing
this relationship on 2015-2016 data only.
Table 4.8: Alternative DV: Regional Average Yandex Searches for Bribery
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sched End of Term −0.005∗∗ −0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Petrov Competition −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Yandex: Putin Corrupt −13.311∗ −13.309∗
(7.838) (7.827)
Yandex: Chaika Corruption 22.779 9.086
(29.075) (28.257)
Constant 0.026∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
N 79 79 79 79
R2 0.061 0.097 0.064 0.099
Adjusted R2 0.049 0.061 0.052 0.063
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
To be sure, the conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis are limited in scope.
The measure captures only internet-using Russians. It is also hard to be sure exactly what
it means when an individual uses a search engine to search for the term ‘bribe.’ However,
this conclusion holds up when using alternative search terms and, as shown in Columns
2 and 4 of Table 4.8, when the grand corruption meanings of ‘bribe’ are controlled for
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with the inclusion of search terms “Putin corrupt” and “Chaika corruption,” referring to the
accusations of corruption recently directed at Prosecutor General Chaika. Finally, of course,
since these are region-level aggregates, we can never know anything about the individuals
who are actually doing this searching. Nevertheless, the strength and significance of the
results provides substantial additional evidence that political competition is closely related
to bribery.
4.4.4 Law Enforcement Data
Another measure of corruption that has been profitably used in other studies is the number
of criminal cases for corruption opened or prosecuted (Schultz, Bambang, and Zakharov
2016; Glaeser and Saks 2006; Alt and Lassen 2014). These measures are problematic for a
number of reasons. First, crime statistics are often of questionable quality even in the best
institutional settings, let alone in developing or non-democratic countries. Second, these
measures are easily manipulated and are likely endogenous to many other features of the
social and political context. Third, it is not certain that an increase in registered corruption
cases, for example, represents an increase in corruption as opposed to simply an increase
in enforcement. Nonetheless, this measure’s prominence in the literature and its relative
availability press for its inclusion in analysis of corruption levels. Table 4.9 does just that,
presenting the results of non-nested multilevel models where the dependent variable is the
number of criminal cases for corruption registered in each region-year per 1000 total criminal
cases registered. This data was scraped from a website containing crime statistics from the
Russian Prosecutor General.14 In this case, I sum the numbers of criminal cases for taking
14http://www.crimestat.ru
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bribes (Article 290 of the Federal Criminal Code), giving bribes (Article 291), and ‘abuse of
official authority’ (Article 285).
Table 4.9: Alternative DV: Number of Corruption Criminal Cases per 1000 All Cases
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sched End of Term −0.589∗∗ −0.602∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.224)
Petrov Competition −0.935∗∗∗ −0.293
(0.285) (0.352)
Log GRP −1.043∗∗∗ −1.143∗∗∗
(0.349) (0.356)
Pct Russian −3.430∗ −3.091
(2.002) (1.996)




Pct Urban 0.113 1.294
(2.555) (2.563)
Constant 5.099∗∗∗ 5.407 4.903∗∗∗ 5.385
(0.314) (4.289) (0.292) (4.643)
N 498 497 583 582
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
For all but one of the models considered in Table 4.9, greater political competition
(scheduled end of term or Petrov competition) is associated with a statistically significant
decrease in the number of corruption cases registered. These results should be taken as
suggestive for the reasons described above, but they provide additional support for my
argument that political competition diminishes bribery.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have rallied a wide array of data and statistical techniques to show the stark
effect of political competitiveness on petty corruption in Russia. The findings presented here,
showing that bribery as it is experienced every day by the public is affected in no small way by
the political risks to office faced by governors, are as robust to probing examination as they
are surprising. The surprise elements of the findings are what confirm the theory laid out in
Chapter 2. First, rather than descend into banditry at the risk of losing one’s job, actors in
autocracies are constrained into better behavior when they know they may be punished. Even
when both democratic accountability mechanisms and consolidated, hierarchical autocratic
institutions are absent, still competition and the threat of punishment limit actors’ rent
seeking.
Second, the strong claim I have made earlier—that political competition is a potent
enough force to change corrupt behavior down through many layers of regime and state
structures—has been borne out by rigorous examination of the data. At first glance it
may be rather surprising that even street-level bribery is affected by competitiveness shocks
like ends of terms in office. But the deliberate nature with which corruption is used, the
leverage that Russia’s ‘petite autocrat’ governors have over chains of corrupt officials, and
the alignment of incentives generated by political competition assure us that this finding is
not in error. Officials in authoritarian regimes can be quite calculating in their management
of a central dilemma: how to steal enough to enrich oneself and co-opt one’s machine, while
not stealing too much so as to provoke unrest and be replaced. The next chapter adds
additional evidence for the veracity of this claim while exploring the findings further.
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The findings in this chapter underline the importance of authoritarian institutions in
affecting the incentives that regime actors face. Governors in the last year of a previously
scheduled term in office are strongly and consistently incentivized to reduce corruption in
their regions as a way of bolstering their reappointment chances. By employing this measure
of political competitiveness—the last year in a scheduled term in office—I have been able
to better causally identify the effect of competition on a day-to-day publics goods outcome
under autocracy. Too rarely do we gain insight into the plausibly exogenous effects of rules
and formal institutions like appointment calendars. Especially when paired with a look at
outcomes as experienced by publics living under authoritarianism, the usefulness of studying
such rules—features that may constrain and incentivize regime actors even without their
conscious knowledge—comes to the forefront.
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5 | Resources and Strength:
Exploring Conditional Effects
To this day it is impossible to start
one’s own thing [business or dealings
with the state] in less than many
months. You have to go to every office
with a bribe—to the fire inspectors, to
the health inspectors, to the
gynecologist...
—Vladimir Putin, address to the
nation, March 6, 2009
In previous chapters, I have argued for and tested the proposition that increases
in political competitiveness, such as those driven by the ends of terms in office, produce
lower levels of corruption since governors worry about being punished by the autocrat for
poor performance. A natural corollary asks: what sorts of governors will be more or less
susceptible to such worries? As not all principal-agent relationships between the autocrat
and his many agents are the same, the effect of competition on those relationships should
depend on the characteristics of the agents.
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Aside from showing that political competition has a nuanced, regime-dependent effect
on corruption levels, finding support for such conditional effects also bolsters confidence
that the proposed intra-regime, principal-agent dynamics do indeed underlie these results.
Why is this the case? If scheduled end of term were capturing other changes occurring
in these years—perhaps other changes to governors’ behavior besides efforts to decrease
corruption—then it would be unlikely to find evidence for the conditional effects predicted
by the theory, described in Chapter 2. Only if at least two conditions are met do these
alternative interpretations of scheduled end of term remain a serious threat: 1) if governors’
access to resources is predicted to have the same conditional effect on corruption as the
specific predictions made by my theory, and 2) if the same assumptions about attention and
period specificity for end-of-term’s effects on corruption hold for the alternative explanations.
In other words, I have argued that there are good reasons to believe that it is only in end-of-
term years that governors act to reduce corruption in the face of political competition. The
same assumptions are much less plausible for other potential interpretations of end-of-term,
and they must hold in order for those interpretations to be valid.
5.1 Identification
Interacting a plausibly exogenous variable with variables potentially suffering from endo-
geneity weakens causal identification of these parameters. In some cases, such as natural
resource endowments and ethnic population makeup, these concerns are very minimal, as
these regional features are highly unlikely to have been substantially shaped by corruption
levels or other confounders. For other variables where endogeneity may be a greater con-
cern, like size of government or turnover in government, I take the results as suggestive and
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supportive of my overall conclusions.
While the conditional unconfoundedness of variables like a governor’s year of tenure
in office is fundamentally impossible to prove, several factors make it very plausible. First, it
is difficult to draw a clear line from petty corruption to a governor being fired in a non-end-
of-term year. In other words, while a governor may be fired for grand corruption and abuse
of office1 if those become too egregious, the ‘reverse causality’ case of high petty corruption
levels directly causing a governor’s tenure in office to end is much harder to make. Certainly
other related factors may come into play, such as if petty corruption prompts a governor’s
support among crucial stakeholder to falter, so I make no strong claims of exogeneity. But
it seems more likely that a governor who has been in office for many years and has been
able to build the political resources necessary to remain in place will feel secure enough to
engage in high quantities of petty corruption to reward his political machine than that this
corruption directly influences his ability to stay in office.
5.2 Theoretical Expectations
In the preceding chapter, I provided evidence that Russian governors are sensitive to the
signaling nature of corruption. When they see political competition rise, such as when their
term in office is coming to a close, they decrease corruption so as to avoid falling foul of the
autocrat. In Chapter 5 I explain why, in fact, this dynamic is likely to be more complex
1Several examples of this from recent history include Nikita Belykh, former governor of Kaluga, and
Aleksandr Khoroshavin, former governor of Sakhalin. While the Belykh case especially is tainted
by political machinations that call the veracity of the corruption charges into question, nevertheless
there are an increasing number of such steep falls from power for Russian governors in a regime
increasingly concerned with appearing clean.
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than the one-size-fits-all relationship demonstrated in Chapter 4. If a governor feels that he
is already in a very secure position vis-a-vis the autocrat, he will be far less concerned about
sudden rises in political competition derailing his time in office.
While unfortunately it is impossible to fully measure an autocrat’s opinion of all of
his key agents, we can employ proxies that capture the political resources, strength, and
performance of governors. The more resources and strength a governor possesses, the harder
it should be for the autocrat to fire him when the end of his term arrives. Similarly, the
better performing a governor is in areas besides corruption, the more likely it is that the
autocrat will overlook limited indiscretions in that area and leave him in office.2
In this chapter, I focus on the three rough categories of governor characteristics—
resources, strength, and performance—that should apply more generally in any setting where
my theory applies. Certainly, though, other features could matter—features which I do not
or cannot contend with here. For example, a close personal relationship between a governor
and the autocrat could sway the autocrat’s decision making. Leverage on the part of the
governor could make his removal difficult in ways that would be hard for an outside observer
to reliably measure. Since such aspects of the principal-agent relationship are essentially
impossible to capture cleanly in an empirical analysis, I set these aside.
As long as a governor does not become a threat to the autocrat,3 an autocrat will
2This underlines that corruption is but one signal of performance of an agent, though I argue that
it is a crucial one for several reasons outlined in Chapter 2. As long as a governor’s corruption is
not so bad that it cannot be overlooked or that the threat of public dissatisfaction approaches the
boiling point, a high-performing governor can freely allow some bribery.
3In the case of Russia, this is rather hard to conceive of under the current regime, though some
would likely point to Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov as a potential threat to Vladimir Putin’s
stable rule.
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view a stronger or more resource-rich governor favorably (Buckley and Reuter 2015). Indeed,
the autocrat is incentivized to co-opt those resources and maximally secure his rule in the
governor’s region. So a rational autocrat incorporates positive signals of performance and
resources, discounts (within reason) signals of high corruption, and is likely to leave the
governor in office for another term. For his part, the governor has a sense, with some
uncertainty, of how well he is performing and how secure he is, and does not feel the need
to drastically reduce corruption during competitive times.
5.3 Regression Analysis
In this chapter, I continue with the general empirical approach employed in Chapter 4.
Multilevel models that take individual-level survey responses at the ‘first’ level and region-
year covariates at the ‘second’ (group) level are used, with testing of the proposed conditional
effects conducted by interacting measures of governor resources with the Scheduled End of
Term covariate. As I am interested in the effect of governor resources on the (previously
demonstrated) negative relationship between final year of a term in office and experienced
petty corruption, the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction
term serves as an indicator of that effect. For example, when a measure indicates greater
governor resources, a positive interaction term shows that greater resources lessens (weakens)
the effect of political competitiveness on corruption levels. This would provide confirmatory
evidence of my theoretical expectations.
I operationalize governor resources as a set of proxy measures indicating when a
Russian governor is likely to feel more secure, more powerful in his or her regional political
milieu. Since I think of resources in a broad way—purely political, bureaucratic, economic,
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social—any of a set of such measures can partially capture the strength of a governor. Most
clear, perhaps, is the variable that assesses the proportion of regional economies that is
based in natural resource production. Governors of regions with greater natural resource
endowments have leverage with their local political machines and elites, with Moscow in
budget and other negotiations (even if natural resource revenue is predominantly transferred
quickly to the center, as it often but not always is), and with the public in their region.4 I
hypothesize that governors with these resources at hand can exploit them—especially when
competition is high—to ensure the public’s contentment and the autocrat’s reappointment
assent in the face of high corruption levels. Even if resources are used as a substitute for
corruption rents, that effect would be quite constant over time and should not be associated
with times of high competition such as final years of terms in office.
In Table 5.1, I explore this finding further, showing conditional effects of Scheduled
End of Term. In Column 1, I show the effect of Scheduled End of Term when interacted
with another exogenous variable, Nat Resources. This variable measures the proportion of
a region’s economic output produced by natural resources. Under my theory, such wind-
fall income should serve as a cushion for embattled autocrats—a substitute for corruption
income—and thus lessen the effect of Scheduled End of Term. Indeed, a region with no
natural resource production shows a substantially larger effect of political competition than
that found in Table 4.2: -0.007. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the
interaction term between Nat Resources and Scheduled End of Term shows that the effect
of Scheduled End of Term sharply shrinks, the more natural resources a region has.
4So, we can see Tatarstan employing natural resource wealth (along with a strong sense of non-
Russian ethnic identity and solidarity) to bolster public opinion by building infrastructure.
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Column 2 shows the mediating effect of another factor decreasing the salience of
political competition for an autocrat: ethnic identity. Here, I interact the covariate measuring
the percentage of the regional population that is ethnically Russian with Scheduled End of
Term. Since so-called titular republics in Russia are generally headed by members of the
majority (non-Russian) ethnic group, such leaders should find it easier to maintain control
and dominance of a state the greater the weight that their coethnics have in the population.
In heavily Russian regions, society is quite homogenous and so political competition can
arise as a significant threat from any direction. The coefficient on the interaction term is
negative and statistically significant, showing that heavily Russian regions show a much
stronger effect of increased political competition than do ethnically diverse regions.
In Table 5.1, I show how a number of characteristics of a governor’s political machine
and the bureaucratic state it governs shape the effects of competition on corruption levels.
This points to the important role of a politicized elite bureaucracy in actively collecting and
distributing bribes. These bribes function as a sort of glue, a means of control, over the
state apparatus. By showing that features of that apparatus and the amount of need for the
‘glue’ temper the sensitivity of the regime to political competition, one can see the role that
corruption plays in authoritarian institutions beyond merely being manipulated to keep the
public just happy enough not to revolt.
How does the size of the elite bureaucracy—composed of the viziers and vice governors
who populate the upper reaches of a Russian regional autocrat’s regime—affect political
competition depresses corruption? To capture this, in Column 3 of Table 5.1 I include
and interact with Scheduled End of Term a variable, Gov’t Size. This variable is an original
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Table 5.1: Corruption, Competition, and the State
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sched End of Term −0.007∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.016) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
Nat Resources −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0004)
Resources X End of Term 0.0004
(0.0003)












Machine Org X End of Term 0.003∗
(0.002)
Log GRP 0.014 −0.008 −0.017∗ −0.014 −0.019∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Pct Russian −0.084∗ −0.047 −0.123∗∗ −0.115∗∗ −0.066
(0.047) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.053)
Log Population −0.006 0.019 0.019 0.015 0.031∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Republic/City/AO −0.023 −0.021 −0.062∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.009
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Pct Urban −0.089∗ −0.095∗ −0.124∗∗ −0.139∗∗ −0.064
(0.054) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.059)
Constant 0.188 0.059 0.257∗ 0.283∗∗ 0.007
(0.123) (0.125) (0.135) (0.138) (0.135)
Number of regions 77 77 75 75 76
Number of years 12 12 9 8 12
N 142,558 142,558 131,853 130,516 136,345
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income not shown.
measure generated from a large new database of Russian elite actors (see Reuter and Buckley
2016). It simply captures the number of department-level or higher officials in each Russian
regional government in each year. This includes mostly high-ranking officials like so-called
vice governors, but also lower-ranked heads of agencies and departments. The larger this
regime machinery and professional staff, the more of a bulwark the petite autocrat should
have against the vagaries of political competition. This is exactly what we observe, with
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larger elite bureaucracies decreasing the magnitude of political competition’s effect. It should
be noted that this bureaucracy is defined differently from the typical measure of all state
employees, encompassing here only individuals quite highly placed in the regime. The effect
observed here holds for either the highest ranked officials only (e.g., vice governors) or for
mid-level officials only.
Column 4 of Table 5.1 shows how a disruption to bureaucratic structures—turnover
of high-placed officials in the regime—affects even low-level corruption that is experienced
far from the halls of power. Even in non-competitive times (i.e., when there is no scheduled
end of term in office), greater turnover among officials is associated with sharply less bribery.
It is true that we cannot be completely certain that this turnover is not being caused endoge-
nously by corruption scandals or public dissatisfaction with levels of corruption. However,
accountability and free press mechanisms are so weak in Russian regions that it is vanishingly
rare that an official would be punished for street-level bribery. This lends credence to the
interpretation of the coefficient on the interaction term of Official Turnover and Scheduled
End of Term as capturing turnover among officials for non-corruption reasons, and thus
measuring the size of the effect of disruption in regime hierarchies on corruption levels.
Finally, Column 5 incorporates a measure of the level of organization of the regime’s
political regime. There is substantial variation from region to region and, indeed, from elec-
toral precinct to electoral precinct, in the vote share that the ruling party, United Russia,
garners. What is more, there is great variation in the dominance that regional autocrats
show in generating pro-regime votes within their fiefdoms. Russia’s electoral system is di-
vided into (in increasing size and aggregation): precincts, districts, and then regions. The
variable Machine Organization captures the extent to which authoritarian political machines
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are well-organized and capable. I generate the Machine Organization measure by calculat-
ing the standard deviations of both turnout and United Russia vote share at the precinct
level (weighted by precinct population). I then sum the turnout and vote share standard
deviations to produce one value that captures the homogeneity of pro-regime votes within
each region across that region’s precincts.
Here too I find a strong, positive conditional relationship between political machine
strength and end of term, with an estimated coefficient on the interaction term of 0.003. This
indicates that for every standard deviation increase in the strength of machine organization,
end of term has a weaker reducing effect on corruption by nearly 100%. This supports
my theory—where governors have little in the way of machine resources to rely on, they
are particularly threatened by end of term political competition and so reduce corruption
drastically. When they can draw on a capable machine, they have no need to decrease
corruption in end of term years and may in fact increase it.
In Table 5.2, I present another set of proxy measures for governor strength and
resources—the alternative measures of political competition employed previously in Table
5.1. Functioning as ways of capturing political competitiveness, they can also be thought
about working in the other direction and assessing the resistance of a governor to political
competitiveness. In Columns 1-5, I interact press freedom, United Russia’s share of the vote
in region from the last national election, the governor’s margin of victory (if applicable) in
his last electoral contest for office, the years of tenure the governor has accumulated in office,
and United Russia’s share of the vote in the last elections for the regional legislature, respec-
tively. In the Russian context, greater press freedom may indicate a weaker grip on regional
politics and so constitutes a sign of governor weakness, all other things being equal. The
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remaining four measures are all increasing in governor strength and resource endowment.
Positive interaction term coefficients for these four variables indicate that the negative effect
of an end of term is decreasing, i.e. weakening. This would indicate that governors with these
characteristics feel less susceptible to political competition due to their political strength.
Table 5.2: Alternative Measures of Competition
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Scheduled End of Term 0.037∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.001 −0.002 −0.061∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011)
Press Freedom 0.018∗∗∗
(0.004)
Press Freedom X Sched End Term −0.013∗∗∗
(0.003)
UR Vote in National Elects −0.009∗∗∗
(0.003)
UR Vote Nat’l X Sched End Term 0.019∗∗∗
(0.003)
Gov Mar Victory 0.0001
(0.0002)
Gov Mar Victory X Sched End Term 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002)
Gov Yrs Tenure 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0003)
Gov Yrs Tenure X Sched End Term −0.0003
(0.001)
UR Vote in Regional Legis 0.0001
(0.0002)
UR Vote Regional X Sched End Term 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002)
Constant
Number of regions 78 75 70 77 75
Number of years 12 11 9 9 9
N 143,254 135,703 45,440 139,354 105,654
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income not shown.
I find strong support for the proposition that strong governors do not feel susceptible
to political competition shocks for governor tenure, Column 4. This is a strong and statis-
tically significant coefficient, indicating that the more years a governor has been in office,
the less he decreases (or, in fact, the more he may increase) corruption when an end of term
year arrives. Columns 1 and 2 do not support my theory, showing a positive and negative
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coefficient, respectively, which is the opposite of what I expected. The remaining columns
are not significant and show very small estimated effects.
5.4 Robustness
In Table 5.3, I reproduce Table 5.1, but using my main alternative measure of political
competitiveness besides the end of term indicator—the Petrov-Titkov democracy score. As
discussed in previous chapters, this measure does not offer the same advantages in exogeneity
that the scheduled end of term in office measure does, but it does have several aspects that
make it well worth considering as a robustness check. It is a continuous measure of political
competition rather than a dichotomous one, it holistically captures ‘background’ levels of
political competition aside from brief temporal shocks, and has been used extensively in
existing research to show when politics have grown competitive in Russian regions.
Examining the findings in Table 5.3, the results here are mixed. In several models the
results do not line up with theoretical expectations or the results in Table 5.1, with a number
of coefficients having the opposite sign from what was expected. For example, greater natural
resource availability has a negative conditional effect on corruption, indicating that natural
resources prompt governors in competitive regions to reduce corruption even more than those
in regions without natural resources. This runs counter to previous findings. Two possible
explanations for these results stand out. First, collinearity between the Petrov measure
of political competition and factors like natural resources may be biasing the estimated
coefficients. Second, the extremely slow-moving nature of all of the variables being measured
here may be making it difficult to accurately assess effects in single region-years, as these
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Table 5.3: Corruption, Competition, and the State: Additional Measures
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Petrov Competition −0.013∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Nat Resources −0.002∗∗∗
(0.0004)
Nat Resources X Petrov Competition −0.001∗∗
(0.0003)
Pct Russian −0.097∗∗ −0.031 −0.126∗∗ −0.115∗∗ −0.062
(0.047) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052)












Machine Org X Petrov Competition −0.004∗
(0.002)
Log GRP 0.027∗∗ 0.0005 −0.005 −0.007 −0.015
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Log Population −0.017 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.032∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Republic/City/AO −0.035∗ −0.026 −0.072∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.018
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Pct Urban −0.072 −0.107∗ −0.112∗ −0.114∗ −0.042
(0.054) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Number of regions 77 77 75 75 76
Number of years 12 12 9 8 12
N 142,558 142,558 131,853 130,516 136,345
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Individual-level predictors male, age, education, urban, income not shown.
models are attempting to do. Therefore, I take these results suggestively, while noting that
they modestly reduce confidence in the main findings of this chapter.
5.5 Summary and Discussion
In this chapter, I have shown how the political strength of a governor conditions the effect
of political competition on the amount of corruption that the governor permits in his region.
Where governors have independent resources or sources of stability, political competition
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matters less to them. They are thus less compelled to decrease corruption in order to
please the autocrat. In other words, not only are governors particularly worried about being
punished by a discontent public and disappointed autocrat during times of high political
competition, as I showed in Chapter 4, but not all governors are equally worried. Some
governors have additional resources to draw on that make them feel more secure in office
than governors without these resources. Being more secure, they are less strongly incentivized
to reduce corruption in these end of term times.
This chapter highlights the importance of context in drawing out the effects of incen-
tives on regime actors. While the theory I am testing shows a relatively simple relationship
in how competition incentivizes behavior within authoritarian principal-agent relationships,
the present chapter notes the complexity of those underlying relationships and of this causal
effect. The autocrat in the case of Russia is essentially a fixed, unvarying factor in the
governor-autocrat dynamic, but the contexts within which the governors are making their
decisions about their job security and about levels of corruption are not static. I show some
examples of how those decisions can be thought of more diversely.
The findings in this chapter also contribute to literatures that describe how features
like natural resources or political machines can be used by authoritarian leaders to strengthen
their holds on power. I show one path through which these features can work—corruption
and fear of political competition. This also suggests a potentially fruitful path forward
for research in many areas. Scholars should consider theoretically-motivated conditional,
interactive ways that resources, public goods, clientelism, state capacity, and other factors
work together to shape how autocrats govern and how they maintain durable regimes.
Finally, perhaps most importantly for the present study, this chapter has attempted to
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provide confirmatory evidence for the theory presented in Chapter 2 and tested in Chapter 4.
While I am unable to fully ‘connect the dots’ between governor decision making, corruption
as a public good, and political competitiveness, since that would require data that is, if not
impossible to conclusively collect, at least beyond the scope of this dissertation, I do test
straightforward observable implications of those mechanisms. Given that the mechanisms
implied by my theory involve a rather deep dive into the decision making processes inside
governors’ heads, this chapter provides a look at other features of that decision making arena
that should shape how governors act. Indeed, I find that contextual factors that capture
governors’ security in office strikingly condition how much those governors react to political
competition.
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6 | Autocrats, Governors,
and the Risk of Public Unrest
What, shall one of us, That struck for
the foremost man of all this world But
for supporting robbers—shall we now
Contaminate our fingers with base
bribes, And sell the mighty space of
our large honors For so much trash as
may be grasped thus?
—Shakespeare, Julius Caesar
A key assumption of the theory developed and tested in preceding chapters is that the
public experiences corruption directly and reacts negatively to those experiences. It is this
reaction that autocrats and governors seek to ‘manage,’ especially in times of high political
competition, by keeping corruption rare enough that the public is acquiescent. In this chapter
I test these empirical implications: does the public’s trust in the government, voting behavior,
or inclination to protest depend on experiences with corruption? How are these reactions
shaped by institutions and context, including political competitiveness? By showing that the
Russian public is deeply, negatively affected by petty corruption experiences, I lend additional
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support to the findings presented in previous chapters as well as their interpretation. This
chapter also highlights the importance of the threat of public protest in autocracies and of
understanding the attitudes of publics living under authoritarianism.1
This chapter seeks to build on and test the observation that autocrats and governors
are not unfounded in their fear of the public protesting or being dissatisfied about corruption
levels. As we have learned from work such as that of Magaloni (2006), such regimes can be
quite sophisticated in measuring and reacting to public opinion. While the ultimate fear is of
mass street protest possibly leading to revolution, such as that seen in many of the so-called
colored revolutions of the mid-2000s in Georgia and Ukraine, this can be thought of as a
result that is strongly off the equilibrium path for all actors: the autocrat, his agents, and
the public. For this reason, the use of detailed individual-level data can be very useful in
building a picture, however imperfect, of attitudes and beliefs on the equilibrium path. In
other words, are autocratic publics sensitive to public goods like corruption? Do they react
to negative experiences with corruption in a predictable way that could, if pushed further,
prompt dangerous anti-regime action? In this chapter I rally extensive new data sources to
answer these questions in the affirmative, joining existing research in showing that autocrats
are right to seek to tailor phenomena like corruption to avoid discontent.
Why bother keeping a population living under authoritarianism happy? Short of the
efficiency losses entailed in wholesale theft of most of an economy, even autocrats face real
risks from a dissatisfied public. Indeed, this risk looms large for all but the most secure,
1This chapter incorporates several parts of an unpublished manuscript “Of Bribes and Badges in
Russia: Does Paying a Bribe Undermine Trust in Government?” (Buckley and Frye 2013), pre-
sented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in April, 2013. The
data and analyses presented here, however, are original to the present work.
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coercive autocratic leaders. Public discontent in its various forms—protest, unrest, rebellion,
or even revolution—figure prominently in many theories of autocratic longevity. The models
presented by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003) describe publics whose threats
of revolution are so substantial that elites would prefer to democratize than take the risk of
being deposed.
Closer in spirit to the present study is a growing literature on why and when autocrats
provide public goods in an effort to assuage popular pressures. Autocrats are well aware that
they cannot simply steal all economic production for themselves (Olson 1993). One risk is
preference falsification until a rift appears and the public rises up to fight the regime (Kuran
1991, 1997). But before that point is reached, public goods should be provided only in so far
as they are a ‘cost-effective’ way of keeping the population happy. Despite the prominence of
petty corruption as a public ‘bad,’ relatively little research examines the public’s responses
and reactions to experiencing corruption (see, though, Tucker and Klasnja (2013, 2016) and
Reisinger, Zaloznaya, and Claypool (2016)). In this chapter, while testing key assumptions
and implications of my theory, I build upon the insights in existing research. By bringing
new data on experienced corruption to bear and focusing on one authoritarian context, I
show that Russian governors’ fears of being fired for allowing public discontent to rise too
far—fears which are only heightened in times of high political competitiveness—are well-
founded. Even in highly corrupt, non-democratic regimes, publics are exceedingly reactive
to experiences with petty corruption.
Despite the widespread condemnation of corruption, some scholars have argued that
corruption need not undermine trust in public institutions. This revisionist view of corrup-
tion suggests that bribepaying can become so engrained in a culture that citizens attach
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little normative content to the practice. Borrowing from this strain of thought, Miller et al.
(1998: 15) develop “two ideal types of low-level corruption.” The first of which is a “culture
of corruption model”—a culture of mutual favors in which citizens are happy to give bribes
and officials are happy to accept them. Both sides justify the practice, perhaps morally
justify it, and neither feels that they are acting under duress.”
Indeed, some scholars working in the modernization tradition view corruption as
performing critical functions in a weak political environment. Huntington’s oft cited quote
(1968: 69) “the only thing worse than a society with a rigid over centralized dishonest
bureaucracy is one with a rigid over centralized honest bureaucracy” represents one of the
clearest depictions of this view. But he is not alone. Becquart-Leclerc (1989: 192) argues:
“Corruption functions like grease in the gears: it has an important redistributive effect, it is
a functional substitute for direct participation in power, it constitutes the cement between
elites and parties, and it affects the effectiveness with which power is exercised.” Similarly,
Leys observes that “the greater the corruption, the greater the harmony between corruptor
and corruptee” (1965). If anything, this last would lead one to expect that bribepaying
should be associated with a positive view of government.
The relatively benign view that culture can dampen the normative impact of bribery
on public attitudes is hardly unknown in the postcommunist region. As Lovell (2002:34)
notes: “Institutions take their meaning from the political culture in which they operate.
And the ‘political culture’ (to take the broadest meaning of this term) of postcommunism is
still in the shadow of communism. The legacy of communism includes a preference for the
bureaucratic-administrative way of doing things; it condones corrupt behavior (accepting
it as sometimes even functionally necessary).” Similarly, Bowser (2002: 85) observes that
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“while the actions of the elites are perceived as being inevitably corrupt, the everyday corrupt
acts that citizens perpetrate (e.g., paying state medical staff for treatment) are not.”
The view that corruption can become a social norm and create a culture of corruption
finds echo in some game theoretic treatments of corruption (Bardan 1997). The act of
engaging in corruption may generate norms of noncompliance that spread throughout society
thereby minimizing the negative connotations associated with bribery (Mishra 2006). Indeed,
if most people pay bribes, then honest citizens are disadvantaged, and are likely to be more
frustrated with the government that will be bribepayers. If this benign view of corruption
were true, then at a minimum, we would expect bribepayers to be no less likely to trust the
government than non-bribepayers, and if anything, may express greater trust in government
given the trust needed to engage in bribery.
On the other hand, many observers argue that the payment of bribes is likely to be
associated with less trust in government as bribepayers resent having to pay state officials for
services that should be provided by law (Eigen 1997; UNDP 1997: vii). In addition, many
argue that corruption undermines trust in government by highlighting the lack of equality
before the state and revealing the underlying distribution of power in society (Noonan 1987;
Uslaner 2008). This orthodox view of corruption has become an article of faith in the
international economic development community.
The theory described in Chapter 2 stipulates that a self-interested governor is con-
cerned with keeping the public in his region just satisfied enough with his leadership to not
protest or press for his removal. There are several testable implications of this proposition,
each of which I test in this chapter.
1. Individuals react negatively to experiences with petty corruption, rather than being re-
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signed to corruption, indifferent, or positively disposed to it
2. Governors who are popular or see little protest are less responsive to political competition
shocks in reducing corruption
3. Governors will use contextual clues to focus reductions of corruption on groups that are
more likely to protest in response to corruption experiences
The combination of individual-level data on attitudes and experiences with macro-
level data on governor popularity allows me to answer these questions in a way that avoids
some of the ecological fallacy concerns and observation of off-the-equlibrium-path behavior
that might come with the use of aggregate data or observational data about public protest
events.
6.1 Empirical Approach
Surveys that ask directly about personal experience with corruption have the advantage of
clarity in that the respondent can rely on personal experience to answer the questions. For
example, Seligson (2002: 2005) develops a “corruption victimization index” which relies on
direct questions of respondents that ask, among other things, whether they have paid a
bribe to a police officer. He finds that experiences with corruption are negatively correlated
with perceptions of government legitimacy in four Latin American countries. Miller (2005)
takes a slightly different approach by asking respondents not whether they paid a bribe, but
whether an official has “ever asked you or your family directly for money, or a present, or not
asked directly but seemed to expect something?” This approach presents the initial offer as
coming from the state official and thereby may make respondents more willing to answer.
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Direct questions about experiences with corruption have the great advantage of clarity
because we rely on individuals recounting their own behavior, but also raise concerns about
the reliability of responses. Direct questions likely underreport bribery, as respondents may
be reluctant to admit to engaging an illegal activity and thereby implicate themselves or
others. Miller at al. (1998:78) note that direct questions “involve confessions as much as
allegations.” Direct questions about experiences with corruption may be more helpful in
democratic settings where discussions of engaging in corruption may be less plagued by
response bias. In autocratic settings the bias in responses raise the possibility of a spurious
relationship between bribery and distrust because more outspoken respondents may be both
more likely to admit engaging in corrupt behavior and be more willing to express distrust in
the government.
Other studies rely on perceptions of corruption. To explore the impact of corruption
on evaluations of government, Anderson and Tverdova (2003) use national-level data on
corruption from the Corruptions Perceptions Index from Transparency International and
individual level data on evaluations of government from the International Social Survey
Program (ISSP). They find not only a direct effect of corruption on trust in civil servants in 16
countries, they also find that respondents in more corrupt countries who support the political
opposition express even less trust in civil servants. In a similar vein, Mishler and Rose
(2001) use data from 10 countries in Eastern Europe and report that perceived corruption is
associated with less trust in political institutions. Using the East Asian Barometer, Chang
and Chu (2007) measure corruption by asking respondents: “How widespread do you think
corruption and bribetaking are in your national [capital city] government?” Responses are
placed on four point scale where 1 equals “hardly anyone is involved” to 4 equals “almost
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everyone is involved.” It is important to understand perceptions of corruptions in their
own right, but perceived corruption may correspond only roughly with objective levels of
corruption (Olken 2007; Treisman 2007; Krastev 2009).
Another approach is to use indirect survey questions that ask not directly about
the respondents’ behavior, but about “respondents like them.” This technique is commonly
used to measure corruption in firm surveys (Frye and Shleifer 1996; Svensson 2003). These
indirect questions may be less threatening for respondents to answer, but likely introduce
greater noise as respondents may have little idea about how other “people like them” have
experienced corruption.
6.1.1 Data and Research Design
Most of the surveys incorporated into the data set I employed in Chapters 3 and 4 have little
to data to offer about corruption besides the experiential question I use. Similarly, consistent
data about trust and other political features is rarely found. In order to learn about how
corruption experiences affect individuals’ attitudes and behavior, it is useful to have broader
evidence about these corruption experiences. In addition to the full complement of data from
my 16-survey data set, in this chapter I also focus on responses to a 2016 survey conducted
by the Levada Center at the behest of the author and colleagues. This allows a closer look
at how and when the public reacts to bribery.
These questions were included in one wave of a recurring, nationally-representative
survey of 1,600 Russians conducted by the Levada center. The questions asked if respondents
had experienced a government official requesting or extorting a bribe from them in the last
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Table 6.1: Detail on Questions in 2016 Survey (Levada Center ‘Courier’)
Question Proportions Available Answers
3a 18.7% 1) I was surprised
81.2% 2) This was not unexpected for me
3b 58.3% 1) I felt irritation, got angry
12.1% 2) I felt ease, relief
29.6% 3) I was indifferent
3c 58.0% 1) It was materially difficult
42.0% 2) It was not so materially difficult
3d 70.7% 1) I felt that it was amoral
29.3% 2) I felt that it was basically normal
five years, and, if so, whether they felt each of the reactions listed. Each question also
included a third possible response: there was no case of experiencing bribery in the last five
years. Overall, 79% of respondents chose this last response, indicated that they had not
had a bribery experience of this sort in the last five years. This accords well with evidence
from other sources about the prevalence of bribery in Russia. All proportions reported in
the Tables 6.1-6.8 are proportions of those 21% of respondents who indicated that they had
experienced bribery.
6.1.2 Causal Identification
In the first part of this chapter, I use survey responses about willingness to protest, regime
satisfaction, and trust in the government as dependent variables, with the variable used as
the dependent variable in Chapters 4 and 5 (having experienced a bribe request from an
official) serving as my predictor of interest. To be sure, having experienced a bribe request
is far from randomly assigned, making unconditional independence of the predictor unlikely.
Independence conditional on observable individual characteristics is more likely, but the
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possibility of endogeneity remains and cannot be solved using the data at hand. What are
the potential sources of endogeneity and how serious of concerns are they for causal inference
in these regressions? I list and discuss several here.
1. Participating in or contemplating public protest may put one in situations that increase
the probability of experiencing bribery (reverse causation)
2. Individuals with general anti-regime attitudes may be more willing to report bribery ex-
periences and to report being willing to engage in protest actions (omitted variable bias,
confounding)
3. Reporting that one is inclined to participate in protest may be a ‘cheap talk’ signal of
general dissatisfaction rather than an indicator of true willingness to go out on the streets
(construct validity)
Eliminating or even seriously mitigating these concerns remains the work of future,
experiment-based research. For present purposes, I simply endeavor to include as many
key potential confounders in my regression analyses as possible and to remain tentative in
interpreting the results of those regressions. The inclusion of potential confounders such as
general attitude towards the regime lessens the second and third concerns with endogeneity,
if the results withstand their inclusion. I also note that the first endogeneity concern seems
rather implausible in the Russian context. As noted in previous chapters, the petty bribery
under study here is a serious material burden for many Russians. Furthermore, there is no
evidence to support or other reason to believe that protesters themselves are situationally
subject to bribery in ways that non-protesters are not.
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6.2 Effects of Corruption on Individual Attitudes
In this section I focus simply on individuals’ reactions to corruption experiences. I take a
number of attitudinal measures and measures capturing potential behavior as self-reported
by respondents as dependent variables, looking for negative correlations of corruption expe-
riences on attitudes like trust in the governments and positive correlations with willingness
to protest.
Why is it important to test empirically what seems to be a straightforward or even
obvious association? Is there any reason to think that the public would not react in such
ways to corruption? This is an important endeavor for several reasons. First, such an
association is in fact often assumed but rarely tested with direct, individual-level measures
in modern authoritarian regimes. While evidence coming from survey responses about topics
like protest should be interpreted with care, such efforts can help us open the black box of
how authoritarian publics related to the regimes they live in and how they react to regime
misbehavior. Second, it should not simply be assumed that individuals in authoritarian
regimes will be particularly reactive to petty corruption experiences. Perhaps they are more
sensitive to media reports of grand corruption, perhaps they are jaded from years of dealing
with mundane bribery, or perhaps they view corruption as a positive, efficiency-enhancing
time saver. Distinguishing between these alternative possibilities is important. Finally, these
attitudes and reactions to corruption form a crucial underpinning of the theory outlined in
Chapter 2. In order for governors and the autocrat to need to be responsive to the public in
shaping corruption levels, they must be able (consciously or unconsciously) be aware of the
potential for corruption to drive citizen discontent with the regime.
142
6.2.1 Reactions to Corruption Experiences
Before moving to assess correlations between having personally experienced corruption and
attitudinal measures, an important ‘baseline’ for capturing how individuals living in Russia’s
authoritarian regime can be set by asking them directly about those experiences and their
reactions. Here I do just that by providing simple descriptive analysis of how survey respon-
dents say that they felt about their encounters with bribery. I analyze a number of original
questions that were included on an early-2016 survey conducted by the Levada Center.
Do Russians in 2016 feel that, when they are compelled to give a bribe to a government
official, the magnitude of the bribe constitutes a material burden? In other words, is petty
bribery a painful cost to individuals, or is it a mere annoyance? Table 6.2 shows that a
majority of Russians reported in this survey that bribery is indeed a material burden. This
question, asked of a nationally-representative sample of 1600 Russians, asks: “Has it occurred
in the last five years that a government official requested or extorted from you an unofficial
payment or service to solve some problems, and if yes, then what did you feel as a result?”
The possible responses were that it was a materially burdensome experience, that it was not
so materially burdensome, or that there had been no such experience in the last five years.
Table 6.2: Material Burden of Bribery
Percent of Respondents
Bribe not materially difficult 43.4
Bribe was materially difficult 56.6
While not an overwhelming majority (likely due to the fact that the size of bribes
varies substantially from context to context and region to region), nevertheless almost 57%
143
of respondents replied that the bribery they experienced what materially difficult for them.
This calls into question any hypothesized ‘normalization’ of corruption wherein bribes are
so insignificant in size that giving them is routine or low-cost. If this were the case, then
any of the damage that corruption would do to attitudes or support for the regime would
be purely normative rather than material. As it stands, bribe-paying does seem to have a
material impact that could hurt attitudes via individuals’ pocketbooks.
What about the normative, notional harm to attitudes towards the regime by having
a bribery experience? In Tables 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 I look at respondents’ descriptive
reactions to the bribe experiences that they had.
Table 6.3: Reaction to Bribery: Surprise
Percent of Respondents
Not surprised at bribery experience 81.5
Surprised at bribery experience 18.5
A small proportion of survey respondents—less than 19%—reported surprise at having
to give a bribe. This speaks to the common nature of corruption in Russia, even if it does
not in fact augur for indifference. Across all measures, very few individuals reported neutral
or positive reactions to their corruption experiences. A majority were annoyed (59%), while
only 12% said that the bribe they paid eased their interaction. A roughly 30% minority said
that they were indifferent to the corruption they experienced.
It seems that Russians are not neutrally and certainly not positively disposed to
the corruption they experience. Though they are rarely surprised at bribery in their lives,
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Table 6.4: Reaction to Bribery: Annoyance
Percent of Respondents
Bribery experience did not generate annoyance 41.5
Bribery experience generated annoyance 58.5
Table 6.5: Reaction to Bribery: Positive, Eased
Percent of Respondents
Bribery was not positive, did not ease things 87.8
Bribery was positive, eased things 12.2
Table 6.6: Reaction to Bribery: Indifference
Percent of Respondents
Not indifferent to bribery experience 70.7
Indifferent to bribery experience 29.3
they do not think of it as acceptable or unimportant. Finally, a strong majority of almost
70% of respondents said that they felt that the bribery they were compelled to engage in
was ‘amoral’. This is a clear indicator that corruption is negatively regarded. A simple
correlation matrix below (Table 6.8) highlights that these reactions are very consistent and
clustered into attitudes and reactions to corruption.
Table 6.7: Reaction to Bribery: Amorality
Percent of Respondents
Did not regard bribery as amoral 30.6
Regarded bribery as amoral 69.4
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Table 6.8: Correlation Matrix of Bribe Reactions
Materially Difficult Surprised Annoyed Eased Life Indifferent Amoral
Materially Difficult 1.000 0.012 0.370 -0.243 -0.228 0.298
Surprised 0.012 1.000 0.201 -0.104 -0.145 0.185
Annoyed 0.370 0.201 1.000 -0.464 -0.759 0.383
Eased Life -0.243 -0.104 -0.464 1.000 -0.225 -0.395
Indifferent -0.228 -0.145 -0.759 -0.225 1.000 -0.131
Amoral 0.298 0.185 0.383 -0.395 -0.131 1.000
6.2.2 Effects on Protest
To look for the deleterious effects of corruption experiences on satisfaction with the regime,
I first look at the correlation between having personally experienced corruption with ex-
pressed willingness to actively participate in one key manifestation of dissatisfaction: public
protest. The theoretical expectation is that, rather than being viewed as a neutral or even
a simplifying positive regime feature, corruption acts as a driver of greater inclination to
protest. To the extent that indicating a willingness to protest is a sincere expression of quite
extreme dissatisfaction with the regime even if it would not result in actual protest action
being taken, this evidence can be taken as a considerable threat to a regime concerned with
keeping the public happy.
In Table 6.9, I show that having experienced a request for a bribe from a government
official is strongly, positively correlated with indicating a willingness to protest. Using two
related questions as dependent variables (Columns 1-3 and 4-6), and including a set of
individual-level attitudinal covariates (in Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6) and region-year control
variables (in Columns 3 and 6), I show that the positive, large, and statistically significant
coefficient on Bribe Experience is found consistently across models.
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Table 6.9: Experienced Corruption and Willingness to Protest
protest_could protest_driven
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bribe Experience 0.152∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
UR Supporter −0.078∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Putin Approval −0.068∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Governor Approval −0.013∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Regional Satisfaction −0.096∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Log GRP 0.039∗∗ 0.010
(0.016) (0.019)
Pct Russian 0.092 0.061
(0.062) (0.090)




Pct Urban Pop −0.010 0.186
(0.092) (0.128)
Scheduled End of Term 0.028∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.007) (0.008)
Petrov Competitiveness 0.004 −0.004
(0.009) (0.014)
Male 0.051∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Education 0.022∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Age −0.035∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Income −0.025∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Urban Rural 0.014∗∗∗ 0.005 0.005 0.037∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Constant 0.153∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗
(0.030) (0.028) (0.160) (0.014) (0.015) (0.223)
Number of regions 74 74 74 74 74 74
Number of years 2 2 2 2 2 2
N 60,732 36,995 36,617 61,304 37,526 37,145
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
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Keeping in mind the caveats about causal interpretation of this non-randomized sur-
vey data discussed earlier, the estimated effect of corruption experiences on willingness to
protest is substantively quite large. It maintains an effect size of 11 to 16 percentage points,
which represents almost half of the average reported willingness to protest (about 27%).
Indeed, as both this covariate of interest and the dependent variable are dichotomous and
the models presented here are linear probability models, we can note that the marginal effect
of having a corruption experience is much larger than any other covariate included.
These results strongly support the fundamental assumptions of the theory presented
in Chapter 2, which contend that autocrats and governors are acutely aware of—indeed,
worried by—dissatisfaction and unrest that could threaten their regimes’ stability. This
unrest is likely to take the form of street protest, which can have a number of harmful effects
on the regime.2
6.2.3 Effects on Trust and Satisfaction
Beyond reported willingness to protest, direct measures of how much respondents trust state
actors or are satisfied with their leaders’ work are useful indicators of overall attitude towards
the regime. This overall attitude is then closely tied to being motivated to protest, turning
out to vote for regime-supported candidates in authoritarian elections, and other aspects of
cooperation with the state.
Columns 1-6 of Table 6.10 demonstrate face validity of the ‘work’ that the corruption
experience indicator variable is doing. In all of these models, having experienced bribery
2Lorentzen (2013) notes that protest can be a good thing from the regime’s perspective in some
cases, as when it can be highly informative without posing a risk to the regime.
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makes respondents less likely to think that the governor is handling corruption well (columns
1 and 2) and more likely to indicate that corruption among the authorities or law enforcement
is one of the top 5 worries in everyday life (columns 3-6).
Table 6.10: Political Competition and Experienced Corruption
govhandlecorrup_well bigworry_corrupauth bigworry_corruplawenf regionsatis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
male1 0.008∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
educ.num −0.002 0.026∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
age.c 0.002∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.003 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
income.c 0.00004 0.024∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
urban1 −0.010∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
bribe_request −0.001 0.066∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
voted_ur 0.003 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
putingood 0.029∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
govgood 0.120∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
regionsatis 0.045∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
lngdp −0.013 −0.014 0.004 0.090∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.010) (0.023)
pctRussian1 0.021 −0.017 −0.027 −0.085
(0.046) (0.049) (0.037) (0.088)
lnpop 0.015 0.037∗∗ 0.023∗∗ −0.053∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.026)
republiccityao 0.009 0.033 0.009 0.006
(0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.040)
pcturban 0.013 −0.033 −0.018 −0.021
(0.068) (0.072) (0.054) (0.131)
sched4 −0.027∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.014∗∗ 0.007
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
demnar3.c 0.008 0.001 −0.005 −0.031∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.013)
Constant −0.052 −0.188 −0.263∗∗∗ −0.176
(0.120) (0.127) (0.097) (0.231)
Number of regions 74 74 74 74
Number of years 2 2 2 2
N 40,032 40,032 40,032 40,032
Log Likelihood −9,276.094 −24,653.400 −18,201.590 −25,997.990
BIC 18,774.730 49,529.340 36,625.720 52,207.920
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
The rightmost columns of Table 6.10 show a strong, deleterious effect of corruption
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experiences on reported satisfaction with how things are going in the region. Respondents
who have experienced bribery are up to 10 percentage points less likely to say that they
think that things are going well in the region overall. Bribery has negative effects on the
public’s attitudes beyond driving them to protest. This idea is further supported Table 6.11,
showing that bribery also harms trust in the government and state.
Similarly, Table 6.11 shows that having experienced bribery is strongly negatively
associated with trust in three important aspects of the regime: the police, authorities in
general, and the sitting government. Measures of trust in these institutions, each on a five
point scale, are used as dependent variables in columns 1 and 4, 2 and 5, and 3 and 6,
respectively.
Regardless of whether only basic demographic controls are included (columns 1 through
3) or a measure of regime support (voting for United Russia) and a baseline measure of trust
in a non-regime institution, the UN, are included, the conclusion remains the same. Having
experienced petty corruption is associated with a fifth to more than a third of a full point
decrease in trust. The exception is in column 6, where being a United Russia supporter
seems to be so closely correlated with trust in the government that corruption is not found
to have a large or statistically significant association with trust in the government. These
estimated coefficients are of magnitude easily comparable or surpassing the magnitudes of
the coefficients on demographic characteristics, hinting at a quite substantial relationship.
It seems that bribery can indeed drastically harm individuals’ trust in state and regime
institutions.
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Table 6.11: Experienced Corruption and Trust
Trust in ...
Police Authorities Gov’t Police Authorities Gov’t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bribe Experience −0.365∗∗∗ −0.363∗∗∗ −0.219∗∗∗ −0.306∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.041
(0.077) (0.081) (0.083) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
UR Supporter 0.316∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.061) (0.062)
Trust in UN 0.230∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Male −0.227∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.087 −0.082
(0.053) (0.056) (0.057) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060)
Age 0.106∗∗∗ 0.060∗ 0.052∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.050 0.037
(0.029) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Education 0.020 −0.024 0.023 0.038 0.013 0.033
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Employed −0.029 −0.055 −0.071 0.009 −0.024 −0.036
(0.063) (0.066) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Income 0.034 0.048 0.078∗∗ 0.033 0.033 0.050
(0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.038)
Urban Rural −0.238∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗ −0.058 −0.239∗∗∗ −0.075 −0.020
(0.066) (0.070) (0.072) (0.074) (0.073) (0.074)
Constant 3.307∗∗∗ 3.257∗∗∗ 3.331∗∗∗ 2.427∗∗∗ 1.811∗∗∗ 1.991∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.114) (0.120) (0.153) (0.147) (0.149)
N 1,177 1,178 1,167 837 838 834
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
6.3 Effect of End of Term Conditional on Governor Popularity
In the previous section I showed that corruption experiences seem to directly cause, or at
least be closely associated with, various assessments of individuals’ support for the regime.
I now return to the interaction of the autocrat, governors, and the public. Using the same
empirical approach and data as in earlier chapters, I introduce three proxy measures for
governor popularity. The dependent variable in these models is once again the dichotomous
response of having experienced bribery.
I seek to test the proposition that governors respond differentially to their ends-of-
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term when they are already unpopular or when they face protest action. Unfortunately, no
region-year data of sufficient detail and quality on protest events is currently available in
Russia, nor are consistent and comprehensive assessments of governors’ popularity. I use
three proxy measures of popularity and overall governor performance to capture the overall
concepts of popularity and protest. I interact each in turn with the Scheduled End of Term
indicator, looking for positive coefficients on the interaction terms that would demonstrate
that popular governors are less pressed to decrease corruption in end-of-term years. The
three proxy measures are: an individual-level assessment of how well respondents think the
governor is doing at his job and two publicly-available ratings of the effectiveness and positive
image in the media of each governor, published by the Fund for the Development of Civil
Society.3
As shown in Table 6.12, none of the expected results are found in this analysis. None
of the interaction term coefficients are near statistical significance at traditional levels. What
is more, the estimated coefficients are only in one of three cases in the expected direction.
While it is difficult to be sure of the reasons that no support is found for the idea that
governors who are popular are less threatened by end-of-term shocks, it should be noted
that very few years or regions of data are available for any of the key predictors. This limits
the sample size at the second level of the multilevel models greatly. It also may simply be
the case that popularity, at least as measured by these crude proxies, is not a significant
factor on the minds of governors when they are faced with an end of their term in office.
Perhaps only larger, more credibly damaging manifestations of discontent are sufficient to
3See, for example, this page with the latest ratings: http://civilfund.ru/mat/101.
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Table 6.12: Governor Effectiveness and Competition
DV: Bribe Experience
(1) (2) (3)








Gov’r Effective X Sched End Term −0.011
(0.022)
Governor Media Image 0.029
(0.043)
Gov’r Image X Sched End Term −0.015
(0.040)
Male 0.038∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.016) (0.015)
Education 0.028∗∗∗ 0.014∗ 0.014∗
(0.001) (0.009) (0.008)
Age −0.045∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.020∗∗
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
Income 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.009) (0.009)
Urban Rural 0.028∗∗∗ 0.0001 −0.007
(0.002) (0.018) (0.018)
Constant 0.056∗∗ 0.135∗ 0.151∗∗
(0.025) (0.077) (0.067)
Number of regions 76 49 49
Number of years 4 2 2
N 106,572 2,475 2,525
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
cause a governor to reduce corruption very sharply when political competition is high.
6.4 Focus of Corruption Reduction on Likely Protesters
One final notable implication of the theory presented and tested in earlier chapters is that
governors may try to be discerning in who experiences corruption. If they are able to
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approximately distinguish between those who are most likely to be made discontent or to
protest as a result of experiencing bribery and those who are safe supporters of the regime,
then they can attempt to more efficiently ‘target’ bribery. By continuing to extract some
corruption rents from unquestioning regime supporters even in political competitive times,
they can continue to enrich themselves and co-opt insiders, while efficiently minimizing the
risk of protest or popular anger.
I test this prediction by interacting the Scheduled End of Term indicator variable and
Petrov-Titkov measure of political competitiveness with respondents’ self-reported proba-
bility of protesting if their situation gets too bad. While of course neither governors nor
their agents are able to directly observe the likelihood that an individual will protest, it
is very plausible that they could make educated guesses about what types of individuals
should be avoided and what types are safe for bribe-taking. If this is the case that target-
ing of corruption is possible with acceptable accuracy, then the efficiency of corruption is
increased.
The expectation is that in times of high political competition, individuals who indicate
that they could see themselves protesting will experience even less corruption than those
who could not see themselves protesting. The result should be negative coefficients on the
interactions of political competition and protest probability.
The evidence for this idea is mixed, as shown in Table 6.13. In one specification
(Column 1), individuals who say they could see themselves protesting actually experience
more corruption in competitive (end-of-term) times than those who could not. This is the
opposite of the proposed effect. When additional region-year controls are included (Column
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2), this coefficient loses statistical significance.
However, measuring political competitiveness using the Petrov-Titkov expert score
(Columns 3 and 4) supplies more supportive evidence. Here, likely protesters in competitive
regions are much less likely to experience corruption than are unlikely protesters in compet-
itive regions. In other words, where competitiveness is high, all members of the public are
spared from corruption to some extent, but those who are most likely to take to the streets
are spared much more. These likely protesters in competitive regions experience bribery at
half the rate that unlikely protesters do.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have provided a deeper look at what petty corruption is for those who
experience it in modern-day Russia. I examined its effects on attitudes and (potential)
behaviors that I have earlier argued and assumed are of crucial importance for autocratic
leaders. By showing that experiences with bribery are strongly associated with less trust
in the government and with more willingness to engage in street protest, I have sought to
demonstrate the fundamental plausibility of this authoritarian regime’s concern with petty
corruption levels. What is more, I have provided tentative evidence that governors are aware
that their popularity may mitigate the risk of protest over corruption and that autocratic
leaders may be discerning in what types of people are more exposed to corruption.
In previous chapters, I showed that Russian governors react to the increased risk of
losing their jobs that is associated with a scheduled end of a term in office by reducing petty
corruption. I argue that they do this because they know that such times of high political
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competition are when the public and the autocrat on whom their jobs depend are moni-
toring their performance closely. However, this mechanism relies on the assumption that
does in fact react negatively to petty corruption. In this chapter, I have shown that this
is emphatically the case. Experiences with petty corruption are not regarded by Russians
as useful ‘greasing the wheels,’ as neutral, unimportant occurrences, nor as the responsi-
bility of bribe-taking bureaucrats alone. Rather, the Russian public does seem to hold the
broader regime responsible for such corruption and accordingly reports lowered trust in the
government, more willingness to protest, and less satisfaction with the regime.
Also, by showing that the public is not indifferent to or neutrally disposed to bribery
experiences, I underline the fact that—more than just because of rare-but-potent revolu-
tionary spirit—authoritarian publics matter. Their experiences with public goods and pub-
lic bads like corruption shape their attitudes towards the regime that governs them. This
is a prime concern for regimes that are so focused on stability and complacence. I also
emphasize that the findings presented in this chapter highlight the importance of further,
deeper research into public opinion in autocracies. While the links between public opinion,
governance, policy, and alternation in power are certainly much weaker in autocracies than
in democracies, too often political science research assumes away these publics in favor of
a focus on elites. These publics hold divergent beliefs and attitudes which, important as
they are for the authoritarian regimes themselves to understand, are important for political
science to understand as well.
One avenue for further inquiry is to investigate how the public reacts to personal
experiences with petty corruption as compared to information in the media about high-level
officials engaging in grand corruption. It is unclear a priori how beliefs about corruption
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at low levels and at high levels may interact. For example, it is possible that hearing of
a prominent arrest of a cabinet official4 could form a positive impression of ‘cleaning up
the avenues of power’ for individuals who have not personally experienced bribery, while it
could reinforce a sense that the authorities are corrupt through-and-through for those who
have. Further investigation, including exploration of exogenous shocks to corruption beliefs,
remains a promising area of research.
4Prominent cases of this are appearing with startling, increased frequency as of this writing. The
first arrest of a sitting minister in Russia in many decades, Aleksey Ulyukaev, on November 15,
2016, on seemingly trumped-up bribery charges is particularly glaring.
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Table 6.13: Political Competition, Protest, and Experienced Corruption
DV: Bribe Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Could Protest 0.092∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Scheduled End of Term −0.010∗∗ −0.002
(0.005) (0.007)
Could Protest X Sched End Term 0.018∗∗ 0.008
(0.007) (0.010)
Petrov Competitiveness −0.015∗ −0.007
(0.008) (0.010)
Could Protest X Petrov Compet. −0.016∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
UR Supporter −0.013∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Putin Approval −0.027∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Governor Approval 0.001 0.0005
(0.004) (0.004)
Regional Satisfaction −0.040∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Log GRP −0.030∗ −0.028∗
(0.016) (0.016)
Pct Russian −0.061 −0.071
(0.064) (0.064)




Pct Urban Pop −0.084 −0.057
(0.092) (0.094)
Male 0.044∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Education 0.018∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age −0.031∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Income 0.033∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Urban Rural 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Constant 0.031 −0.108 0.032 −0.155
(0.037) (0.162) (0.037) (0.167)
Number of regions 74 74 74 74
Number of years 2 2 2 2
N 60,732 36,617 60,732 36,617
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
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7 | Improving Corruption Measurement
with MRP
In previous chapters I exploited a powerful new data set that measured corruption—the out-
come variable in my theory and analyses—using a direct, survey-based approach. This data
set, combined with a measure of political competition arising from scheduled ends of terms
in office of Russian governors, allowed me to make causally-identified inferences about the ef-
fects of political competition on corruption. In other words, I captured change in corruption
from region to region and year to year. Another use of this data is not for inference—not
using these measures of corruption as outcome variables—but for descriptive and predictive
purposes. For this task, the measures introduced earlier into multilevel regressions must be
appropriately processed to ensure that levels of corruption are estimated accurately rather
than simple changes to levels of corruption.
To this end, in this chapter I employ multilevel regression and poststratification
(MRP) to estimate average levels of experienced corruption at the level of the Russian
subnational polity. By integrating large waves of surveys of the Russian population with
detailed census information, these estimates exhibit the most accurate picture possible of
trends in bribery in Russia. This represents an important improvement over existing mea-
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sures of corruption in several ways. It avoids difficulties of validity, reproducibility, and
generalizability that are inherent to perceptions-based expert assessments of corruption lev-
els. It also allow for estimation of aggregate prevalence of true corruption experiences at
levels of observation that are not otherwise accessible. In other words, where traditional
measurement techniques are unable to provide reliable measures of corruption at less than
the national level, MRP allows for a deeper look at what the data has to say—precise es-
timation of corruption prevalence in subnational units or within population subgroups are
easily within reach. By bringing the insights offered by MRP from the realm of state-level
estimates of public opinion in the United States to measures of experiences in Russia, I
contribute both to the methodology of MRP and to measurement of corruption. 1
Multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) is a quickly-developing technique
for data analysis that allows for the easy combination of public opinion surveys and census
data to predict aggregate public opinion. When the desired predicted quantity is an average
at the level of a geographic area, for example, MRP performs better than simply taking
the mean of survey responses in that area (Lax and Phillips 2009). So, in effect, MRP
‘smooths out’ the fact that surveys often do not contain large or representative samples
within all geographical areas of interest. It also simultaneously corrects for poor sampling
procedures, makes the fullest use of available data due to the partial pooling inherent in
multilevel modeling, and allows for flexible prediction of quantities of interest other than
simple geographical averages.
1The MRP estimates presented here are of particular use as predictors in quantitative analyses and
as descriptive measures. While they could function as dependent (outcome) variables in regressions,
such a ‘two-step’ estimation procedure would be inefficient and have to contend with appropriate
inclusion of uncertainty. For this reason, all proceeding analyses in this project have followed a
‘one-step’ multilevel modeling procedure that avoids these difficulties.
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Aside from its instrumental use, this implementation of MRP is important in several
other ways. It represents a novel application of the method outside of the United States and,
as such, offers a number of opportunities for learning about how census data, survey data,
and region-level data interact to produce high- or low-quality MRP estimates. I also extend
existing procedures by showing how model uncertainty from the multilevel regression step of
MRP can be used to generate estimates of the uncertainty around MRP estimates. Finally,
I show that MRP need not be limited to estimates of individual-level public opinion. I use
several surveys of Russian firms and a pseudo-census of all active firms in Russia to generate
MRP estimates of average rates of bribery experienced by firms.
The MRP measure I develop here represents a significant advance over existing data,
which are either based on subjective expert assessment or capture a small number of regions
in a small-sample snapshot. MRP is a powerful technique that uses national survey data
to generate reliable estimates at a level much lower and detailed than would otherwise be
possible (Park, Gelman and Bafumi 2004, 2006; Gelman and Little 1997; Ghitza and Gelman
2013). Using MRP here offers a number of benefits over existing estimates of regional-level
corruption that are not based on experienced measures, focus on grand corruption, and
ignore possible bias arising from the sensitive nature of the topic. Best practices regarding
modeling issues such as the sensitivity of MRP estimates to inclusion of various second-level
predictors, correct incorporation of uncertainty in MRP estimates, and reliability of MRP
estimates in general (and in potentially ‘unstable’ contexts outside of familiar attitudes of
the U.S. population) are still very much in flux, so I follow the approaches and advice given
in recent research (Lax and Phillips 2013; Buttice and Highton 2013).
Though all MRP estimates are necessarily subject to substantial uncertainty (and,
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arguably, high sensitivity to modeling and specification choices), the estimates of regional-
level petty corruption that I provide here offer several important advantages over existing
measures. They continue the string of responses to Treisman’s (2007) call for greater use of
experience-based measures of corruption over measures of perceived corruption. Second, they
are recent and easily repeatable. Third, they are likely more accurate than existing survey-
based experiential measures, as they are based on recent advances in sensitive question
survey technology. In addition, the MRP method of analysis offers all assumptions and
modeling decisions up for explicit display. This increases the transparency, robustness, and
reproducibility of the estimates.
7.1 Data and Design
The primary data source for my MRP analyses is the set of survey data presented in Chapter
3. Due to their unusually large sample size, this data set is dominated by several surveys from
the GeoRating project, conducted by the well-regarded Russian survey firm ‘Public Opinion
Fund’ (known as ‘FOM’ in Russian). This full project is comprised of 36 waves of surveys of
about 50 questions each from 2003 to 2011. Most waves consist of 500 respondents from each
of about 69 regions, for total samples of approximately 35000. The questions asked vary quite
widely from wave to wave, with only a few basic questions and some simple demographics
being repeated in every wave. Only four waves offer questions about experienced corruption.
For some preliminary analyses I present here, I focus on one wave – from 2011. This survey
was conducted on 52644 respondents in 74 regions.
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7.1.1 Russian Census Data
In this section I provide basic information on the Russian census data underlying the post-
stratification step of my MRP procedure. As most implementations of MRP are on US
states, cities, or electoral districts, it is important to examine and ‘validate’ new census data
before including them in analysis. In particular, it can be useful to explore the extent of
variation across demographic cells in order to better understand how much regions vary from
each other and how well these demographic cells capture quantities of theoretical interest in
the response model.
































































Another larger set of GeoRating survey waves provides a consistent view of a different
question: when do respondents see corruption as one of the most important or troubling social
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or economic problems in their region? The response “corruption, bribetaking in government
structures” is included in a list of issues within a five-response question on which issues are
seen as most troubling. This question is included in 13 survey waves from 2007 to 2011.
7.2 Pooled MRP
The simplest approach to MRP modeling of complex data such as the collection of surveys
presented in Chapter 3 is to pool the responses over time. After all, none of the surveys
included in my data set sample from all regions of Russia, and most sample from a small
subset of all of the more than 80 regions comprising the Russian Federation. This introduces
the problem of how to (or whether to) make reasonable out-of-sample predictions for regions
that are sampled infrequently or not at all. The simples and most robust solution is to pool
all surveys over time and produce estimates of average corruption over the full time period
in each region. In a later section I extend this by considering approaches to full time series
cross-sectional estimation.
7.2.1 The MRP Response Model
The first ‘stage’ of MRP consists of estimating a rather simple multilevel ‘response’ model
on the national survey data. The model I estimate is presented below as Equation 7.1. The
intercept of this model is allowed to vary for each factor: gender, age (transformed into
a seven-category ordinal scale), education, urban or rural residence, and the respondent’s
region. The dependent variable in all models is Bribery Experience, the dichotomous yes-no
response to the question “Have you in the last year or two personally encountered a situation
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where any government official requested or expected an unofficial payment or service from
you for his or her work?”









αgenderj ∼ N(0, σ2gender), for j = 1, 2 (7.2)
αagek ∼ N(0, σ
2
age), for k = 1, ..., K (7.3)
αeducl ∼ N(0, σ2educ), for l = 1, ..., L (7.4)
αurbanm ∼ N(0, σ2urban), for m = 1, ...,M (7.5)
αregionr ∼ N(0, σ2region), for r = 1, ..., R (7.6)
The individual-level (response) models I employ to generate the estimates above are
logistic multilevel models estimating using glmer() in R. In this study I primarily use a
slightly different model to that shown above—I replace Equation 5 with Equation 6. This




region ∼ N(αregionq[r] + β ·Xr, σ
2
region), for r = 1, ..., R (7.7)
The current state of research on MRP estimation offers little in the way of guidance
on model selection. An exception is a working paper by Lax and Phillips (2013), which,
while useful, is acknowledgedly both preliminary and developed with application to typical
public opinion data from the United States in mind. Of particular interest is the choice
of region-level predictors (RLPs, equivalent to state-level predictors in American politics
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application), as I discuss above. Including one RLP has been shown to improve the accuracy
of the MRP estimation procedure, but it is not currently known how widely this applies or
within what limits. Inclusion of RLPs introduces a tradeoff between bias and efficiency and,
in current practice, is largely left to educated guesswork informed, to the extent possible, by
researchers’ substantive theoretical knowledge.2
θc = logit−1(β0 + αC) (7.8)
7.2.2 Post-stratification
Having acquired random effect point estimates for demographic variables using one of the
above response models, I continue to the second step of the MRP procedure: poststrati-
fication. Here I follow standard practice and apply the random effects to each cell of the
demographic data contained in a population census of Russia. Aggregating by region then
generates the estimated levels of experienced petty corruption among officials separately for
each of Russia’s regions. This is done by summing all cells’ predicted probability of having
experienced corruption, θc, and weighting them by Nc, their true population frequency in






2Note that I do not include any variables measuring institutions as predictors in the MRP multilevel
model. Given the little guidance on what (or how many) predictors should be included in MRP,
I have opted to avoid including (potentially) questionably-measured institutional variables that
are conceptually very close to the outcome variable, preferring to include only nicely-predictive
structural variables. And only a small number of these predictors are included, which yet further
acts to prevent possible overfitting.
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Having obtained random effect point estimates for demographic variables using one of
the above response models, I continue to the second step of the MRP procedure: poststrat-
ification. Here I follow standard practice and apply the random effects to each cell of the
demographic data contained in a population census of Russia.3 Aggregating by region then
generates the estimated levels of experienced petty corruption among officials separately for
each of Russia’s regions. This is done by summing all cells’ predicted probability of having
experienced corruption, θc, and weighting them by Nc, their true population frequency in







The estimation procedure outlined above produces the following results.
7.3 Extending MRP
In previous sections I have demonstrated the use of MRP when applied to measures beyond
public opinion—in this case, to experiences with corruption—and to contexts outside of US
states. In this section I explore several modest methodological additions to MRP as it is
currently implemented. I demonstrate one simple way of assessing the uncertainty associated
with MRP estimates. I also show how MRP estimates can be reweighted to fit research needs,
3A brief descriptive presentation of the characteristics of this Russian census data is given in the
appendix.
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such as by reweighting to account for potential sensitive question bias. Finally, I develop a
simple diagnostic technique that can be used to learn more about which aspects of the MRP
estimation procedure are doing the most ‘work’ in generating valid estimates.
7.3.1 Uncertainty and MRP Estimation
In addition to producing standard MRP point estimates, I also produce and present the first
applied usage (to my knowledge) of the full uncertainty to which MRP estimates are subject.
Unlike in existing published work, I use a simulation procedure to carry the model-based
uncertainty from the response stage through to the final MRP estimates. This uncertainty
is reflected in the error bars shown later in Figure 7.4. Using the sim() function, I generate
1000 draws from the glmer() response model objects. I then calculate MRP estimates for
each of the 1000 draws, a procedure which results in a distribution of MRP estimates that
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reflects the variance and covariance structure of the parameters estimated in the response
model. The region-level means or medians can then be used as point estimates and standard
deviations or quantiles can be used to represent the modeling uncertainty. Future versions
of this work will combine this step and the inference shown later into one fully Bayesian
estimation step using Stan.
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Figure 7.4: MRP Estimates with Uncertainty
Experienced Petty Corruption (MRP estimates, GeoRating)
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MRP - No RLP
Region Means (Disaggregation)
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7.3.2 Adjusting MRP Estimates Using List Experiments
One powerful advantage of using MRP is the transparency of all steps of the procedure. This
can also allow adjustment of MRP estimates at the poststratification stage. Since this step
of MRP simply involves calculating point estimates for each of a large number of (usually)
demographic cells, it is easy to apply any desired adjustments to each cell.
One salient example of when this adjustment may be desirable is correction for possi-
ble sensitive question bias. If one can obtain reasonable estimates for the bias in the answers
of respondents in each cell, this bias can be corrected for at the cell level. While direct
poststratification of list experiment data is technically possible, the uncertainty that is in-
tentionally designed into list experiment designs makes precise estimation of the cell-level
random effects very demanding on data and sample size, rendering this unadvisable in most
real-world applications. So using the information gleaned from simple list experiment analy-
sis to correct ‘plain old’ survey responses for sensitive question bias is attractive and flexible.
It is also trivial to assess uncertainty and to conduct analysis of the sensitivity of results to
various plausible forms and levels of sensitive question bias (or other bias).
I present here just such an adjustment of the MRP corruption estimates presented
above. This is currently presented as a proof-of-concept, as the cell-level estimates shown
here are examples only.4 As we shall see, these sensitive bias corrections in MRP generally
have little substantive effect on the overall MRP estimates. Reasons for this are explored in
Section 7.3.3.
4At the moment, I do not have access to survey data where a corruption question was asked in both
list experiment form and direct form, as advocated by Corstange (2009). Thus, for expository
purposes, I compare list experiment and direct questions from separate surveys.
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For this I use a list experiment asking a very similar question to the bribery experi-
ence question found in the GeoRating survey. In December 2012 an independent survey firm,
the Levada Center, conducted 1600 face-to-face interviews with a nationally-representative
sample of Russian citizens, including a series of survey experiments and list experiments on
respondents’ interactions and attitudes towards the police and the state in Russia. I use the
ictreg() function in the list package in R and several other methods to conduct my statistical
analysis of the list experiment data from my primary experiment of interest (Imai 2011; Blair
and Imai 2012).
List Experiment: Look at this card and try to remember which of the following actions
you have taken at least once in the last 12 months. Don’t say which actions, just say how
many of the actions listed on this card you have taken at least once in the last 12 months.
1. Gone to local authorities to get some documents in order
2. Seen the head of your local administration on television
3. Called local authorities to get information about the services they offer
4. Complained to a friend about the work of your local administration
5. Given a bribe to an official of your local administration in order to solve
an everyday problem
Respondents in the treatment group were given the sensitive item (item five, in bold)
in addition to the four control items that were presented to all respondents.
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Figure 7.5: Histograms of List Experiment Responses
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To incorporate this list experiment data into my MRP estimates, I employ a novel
reweighting procedure. Here, I generate estimates of sensitive question bias for each cell of
the demographic-variable census matrix used in MRP’s poststratification step. In effect, I
reweight each cell’s predicted probability (which is obtained from poststratification) accord-
ing to the estimated bias that my list experiment tells me each cell is subject to. Cells are
then aggregated into region-level estimates as before. The final effect of this reweighting pro-
cedure is not large, but does somewhat increase the estimated prevalence of petty corruption
in every region. The amount that any given region’s estimate is increase varies depending
on the demographic profile of that region. The reweighted estimates are always correlated
at ρ > 0.9 with the unadjusted MRP estimates, and substantive results are unchanged when
173
using either set of estimates. I use the adjusted (reweighted) estimates in this study, as
they represent the highest-quality, most sophisticated evaluation of true experienced petty
corruption.
7.3.3 Simulation MRP for Testing and Prediction
Existing applications of MRP generate point estimates of region-level mean characteristics.
This leaves a substantial amount of information on the table, as the data and estimating
procedure under the hood of MRP can quite easily be used to conduct inference for the
purposes of testing policy changes and predicting hypothetical outcomes. In other words,
one can estimate the effect of changes to policy, demographics, and other factors on the
outcome at hand, or, similarly, generate predictions for interesting hypothetical cases. I
introduce and explore these techniques here.
Aside from modeling decisions, there are three inputs to MRP that determine the
values of the estimates it produces: survey demographic information, census demographic
information, and second-level predictors. The demographic information contained in the
survey is what ties the response variable to the census data, while the second-level (state-
level) predictors reduce uncertainty in the second level of the multilevel model. Each of these
inputs have an empirical distribution that we observe when we look at the data at hand.
Most simply, I suggest examining how each of the MRP inputs affects the estimates
it produces. This allows the user to determine how much ‘work’ is being done by survey
demographics, census variation, and second-level predictors. As a descriptive and diagnostic
tool this can help with MRP model selection, with identifying problems in MRP estimation,
and with descriptively assessing the magnitudes of differences between regions, for example.
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It is quite easy to separate the effects of each input, as I propose: examine the inputs to the
poststratification step of MRP by simulating that poststratification step using the empirical
distributions of the inputs. In other words, holding survey and second-level predictor data
constant, one can simulate the MRP estimate for Region 1 using the census data for Regions 2
through 50. The result is an empirical distribution of simulated, hypothetical MRP estimates
for Region 1 as if it had the census demographics of all other regions in turn. One can then
easily examine the shape and other characteristics of this empirical distribution to assess
the effect of census data in determining the true estimate. One can also compare the true
estimate to the distribution in order to make conclusions about how ‘extreme’ that region’s
census demographics are.
Figure 7.6 gives an example of the output of this procedure. Each row shows one of
the 83 regions of Russia, labeled simply 1 through 4. The first column simulates the census
demographics in the manner described above—this holds survey demographics and second-
level predictors constant. A histogram of the results is shown, with the region’s true estimate
in red and the mean of the distribution in blue. The second column simulates the second-
level predictors, holding census demographics constant. In other words, this shows what the
estimate for Region 1 would be if it had the values of the second-level predictors of all other
regions. Finally, the third column simulates the random effects of each region, showing how
much ‘work’ in the estimate is being done by unexplained regional characteristics. One might
wish to minimize the dispersion of this distribution, for example, or compare the distributions
in the second column with those in the third to assess how well the second-level model is
explaining outcomes.
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Figure 7.6: Simulation MRP
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Beyond such descriptive representations of these simulated MRP results, a number
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of summary statistics can be calculated for these distributions for all regions in the data.
This can aid with model selection or diagnosing outlier regions in the data that may be of
interest.
It is one more small step to simulate these estimates using distributions of census
demographics other than the empirical distributions at hand. The end result is akin to
synthetic control methods. One can easily examine how changes to demographics or to the
values of second-level predictors affect the estimates that MRP produces.
7.4 MRP on Firms
Multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP) is a rapidly growing, promising technique
for generating high-quality estimates of, for example, state-level mean policy preferences.
These estimates are produced by combining individual-level survey data with census infor-
mation about the demographic makeup of each state’s population. To my knowledge, MRP
has previously only been applied to situations where the individuals are humans (or perhaps
households) and the census is a typical national census of humans. In this section I apply
MRP to a new universe: firms. As individual-level survey data I use surveys of firm direc-
tors, managers, and employees. I match the estimates of firms’ responses, which I retrieve
from a multilevel model, to a pseudo-census of the absolute frequencies of firm types in each
Russian region. The cells in this census correspond to the estimates produced in the survey
response model, and are built along four dimensions: firm size, firm age, ownership type,
and sector.
This technique allows me to generate estimates of the regional prevalence of firm ex-
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perienced corruption that are both more precise and more accurate than those that were
possible before. The application of MRP to firms plays particularly well to the strengths of
multilevel regression and poststratification. Since firm surveys are relatively scarce and, due
to the difficulty in implementing firm surveys with a large sample size, multilevel modeling
will automatically perform partial pooling as appropriate for each region and firm charac-
teristic. This can substantially improve what we can learn from what are often unusual,
unrepresentative, and skewed samples of firms in firm surveys.
The following figures show some characteristics of the firm pseudo-census that I use.
Each figure shows the distribution of each firm characteristics in each region.
Figure 7.9 shows that the number of firms in each region in my pseudo-census closely
matches the number of firms in the region as reported by the Russian state statistics service.
So while my pseudo-census does not capture every firm existing in Russia, it is a very close
approximation. I have no a priori reason to believe that there is any systematic bias in the
firms entering into the pseudo-census that would negatively affect my MRP estimates.
I obtained this pseudo-census from a database, Ruslana, containing comprehensive
data on all Russian firms. I filtered and exported the full set of firms, along with the four
firm characteristics with which I match to the response model. The pseudo-census consists
of 468,370 firms in all of Russia’s regions. A secondary collection of firm data is underway,
which I anticipate to include additional firm characteristics and a fuller sample. While the
data in this pseudo-census is more recent than the survey data I use in my MRP procedure,
I assume that the relative stability over time of the universe of firms existing in a country
makes this a negligible issue.
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In Figure 7.10 I show the region-level estimates of firm experienced corruption as
generated by MRP. As my firm surveys do not include every region in Russia, I exclude here
regions for which I have no survey data. While MRP is easily capable of generating estimates
for these excluded regions, their estimates will be based purely on the census information, as
their region random effect will be set to zero. These estimates are presented in an appendix.
7.5 Conclusion
Description and prediction are key elements of the scientific endeavor in addition to inference.
In previous chapters, I have focused on the latter, using a plausibly exogenous measure of
a political competition shock to show how authoritarian institutions can affect corruption
levels. In this chapter, I have contributed to the former two tasks by applying a powerful new
measurement technique—multilevel modeling and poststratification (MRP)—to corruption
in Russia. This goes beyond existing measures of corruption that rely on perceptions, expert
assessments, or surveys that cannot achieve precision at anything beyond highly aggregated
levels. Taking MRP out of the realm of United States public opinion and into the realm
of actual self-reported experiences in new countries and contexts helps us expand the ways
that we can learn about corruption and about Russia.
In addition to providing a new and widely-applicable measure of subnational corrup-
tion levels in Russia, I have also taken steps to incrementally advance MRP methodology and
application. I estimate the uncertainty of the levels of petty corruption in Russian regions
and explore the extent to which demographics or model-based structural factors contribute
to those estimates. I also present a potential technique for reweighting MRP estimates
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to account for known bias. Finally, I show that MRP need not be limited to individuals.
I implement MRP on a survey of firms in Russia to develop a measure of corruption as
experienced by firms in Russian subnational units.
While some existing, publicly-available assessments of corruption such as the Trans-
parency International Corruption Perceptions Index do incorporate public opinion surveys
as one component measure, these products are necessarily quite limited. The addition of
multilevel modeling and census data allows for representative estimates of experienced cor-
ruption for groups (including but not limited to subnational units) previously inaccessible
with typical data. This can allow researchers and practitioners alike a superior view of how
petty corruption afflicts countries at a very fine-grained level and with great flexibility in
examining change over time.
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The fight for justice against corruption
is never easy. It never has been and
never will be. It exacts a toll on our
self, our families, our friends, and
especially our children. In the end, I
believe, as in my case, the price we pay
is well worth holding on to our dignity.
—Frank Serpico
In this dissertation, I show that, even in the absence of democratic institutions, po-
litical competitiveness can reduce corruption levels. Authoritarian institutions, such as the
electoral calendar, drive variation in political competitiveness that shapes the behavior of
regime principals and their agents at the regional level. Corruption serves as a useful signal
to the autocrat about the performance and loyalty of his agents, and the agents (in Russia’s
case, governors) decrease bribery in an effort to please the autocrat and remain in power.
This research contributes to comparative and authoritarian politics by showing how
institutions under autocracy shape principal-agent dynamics and the production of public
goods. It also contributes to the study of corruption by improving measurement using
micro-level experiential evidence and by showing that political competition works to decrease
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corruption in non-democracies too, but—crucially—by a different mechanism: the risk of
public protest and regime instability keeps governors in line during end-of-term periods.
I seek to contribute to the study of Russian politics by demonstrating that institutions
matter even under President Putin’s ‘vertical of power’—the corruption experiences of the
public vary widely across Russia for political reasons rooted in the regime itself. This goes
against much prevailing wisdom, often supported by Putin’s regime itself, which asserts
that corruption is simply a matter of out-of-control bureaucrats who simply have yet to
be reached by a still-developing regime. Rather, I show that corruption and variation in
corruption levels from region to region are not purely mistakes. Corruption is an outcome
that can be controlled to some extent—not only by democratic institutions, but also by
authoritarian institutions.
While large, insightful literatures in many fields have helped us get a grasp on the
ways that corruption functions across the world, the account that I have developed here
brings news insights. These insights are derived from empirical evidence of a sort that is
all-too-rarely used thus far in political science, from a distinct and consistent focus on the
most visible and regime-threatening form of corruption—everyday petty bribery, and from a
view of corruption as institutionally important, politically motivated, and deliberate. None
of these approaches are consistently applied in most research, so by combining them I am
able to build findings that are of relevance not only to research on corruption but also to
authoritarian institutionalism more broadly.
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8.1 Goals of the Dissertation and Empirical Findings
This dissertation set out with two goals: to explain vast, puzzling variation in the prevalence
of corruption in authoritarian regimes and to show how political competition is a powerful
force in autocracies—a force that shapes corruption, replacement of autocratic actors, and
attitudes of the public towards their regime. By grappling with these questions, we can better
understand how rulers, ruled publics, and rulers’ agents interact—and how their interactions
are shaped by institutions—using arrays of monitoring techniques, public goods provision,
formal institutionalization, and ad hoc adjustment to political exigencies. The empirical
evidence provided in Chapters 4 and 5 is consistent with my theory that describes these
interactions and features, laid out in Chapter 2.
The fact that we observe high levels of corruption in some countries and contexts but
we see low levels in others is not original. Indeed, a bevy of explanations tackle aspects of
this variation. Nevertheless, it was an important goal of this dissertation to do better—gaps
in these existing explanations left many questions as to the provenance of variation within
and across authoritarian countries. By seeking out a broadly applicable, non-functionalist,
empirically testable theory of why corruption varies so much under authoritarianism, this
dissertation has worked to fill some of these gaps.
It is no less important to delve into sources of autocratic stability and the roles of insti-
tutions in autocratic regimes. While democratic institutions like strong voter accountability
are lacking in autocracies, institutions like terms in office and semi-formal arrangements
between autocrats and their agents must not be neglected. This dissertation has sought
to elucidate the ways that political competition works—through end-of-term dynamics and
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through performance signals like corruption—to help autocrats rule. As shown in Chapters
4 and 5, even modest changes to political competitiveness can have sizable effects on the
amount of corruption experienced by individuals in their day-to-day, street-level experiences.
In several empirical chapters, I have built and analyzed a large data set that has
allowed me to thoroughly test my theory. This data set combines a very large pool of survey
data from across Russia’s subnational units from 2001 to 2016 with macro-level statistics
on political competitiveness at the region-year level. Analyzing this data using multilevel
modeling, I have shown that corruption levels markedly decrease in regions and years when
the governor’s term in office is coming to an end. This finding is robust to a wide array of
modeling choices, alternative measures, and inclusion of covariates.
In another chapter I dive deeper into this analysis, providing heterogenous effects that
both advance our understanding on where and why corruption varies in countries such as
Russia and powerfully confirm the theoretical underpinnings of my primary findings. Here,
I bring in the insight that governors’ concern about staying in office should be contingent
on the resources available to them. I show that the availability of resources like natural
resource rents allow governors to mitigate the risks that an impending end of term entail.
I also show suggestive evidence that stronger political machines, perhaps fueled by grand
corruption but less by petty corruption, also lessen governors’ need to reduce corruption in
the face of political competitiveness. This highlights the importance of studying conditional
relationships in authoritarian regime structures. It also provides a powerful validity check
on the mechanisms implied by my theory and main empirical tests.
In a third core empirical chapter, I expand on the assumptions of my theory—for
example, that autocratic leaders are concerned about public discontent—and test them using
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new survey data and a large bank of existing survey responses. I show that bribery is indeed
painful and unwanted for Russians and that it can have real impacts on citizens’ attitudes
towards the regime and the state. Authoritarian regimes are wise to tamp down petty
corruption at times where political competitiveness is high. To the extent that popularity,
satisfaction, quiescence, and cooperation among the populace are fundamental desires for
any type of government to have—but especially for authoritarian regimes where democratic
outlets of opinion are absent—then the detrimental effects of corruption on these attitudes
will be deeply felt by leaders and their agents alike.
A final chapter contributes to research on corruption by introducing a powerful new
method of measuring petty bribery. I apply multilevel modeling and poststratification
(MRP), heretofore used largely to assess state-level variation of public opinion in the United
States, to survey-based reports of experiences with corruption. This allows for much more
precise estimation of aggregate corruption prevalence at the subnational level in countries
like Russia. Existing measures of corruption either rely on hard-to-verify expert perceptions
or are unable to provide reasonable estimates at anything but the aggregate national level.
I show how the MRP method combines survey data with census information to avoid these
pitfalls. This chapter also incorporates uncertainty in MRP estimates and offers some simple
advancements to weighting of MRP measures and diagnostics of what is occurring ‘under
the hood’ in the MRP procedure.
Of course, corruption is a widespread phenomenon found not only in modern Rus-
sia. The task of understanding variation in corruption within countries has been tackled by
scholars studying Brazil, Mexico, the United States, Ukraine, Indonesia, and many other di-
verse settings (e.g. Ferraz and Finan 2008; Olken 2005; Olken and Barron 2007). My theory
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of political competitiveness and petty bribery is limited to non-democratic contexts. Here,
traditional factors like voter accountability and free press are largely absent, yet the regime
must rely on internal loyalty and performance in ways that are distinct from democracies.
In democratic contexts, better-understood institutional features like bureaucratic profes-
sionalism and availability of information from a free press will dominate the fight against
corruption. Here, political competition surely plays a crucial role, but that political com-
petition will affect incentives quite directly, rather than indirectly through the autocrat’s
assessments of public sentiment and agent performance as in the autocracies considered in
this study.
What characteristics might need to be found in order for my theory to be applicable?
First, there should be some minimal amount of contestation of power or, at the very least,
some plurality in the political realm. If there is no risk of losing office to a challenger, if
there are no plausible challengers (due, for example, to hereditary, life-long appointment in
combination with repression), or if repression is so overwhelming that political competition
has been fully quashed, then the mechanism I propose—reducing corruption in order to
reduce the risk of losing office—will have no purchase. It is difficult to ascertain whether
countries like North Korea or Cuba which appear to be highly unitary and dictatorial feature
the sorts of principal-agent dynamics and appointment scheme necessary for my theory to
apply.
Second, in highly institutionalized environments, the underlying logic of my theory
may work, but the effects of political competition are likely to be overwhelmed by hierarchy.
For example, a strict one-party state like China1, there is no real contestation of power,
1Though of course China does nominally have a multiparty system, for all intents and purposes the
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but, more importantly, the system of rule is highly systematized—governed by credible
institutions that bind and incentivize actors far beyond the extent that simple political
competition can.
Finally, at the extremes of cases such as those discussed in Chapter 5, regime agents
may have such an abundance of political resources that political competition is an insignif-
icant concern. In such regimes, such as in Saudi Arabia where natural resource rents and
resulting grand corruption dominate the political landscape, agents’ jobs will still always
be under threat, but it is possible that performance metrics other than public unrest over
bribery levels crowd out any danger from political competition. Indeed, low-level bribery
may not be a significant feature of such regimes at all, seeing as other, more lucrative sources
of rents are available.
8.2 Implications and Future Research
A number of implications of the theory described and tested in this dissertation are worthy
of discussion. I highlight implications for our understanding of (formal) institutions under
autocracy, the role of the public in the very real threat of unrest for autocrats, and how
corruption can function as a public good whose delivery must be optimized in order to reach
actors’ goals in an authoritarian regime.
While we have recently begun to understand some of the roles that institutions un-
der authoritarianism—the legislatures and parties, for example, long dismissed as ‘window-
dressing’—our grasp on the full breadth and impact of these institutions is far from complete.
country is ruled by the Communist Party of China.
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I build a theoretical and empirical apparatus that shows the effect of a formal rule-based
institution, the electoral and appointment calendar, on actors’ incentives under autocracy.
This is a different sort of institution, one that is easily overlooked and yet that has real
effects. It is much more easily manipulable than prominent institutions like a party or leg-
islature. It appears that much of its power lies in the fact that it subtly (but unmistakably)
shapes actors’ incentives and behavior in ways that they do not notice, so those actors see
no need to bend it to their will.
There is no doubt that the ‘games’ and intrigues played by an autocrat and his
agents in complex authoritarian regimes are no simple matter. This dissertation shows that
changes to their incentives, however, can be quite simple and quite powerful. Mere terms in
office or other manifestations of political competitiveness shape how governors respond to
the autocrat and how the autocrat and governors both respond to public sentiment. This
suggests a role for policies that make small changes to incentives but that may result in real,
even unintended, positive outcomes for governance. Even rules and norms that can easily
be manipulated or abandoned by an unaccountable regime can have beneficial effects.
Another implication that I draw from this research is that public sentiment in author-
itarian regimes is worthy of deep study. In both the theoretical and empirical realms, I have
shown that the public’s mood can be taken into account by nominally-uninterested regimes.
This goes further than simple revolution-on-the-streets dynamics, and includes public goods
and intra-regime relationships in a way that is not generally heretofore acknowledged.
This dissertation also serves as an example of what can be learned from careful study
of petty corruption. Too often popular and academic attention is dominated by suitcases
of cash and other similarly visible instances of grand corruption. Without a doubt these
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are deserving of scrutiny. Nevertheless, petty bribery is deserving of much more scholarly
focus than it has thus far received, for at least two reasons. First, as demonstrated in
Chapter 6, publics in authoritarian countries can indeed react strongly and negatively to
experiences with bribery. This has implications for attitudes and behaviors such as protest,
but also for how we research perceived and experienced corruption of both petty and grand
varieties. Second, petty corruption should gain stature as one important element of public
goods provision. While roads and schools should continue to receive scholarly attention
as public goods that leaders, autocratic or democratic, can provide and target to their
supporters, petty corruption should not be overlooked as a highly dynamic, politically salient,
and extremely visible form of public goods.
I extend the call to improve measurement of corruption and to take petty bribery
seriously. Far from being a mere byproduct or symptom of authoritarian rule or low state ca-
pacity, corruption is a signal that autocrats can use to maintain power. Across the spectrum
of authoritarian political systems, leaders use bribery calculatingly as a way of monitoring
their political machines. And when studying a hard-to-measure phenomenon like corruption,
macro-level and firm-level assessments will remain important, but the study of the corrosive
presence of bribery in the everyday public sphere should not be neglected.
My findings also have implications for anti-corruption policy. They suggest that push-
ing governments to implement anti-corruption campaigns, build state capacity, or change
cultures of governance may not be enough to fight graft effectively. Political competition
can come in many forms, and is effective at reducing corruption even when democratic ac-
countability mechanisms are absent. Moreover, authoritarian institutions should be taken
seriously as a force driving corruption levels. While anti-corruption campaigns, changes to
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cultures of corruption, free flows of information, or external inducements remain very impor-
tant, this dissertation suggests that policy makers should be cognizant of the many forms
that political competition can take in non-democratic countries and the beneficial effects
that can result from increased competitiveness.
Future research should address beliefs about and experiences with corruption from
the perspective of government officials themselves. This will help to complete the picture
of the roles that corruption plays in politicizing the state, maintaining regime stability, and
driving public perceptions of politics.
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10 | Appendix
10.1 Survey Data Used
The surveys used in this dissertation, described in Table A1 , were gathered from a variety
of sources: ICSID databases at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, the Life in
Transition Survey website, the Higher School of Economics “Unified Archive of Economic
and Sociological Data,” and directly from the Levada Center.
Table A1 : Summary of Survey Data
Year Survey Num Obs Num Regions
2001 INDEM 2,017 15
2002 FOM Penta 1,933 46
2002 INDEM 5,666 40
2003 FOM GeoRating 31,325 63
2005 Levada Courier 1,651 45
2005 INDEM 3,100 29
2006 Levada Courier 1,570 46
2006 Life in Transition 1,000 32
2007 Levada Courier 1,601 46
2008 FOM GeoRating 32,289 65
2010 FOM GeoRating 32,870 68
2010 Life in Transition 1,391 37
2011 FOM GeoRating 52,670 74
2012 Levada Courier 1,601 45
2013 Levada Courier 1,601 45
2016 Levada Courier 1,484 47
181,659
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Figure A1: Correlation Matrix of Individual-level Variables
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10.2 Regional Data Used
The core of the region-year level data, described briefly below in Table A2 , was collected
from the central regional database of the International Center for the Study of Institutions
and Development (ICSID) at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, which in turn
is formed from a variety of statistical databases, most prominently Russian government
statistical service, Rosstat. The scheduled end of term variable is from the ICSID database
with additions for more recent years by the author. The Pct Russian variable was updated
by the author from official Russian census data.
Table A2 : Descriptive Statistics: Region-Year Variables
Variable N Min. Max. Mean Median #NA
Sched End of Term 1424 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.00 92
Petrov Competitiveness 1417 -2.39 3.11 0.00 -0.03 99
Log GRP 1479 6.38 16.27 11.88 11.96 37
Pct Russian 1516 0.01 0.97 0.74 0.85 0
Log Population 1516 9.70 16.30 13.78 13.97 0
Republic/City/AO 1504 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.00 12
Press Freedom 1417 1.00 5.00 2.76 3.00 99
UR Vote in National Elects 1239 -1.86 2.97 -0.01 -0.30 277
Gov’r Margin Victory 1222 0.20 4804.50 79.50 38.00 294
Gov’r Yrs Tenure 1034 0.00 20.00 6.83 6.00 482
UR Vote in Regional Legis 830 17.66 90.40 49.59 50.01 686
Nat Resources 1504 0.00 78.60 9.63 1.70 12
Gov’t Size 928 1.00 101.00 33.56 33.00 588
Official Turnover 839 0.00 18.00 0.42 0.28 677
Machine Organization 1441 -1.89 3.58 0.02 -0.34 75
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10.3 Additional Analyses
Table A3 : Political Competition and Experienced Corruption
Govt Handles Corrup Well Corrup of Authorities Corrup of Law Enf Regional Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male −0.001 0.065∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Education −0.005∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age −0.001 0.009∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Income 0.003 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Urban/Rural −0.014∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Bribery Experience −0.010∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Constant 0.107∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗ 0.023 0.445∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.020) (0.017) (0.040)
Number of regions 74 74 74 74
Number of years 2 2 2 2
N 68,041 68,041 68,041 60,237
Log Likelihood −13,022.300 −41,909.860 −31,010.620 −45,323.470
BIC 26,155.880 83,931.010 62,132.530 90,757.010
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
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Survey: Courier 0.069∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.019)
Survey: LiTS 0.098∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.031)





∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
Table A5 : Political Competition and Experienced Corruption
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3)
Male 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age −0.039∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban/Rural 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Survey: INDEM 0.005 0.005 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Survey: Courier 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Survey: LiTS 0.116∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Sched End of Term −0.005∗∗ −0.005
(0.002) (0.006)
Federal Election Yr −0.048 −0.048 −0.045
(0.050) (0.050) (0.048)
Sched End Term X Fed Election −0.0001
(0.007)
Constant 0.068∗ 0.068∗ 0.070∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
N 170,861 170,861 133,861
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
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Table A6 : Political Competition and Experienced Corruption
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.040∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age −0.044∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Income 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Urban/Rural 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sched End of Term −0.005∗ −0.003 −0.005∗ −0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Region Mean: Male −1.926∗∗
(0.828)
Region Mean: Education 0.317∗∗∗
(0.050)
Region Mean: Age 0.031
(0.088)
Region Mean: Income −0.028
(0.022)
Region Mean: Urban −0.175∗∗∗
(0.050)
Regn-Yr Mean: Male 0.458∗∗∗
(0.069)
Regn-Yr Mean: Education 0.019
(0.012)
Regn-Yr Mean: Age −0.010
(0.018)
Regn-Yr Mean: Income −0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
Regn-Yr Mean: Urban 0.039∗∗∗
(0.014)
Region Mean: Sched End of Term 0.008
(0.033)
Constant 0.273 −0.179∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.394) (0.047) (0.024) (0.023)
N 143,264 143,264 143,264 143,264
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
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Table A7 : Political Competition and Experienced Corruption
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male 0.040∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.028∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age −0.044∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Income 0.024∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Urban/Rural 0.027∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sched End of Term −0.005∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.009∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log GRP −0.005 −0.016∗ 0.013
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
Pct Russian −0.066 −0.083∗ −0.038
(0.048) (0.048) (0.052)
Log Population 0.024∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Republic/city/AO −0.021 −0.027 −0.013
(0.018) (0.022) (0.020)
Region Mean: Male −1.425∗ −1.359 −1.377
(0.776) (0.855) (0.853)
Region Mean: Education 0.321∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.050) (0.050)
Region Mean: Age 0.105 0.039 0.093
(0.097) (0.088) (0.104)
Region Mean: Income 0.001 −0.084∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.030)
Region Mean: Urban −0.222∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.050) (0.059)
Regn-Yr Mean: Male 0.443∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.081)
Regn-Yr Mean: Education 0.020∗ −0.014
(0.012) (0.015)
Regn-Yr Mean: Age −0.008 0.023
(0.018) (0.023)
Regn-Yr Mean: Income −0.019∗∗∗ −0.010∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Regn-Yr Mean: Urban 0.038∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.014) (0.017)
Region Mean: Sched End of Term −0.143 −0.160 −0.252∗∗ −0.111∗∗ −0.310
(0.391) (0.411) (0.128) (0.056) (0.430)
N 142,558 106,816 142,558 106,816 106,110
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
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Table A8 : Political Competition and Experienced Corruption
DV: Bribery Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.040∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age −0.044∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Income 0.024∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Urban/Rural 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Petrov Democracy −0.014∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗









Sched End of Term 0.004
(0.003)
Region Mean: Male −2.002∗∗ −1.644∗∗ −2.056∗∗
(0.845) (0.791) (0.843)
Region Mean: Education 0.297∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.047) (0.051)
Region Mean: Age 0.013 0.048 0.012
(0.090) (0.099) (0.090)
Region Mean: Income −0.023 −0.010 −0.026
(0.022) (0.025) (0.022)
Region Mean: Urban −0.148∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.055) (0.053)
Regn-Yr Mean: Male 0.509∗∗∗
(0.069)
Regn-Yr Mean: Education 0.012
(0.012)
Regn-Yr Mean: Age −0.009
(0.018)
Regn-Yr Mean: Income −0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
Regn-Yr Mean: Urban 0.043∗∗∗
(0.014)
Petrov Democracy X Sched End Term −0.020∗∗∗
(0.003)
Constant 0.344 −0.185∗∗∗ −0.098 0.358
(0.402) (0.047) (0.398) (0.401)
N 143,254 143,254 142,558 143,254
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
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Table A9 : Political Competition and Experienced Corruption
Bribe Experience Non-Response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Education −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Income 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Urban/Rural −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Survey: Courier 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)












Constant 0.039∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.099∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.031∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.028) (0.052) (0.013) (0.018)
N 130,669 130,669 129,977 130,669 130,669 130,669
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
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Table A10 : Political Competition and Experienced Corruption
Bribe Experience Non-Response to Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male 0.040∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Education 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age −0.043∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Income 0.026∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Urban/Rural 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗







Sched End of Term 0.003 0.002 0.009∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Log GRP −0.019∗ −0.008
(0.010) (0.009)
Pct Russian −0.068 −0.081
(0.057) (0.053)






Petrov Democracy X Sched End Term −0.015∗∗∗
(0.003)
Petrov Democracy −0.023∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.013 0.109 0.165∗∗∗ 0.044 0.164∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.137) (0.059) (0.146) (0.059)
N 149,109 148,396 149,099 148,396 149,099
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors shown in parentheses; all models are linear non-nested multilevel.
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